of these Federal Rules

144. Monitoring of compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out Federal agency air transport, service authorities air traffic(flight control) in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of airspace Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft - violators of the rules for using airspace (hereinafter referred to as violator aircraft) and aircraft - violators of crossing rules state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. If the air traffic services (flight control) authority identifies a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense authority and the aircraft commander, if radio communication is established with it.

146. Air defense authorities provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening to illegally cross or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) being unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting a "Distress" signal;

e) performing flights of letters “A” and “K”;

f) performing search and rescue flights.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) use of airspace without permission from the relevant center of the Unified System under the permitting procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) failure to comply with the conditions specified by the center of the Unified System in the permit to use the airspace;

c) failure to comply with the commands of air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) failure to comply with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

f) flight of a group of aircraft in a number exceeding the number specified in the aircraft flight plan;

g) use of the airspace of the prohibited zone, flight restriction zone without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unscheduled (undeclared) airfield (site), except in cases forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services authority (flight control);

i) failure by the aircraft crew to comply with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except for cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);

(see text in the previous edition)

j) deviation of an aircraft beyond the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, authorized by the air traffic services (flight control) authority, except for cases when such deviation is due to flight safety considerations (avoidance of dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without permission from the air traffic services authority (flight control);

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services authority.

148. When identifying an intruder aircraft, the air defense authorities give a “Mode” signal, meaning a requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

Air defense authorities communicate the “Regime” signal to the relevant centers of the Unified System and begin actions to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in the previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the violating aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the “Mode” signal sent by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in the previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the violating aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is made by:

a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic service routes;

b) heads of duty shifts of regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;

c) operational duty officer of the air defense agency - in other cases.

(see text in the previous edition)

150. The centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace, about the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules.

(see text in the previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an intruder aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases the air defense authorities give the “Carpet” signal. , meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the relevant area of ​​all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in combating intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue missions.

(see text in the previous edition)

Air defense agencies communicate the “Carpet” signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​coverage of the specified signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in the previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to remove aircraft (their landing) from the area of ​​coverage of the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in the previous edition)

152. If the crew of the offending aircraft fails to comply with the command of the air traffic services authority (flight control) to stop violating the procedure for using airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense authorities. Air defense authorities take measures against the offending aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to comply with the commands of duty aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

In the event of a forced landing of an intruder aircraft, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing this type of aircraft.

153. If a threat to flight safety arises, including one related to an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew issues a “Distress” signal. On aircraft equipped with a danger alarm system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the “MTR” signal is additionally given. When receiving a “Distress” and (or) “MTR” signal from the aircraft crew, air traffic services (flight control) authorities are required to accept necessary measures to provide assistance to a crew in distress and immediately transmit data on its location and other necessary information to the centers of the Unified System, aviation search and rescue coordination centers, as well as to air defense authorities.

154. After identifying the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission to further operate an international flight or a flight associated with crossing more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - by the heads of duty shifts of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.

Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects

At the end of the 20th century, the question of creating a single radar field the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and equipment, often duplicating each other and consuming colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

Work on the creation of a federal system for reconnaissance and control of airspace began with the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 1993 “On the organization of air defense in the Russian Federation,” in which the now familiar name was first heard - the federal system of reconnaissance and control of airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The Military Scientific Committee and the Directorate of Radio Technical Troops (RTV) of the High Command of the Air Defense Forces prepared draft reports and regulatory legal documents that formed the basis for the 1994 decrees of the President of the Russian Federation “On the creation of a federal system for reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation” and “ On approval of the Regulations on the Central Interdepartmental Commission of the Federal System of Intelligence and Airspace Control of the Russian Federation.”

The FSR and KVP were assigned the following tasks:

• radar reconnaissance and radar control of the airspace of the Russian Federation;
• operational control of forces and means of radar reconnaissance and radar control airspace;
• organization of interaction between control bodies of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) and air traffic control bodies;
• information support for military command and control systems and air traffic control bodies;
• placement of radio-electronic equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of a unified technical policy.

The information basis of the FSR and KVP was made up of units of RTV air defense, communications troops and radio technical support of the Air Force, radar surveillance of the Navy, and radar positions of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (US ATM). Radar reconnaissance units of the Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces could be used by special order.

Thus, the unified radar system of the federal system was supposed to consist of the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as a control system, collection and processing of radar information, the basis of which was the command posts (CP) of radio technical units and formations , reconnaissance and information centers of command posts of formations and formations (districts and zones) of air defense.

In their development, the FSR and KVP, as its ideologists imagined, had to go through a number of stages of development, while it was necessary to make maximum use of the potential of the radar system of the RF Armed Forces:

1st stage. Preparatory (1993).

2nd stage. Priority work on the creation of the FSR and KVP (January - September 1994).

3rd stage. Deployment of the main elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones (October - December 1994).

4th stage. Deployment of dual-use information elements and testing of technical means of a unified automated radar system - EA radar (1995–2001).

5th stage. Complete transition to EA radar (2001–2005).

The FSR and KVP have been formed for two decades. Practical activities to create a federal system began in October 1994, when, on behalf of the President of Russia, the central interdepartmental commission of the FSR and KVP (TsMVK) began to function under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces, Colonel General of Aviation V. A. Prudnikov. At the origins of the creation of the federal system were professionals in their field, military and civilian leaders and specialists in the field of air defense and air traffic control: V. A. Prudnikov, V. G. Shelkovnikov, V. P. Sinitsyn, V. F. Migunov, G. K. Dubrov, A. I. Aleshin, A. R. Balychev, Ya. V. Bezel, V. I. Mazov, A. S. Sumin, V. P. Zhila, V. K. Demedyuk, V. I. Ivasenko, V. I. Kozlov, S. N. Karas, V. M. Korenkov, A. E. Kislukha, B. V. Mikhailov, B. I. Kushneruk, N. F. Zobov, A. A. Koptsev, R. L. Danelov, N. N. Titarenko, A. I. Travnikov, A. I. Popov, B. V. Vasiliev, V. I. Zakharyin and others.

During the first four stages, coordinating bodies of the federal system were created and began to work: TsMVK FSR and KVP, six zonal interdepartmental commissions (for air defense zones), two interdepartmental commissions with zonal rights (in two air defense regions in the west and east of the country).

Regulatory legal documents were developed and approved regulating the creation of dual-use information elements of the FSR and KVP in air defense zones and regions: “Regulations on dual-use units of the Russian Ministry of Defense”, “Regulations on dual-use positions of the Russian Ministry of Transport”, General Agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia “On the creation, operation and operation of dual-use units and positions.”

Rice. 1. Assessment of reduction in resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment RTV Air Force
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

As a result of this work, agreements were reached between the authorized structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport on the creation of 30 positions and 10 dual-use units.

The first practical steps to create dual-use information elements of the federal system were made thanks to the persistence and enthusiasm of specialists from the Radio Engineering Troops (RTV), who performed the functions of the CMVC apparatus, as well as EU ATM enterprises and enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC).

The experience of information interaction between military and civilian authorities has shown that the use of dual-purpose RTV units in the village. Chalna, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Kyzyl, Kosh-Agach made it possible to reduce the economic costs of enterprises in the interests of solving EU ATM problems by at least 25–30 percent. RTV radars of types 5N87, 1L117 and P-37 were used as sources of radar information.

In turn, the use of TRLK-10 and P-37 radar at dual-purpose positions of the North Caucasus Air Traffic Control Center, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Perm, Kolpashevo ATM centers made it possible to maintain the quality of control over the use of airspace within the boundaries of responsibility for air defense in the context of a reduction in personnel and number of RTV Air Force.

However, the subject of FSR and KVP, despite the very high level of documents in accordance with which it was necessary to carry out work, was financed within the framework of the state defense order on a residual basis. And R&D on FSR and KVP in these years was financed at the level of 15 percent of the need.

Radio altimeter PRV-13 at one of the sites of the Kapustin Yar training ground. Intended to work as a means of measuring altitude as part of the 5N87 radar complex together with other rangefinders (P-37, P-35M, 5N84, 5N84A)
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

As of July 1, 1997, it was not possible to conclude a single agreement (local agreement) on the creation of dual-use information elements due to the lack of real opportunities for mutual settlements between military and civilian users of radar information.

There is an urgent need to have priority funding when creating a federal system. Therefore, in December 1998, a special working group was formed from representatives of the apparatus of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Federal aviation service(FAS) of Russia, which prepared an analytical note on the FSR and KVP for a report to the country’s top leadership.

The note noted that the situation with the creation of the FSR and KVP poses not only a serious threat to Russia’s national security, but also causes lost profits from possible revenues Money to the federal budget through the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia from foreign and domestic airlines using Russian airspace.

It was stated that the FSR and KVP are the national treasure of Russia, one of the most important fragments of the country’s unified information space. She needed immediate and comprehensive government support.

Rice. 2. Indicators of increasing the area of ​​controlled airspace
Graphics by Yulia GORELOVA

The issue was resolved at the level of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov. In the shortest possible time, the materials of the analytical note were reviewed at all levels and instructions were given for further actions. The Russian Ministry of Defense, together with interested departments, prepared and agreed on projects necessary documents and in August 1999, a decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On priority measures of state support for the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation” was issued.

The decree identified the state customers and the main contractor for the work to improve the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. The Government of the Russian Federation was instructed to ensure the development and approval in 1999 of the Federal Target Program (FTP) for improving the FSR and CVP for 2000–2010, providing for the financing of this program from the federal budget.

Over the course of several years, the draft Federal Target Program was reviewed, adjusted, clarified, reduced, supplemented, but was not submitted to the government for consideration. In 2001, the Main Control Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation became interested in how the decisions taken on the creation of the FSR and KVP were implemented, and conducted an inspection of the state of affairs.

The audit showed that the government and a number of ministries (the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Finance) did not take proper measures to implement the adopted regulatory legal acts. The state of affairs in creating the FSR and KVP was considered unsatisfactory and did not meet national security requirements. It was recommended to take urgent measures to correct the current situation. However, even such a harsh assessment did not change the situation for the better.

At the same time, life did not stand still. Troops and enterprises involved in the use of airspace and air traffic control needed to be given some kind of tool to equip dual-use information elements with dual-use track radar systems (TRLC DN).

Specialists from interested structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development prepared a draft decision on shared financing of equipping dual-use radar positions (TRLP DN), which was submitted to the commanders-in-chief of the Air Force for approval by the heads of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

PRV-13 were also used as part of the automated radio engineering units of the ACS facilities 5N55M (Mezha-M), 5N53-N (Nizina-N), 5N53-U (Nizina-U) of the Luch-2(3) system. ,86Zh6 (“Field”), 5N60 (“Base”) of the Luch-4 system. PRV-13 interfaced with the objects of the automated control system "Vozdukh-1M", "Vozdukh-1P" (with ASPD data acquisition and transmission equipment and "Kaskad-M" instrument guidance equipment), with the air defense control system ASURK-1MA, ASURK-1P and cabin K -9 S-200 air defense systems
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

The decision was approved in November 2003. Starting from 2004, it was planned to finance the equipping of air traffic control systems on the principles of shared participation within the framework of the state defense order and the subprogram “Unified Air Traffic Management System” of the Federal Target Program “Modernization” transport system Russia (2002–2010)".

The equipment for equipping the DN TRLP was identified as the DN TRLC "Lira-T" produced by JSC "Lianozovsky Electromechanical Plant". In accordance with this decision, given the absence of a federal target program for the FSR and KVP, work was carried out over several years. The main technical solutions for equipping the Lira-T DN TRLC were tested during state tests at the Velikiye Luki DN TRLC. For the period 2004–2006 more than a dozen DN TRLPs were equipped: in 2004 – Omolon, Markovo, Keperveem, Pevek, Shmidta metro station; in 2005 – Okhotsk, Okha, Nakhodka, Arkhara; in 2006 – metro stations Kamenny, Polyarny, Dalnerechensk, Ulan-Ude.

The work done made it possible to have 45 dual-use information elements by the end of 2006 (33 percent of the approved lists). This result was achieved to a large extent thanks to the active position of the Central Military Commission, which different years were headed by the current commanders-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces, and since 1998 - by the Air Force.

The main burden of organizational and technical support for the creation of the FSR and KVP fell on the TsMVK apparatus, the functions of which were performed by the RTV Directorate. In 2003, the center of this very important work became the specially created 136th Coordination and Regulatory Department (KNO) of the FSR and Air Force KVP.

The management of the department was entrusted to A.E. Kislukha, who since 1994 had been the executive secretary of the Central Military Commission and led the functional direction of work on creating elements of the federal system in the RTV Directorate of the main command of the Air Defense Forces, and later the Air Force.

The formation of the KNO, of course, eliminated a number of problems of coordinating the work of various departments, but the department did not solve the main task of testing technical equipment. Due to this and a number of other reasons, it was not possible to solve the main task of technical re-equipment with dual-use equipment and the transition to EA radar by 2005. The determining factor was the lack of targeted funding for research, development and serial supply of dual-use technical equipment to improve the FSR and KVP.

Only in January 2006, by decree of the government of the Russian Federation, the concept of the federal target program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation for the period until 2010” was approved, and then in June of the same year, decree of the government of the Russian Federation No. 345 “On the federal target program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007–2010).”

Three-coordinate combat mode radar (centimeter wave range) ST-68UM
Photo: Leonid YAKUTIN

A lot of work on the preparation of draft documents was carried out by the leaders and specialists of the Air Force High Command: A. V. Boyarintsev, A. I. Aleshin, G. I. Nimira, A. V. Pankov, S. V. Grinko, specialists from the production and technological policy department and civil products (PTP PGN) OJSC "Concern Air Defense "Almaz-Antey": G. P. Bendersky, A. I. Ponomarenko, E. G. Yakovlev, V. V. Khramov, O. O. Gapotchenko, managers and specialists of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation: A. V. Shramchenko, D. V. Savitsky, E. A. Voitovsky, N. N. Titarenko, N. I. Torba, A. Lomakin, as well as managers and specialists of the FSUE State ATM Corporation ": V. R. Gulchenko, V. M. Libov, K. K. Kaplya, V. V. Zakharov, K. V. Elistratov.

The concept for the development of the FSR and STOL of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2015 and further prospects determined the main directions of organizational, military-technical and economic policy for the development of the FSR and STOL in the interests of solving the problems of aerospace defense, organizing air traffic and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in airspace of the Russian Federation.

The concept reflects the agreed positions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, as well as other interested federal executive authorities on the main directions of development and application of the FSR and KVP in Peaceful time.

Ideologically, a new stage in the development of the FSR and KVP was recognized. In its development, the FSR and KVP must go through five main stages:

• Stage I – 1994–2005;
• Stage II – 2006–2010;
• Stage III – short-term perspective (2011–2015);
• Stage IV – medium term (2016–2020);
• Stage V – long-term perspective (after 2020).

At stage I from the moment of the creation of the FSR and KVP, the basis for building a federal system in accordance with the regulatory legal documents in force at that time was the principle of the coordinated use of radar equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in joint basing areas. The implementation of this principle was achieved by centralized (unified) planning of the use of radar equipment in air defense zones (districts).

At the same time, the exchange of information about the air situation between the dual-use radio technical units (RTP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the regional centers of the EU ATM, as well as between the dual-purpose radar positions (RLP DN) of the Russian Ministry of Transport and the radio technical units of the Air Force and Navy was carried out mainly in a non-automated way.

The source of financing for work related to the creation and use of dual-use units and positions were funds received by the Russian Ministry of Transport through air navigation fees, as well as funds allocated by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the construction and maintenance of the Russian Armed Forces.

The lack of a mechanism for targeted financing of activities for the creation of FSR and KVP did not allow organizing the use of information about the air situation from the EU ATM radar station located in areas where the air defense forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense do not create a radar field. This factor, as well as the lack of information and technical interaction (interface) of automated systems of EU ATM and air defense units, did not lead to a significant increase in the efficiency of the functioning of the FSR and STOL.

At stage II creation and development of the FSR and KVP, after many years of effort, guaranteed state support for the deployment of the FSR and KVP was finally achieved within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP of the Russian Federation (2007–2010).”

Three main areas of activity were planned:

1. Comprehensive work to improve the FSR and KVP, including:

• development of design documentation for information interaction between EU ATM centers and air defense control bodies;
• development of documentation for the reconstruction of EU ATM centers;
• development of design documentation for the reconstruction of dual-use route radar positions of the EU ATM.

2. Reconstruction of dual-use route radar positions of the EU ATM.

3. Reconstruction of EU ATM centers in terms of equipping air traffic control systems with air defense control units.

The main task of the Federal Target Program is to create the material and technical base of the FSR and KVP in the Central, North-Western and Eastern regions of the Russian Federation by equipping the EC ATM Center with information and technical interaction systems (ITI) with air defense control bodies, as well as modernizing the RLP of the Ministry of Transport of Russia to perform dual-use functions.

General coordination of the activities of the FSR and the KVP at the second stage of its development was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation, formed by decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2006.

A significant assistance in the work was the release in 2008 of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On measures to improve the management of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation.”

The Decree legally consolidated the organizational and technical changes in the field of FSR and KVP, which actually occurred after the emergence of a new coordinating body represented by the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of the Airspace of the Russian Federation (IVC IVP and KVP), and also established that the only supplier (lead contractor) when placing orders for the supply of goods, performance of work, provision of services for state needs in the interests of the defense of the country and the economy of the state in the field of use, reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, OJSC is the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern.

During the implementation of the Federal Target Program, much attention was paid to the issue of creating SITV, to achieve the effectiveness of which a standard structural diagram of SITV centers of the EU ATM centers with control bodies and air defense command posts was developed. The scheme provides for the implementation of two methods of issuing information about the air situation from dual-use information elements: centralized and decentralized.

To organize direct interaction between the EU ATM center and air defense authorities, an interaction dispatcher is appointed from the combat crew of the duty shift of the command post of the air defense formation. The dispatcher's workstation for interaction with air defense authorities is installed in the ES ATM center and includes technical means for displaying radar and planning dispatch information and means for communication with officials of the ES ATM center and the command post of the air defense connection.

This decision has stood the test of time (1999–2005). The so-called ulnar interaction between air defense control command officers and dispatchers was carried out directly at the EU ATM centers in air defense zones. The proposed technical solutions within the framework of the Federal Targeted Program significantly increase the possibilities of interaction.

The technical solution to the problem of information and technical interaction is based on a set of software and hardware tools (CPTS), which makes it possible to receive radar and planning information from automated air traffic control systems (ATC systems) of EC ATM centers, as well as receive, process and integrate radar information. information from TRLP DN, which are part of the EU ATM center, for subsequent transfer to the air defense command post automation equipment complexes.

The technical means of SITV also include remote sets of subscriber equipment (RKAO), complexes of communications and transmission of air situation data (CSPD). The methodological apparatus for designing and evaluating indicators and parameters of the Federal Target Program, used in the design of Federal Target Program measures, was developed at the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the State Scientific Research Institute "Aeronavigation" and the Scientific and Technical Center "Promtekhaero".

To carry out the complex of works provided for by the Federal Target Program, a cooperation of co-executors was created at OJSC Air Defense Concern Almaz-Antey, which included more than 10 enterprises and organizations. A large amount of work in the main areas of activity was carried out by the Department of PTP PGN, MNIIPA, VNIIRA, the company NITA, NPO Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant, STC Promtekhaero, LOTES-TM, Radiophysics, State Research Institute Aeronavigation, 24th NEIU and the 2nd Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In order to reconstruct the DN TRLC, based on the requirements of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport, JSC NPO Lianozovo Electromechanical Plant specially developed and successfully passed state tests of the Sopka-2 TRLC DN.

TRLK DN "Sopka-2" is designed to equip dual-purpose radar positions of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and provide radar information to the PU of the Russian Armed Forces, involved in air defense combat duty in peacetime, to solve problems of detection, measurement of three coordinates, assessment of movement parameters, determination of nationality air objects, as well as receiving additional (flight) information and receiving “Alarm” (“Distress”) signals from aircraft located in its coverage area, and issuing generalized information about the air situation to display equipment or to the ATC system of the EU ATM and to CP (PU) of the RF Armed Forces.

The work carried out during the II stage on the deployment of SITV in nine EU ATM centers (Moscow, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Magadan, Yakutsk, Rostov, St. Petersburg, Murmansk) and the modernization of 46 air traffic control radars made it possible to create in the Central, Eastern and Northern -In the Western regions of the country, fragments of a unified radar system of the FSR and KVP, built on the principle of information and technical interaction of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.

At the same time, the exchange of information about the air situation between the EC ATM centers equipped with SITV and the command posts of aerospace defense brigades is carried out in an automated mode, and at most modernized positions, DN TRLCs are deployed, which include equipment for state identification of the EC GRLO and measuring the flight altitude of the observed airborne aircraft. The work carried out at stage II to improve the FSR and CVP made it possible to increase the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (at an altitude of 1000 meters) by more than 1.7 million square meters. km, reduce the resource consumption of radio-electronic equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense by almost 1.4 million hours and ensure the required level of air traffic safety by reducing the risk of accidents from 13x10 -7 to 4x10 -7.

The ending follows.

Alexander KISLUKHA

I reported to the President that the Aerospace Forces, in accordance with the army and navy rearmament program adopted in 2012, have already received 74 new radar stations. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance of the country's airspace looks good. However, there remain serious unresolved problems in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are essential conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the skies above it.

In Russia, the solution to this problem is entrusted to the radar of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficiently, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control became increasingly complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially by foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and low level equipment civil aviation respondents of the unified system of state radar identification.

Control over flights in the “lower” airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megacities and especially in the Moscow zone, has become sharply more complicated. At the same time, the activities of terrorist organizations capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft have intensified.

The airspace control system is also influenced by the emergence of qualitatively new surveillance equipment: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) equipment, when, in addition to secondary radar information from the monitored aircraft, parameters are transmitted directly to the controller from the aircraft’s navigation instruments, and etc.

In order to streamline all available surveillance means, in 1994 it was decided to create a unified system of radar equipment of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first regulatory document that laid the foundation for the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, we were talking about an interdepartmental dual-use system. The purpose of creating the FSR and KVP was declared to combine the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in Russian airspace.

As work was progressing to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles of the coordinated use of civilian and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Rosaviation).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out through the State Armaments Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007-2015).” Was approved as the lead contractor for the implementation of the Federal Target Program. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the minimum acceptable level, but the work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERLS).

Until 2015, the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces was growing steadily, and the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the Federal Target Program were completed within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (ERLS). Such a reconnaissance and airspace control system was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed for the continuation of the program that had been started but not completed in order to fully deploy a unified reconnaissance and airspace control system over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the “Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2016 and beyond,” approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, assumes the full-scale deployment of a unified federal system by the end of last year.

However, the corresponding federal target program expired in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with, to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015)" with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were supposed to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin’s order was never implemented, and work to improve the federal reconnaissance and airspace control system has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted Federal Target Program expired, and the new one was never approved.

Previously, coordination of relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was assigned to the Interdepartmental Commission for the Use and Control of Airspace, formed by presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary regulatory framework.

Moreover, in 2015, the position of general designer was eliminated in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control. Coordination of the FSR and KVP bodies on state level has actually stopped.

At the same time, competent specialists now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-use radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with a reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack.

A new dual-use system must have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is only possible by solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation and the strengthening of threats from aerospace in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new type of armed forces - the Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is ensuring effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the likely directions of attack by aerospace attack weapons - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean Peninsula.

This necessarily requires new funding for the FSR and KVP through the relevant federal target program or in another form, the re-establishment of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example until 2030.

Moreover, if previously the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period the priority tasks will be to warn of an air attack and provide information support for combat operations to repel missile and air strikes.

- military observer for Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the main headquarters of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy (1998).
Columnist "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

This problem can be solved using affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty field for airspace control at extremely low altitudes (AL) is complex and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to consolidate the orders of radar stations (radars), the creation of an extensive communication network, the saturation of the ground space with sources of radio emissions and passive reflections, the complexity of the ornithological and meteorological situation, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of regulations relating to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments when monitoring surface space are separated. All this significantly complicates the possibility of organizing radar monitoring of airspace in the WWII.

Why do we need a continuous field of surface airspace monitoring?

For what purposes is it necessary to create continuous field monitoring of surface airspace during WWII in peacetime? Who will be the main consumer of the information received?

Experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit, limited in goals, objectives and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace during WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border Service - above the state border, and no higher than 10 meters from the ground. Unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for takeoff or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around sensitive objects.

Ministry of Emergency Situations - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of residence of protected persons.

This situation indicates the absence of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the low-altitude surface environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace during WWII was transferred from the responsibility of the state to the responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with current Federal airspace regulations, for flights in Class G airspace ( small aircraft) a notification procedure for the use of airspace was established. From now on, flights in this class of airspace can be carried out without obtaining air traffic control clearance.

If we consider this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, and in the near future, passenger “flying motorcycles”, then a whole complex of problems arises related to ensuring the safety of the use of airspace at extremely low altitudes above settlements, industrially hazardous areas.

Who will control traffic in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadcopter for flights (attention!) outside airfields by 2020. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law “On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aircraft.” In accordance with this law, all unmanned vehicles are subject to registration. aircrafts(UAV) weighing more than 250 g.

In order to register a UAV, you must submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form indicating the details of the drone and its owner. However, judging by the way things are going with the registration of manned light and ultra-light aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now two different organizations are responsible for registering light (ultra-light) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a consequence, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide monitoring field in the PMV in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hampered by restrictions on sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of radio electronic systems. Existing legislation strictly regulates the radiation regimes of radio electronic devices, especially in populated areas. This is strictly taken into account when designing new distribution networks.

So, what's the bottom line? The need for monitoring of surface airspace at PMV objectively remains and will only increase.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining a field in WWI, the inconsistency of the legal framework, the absence of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

There is an urgent need to begin developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of WWI airspace.

The maximum height of the boundary of Class G airspace varies up to 300 meters in Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in areas of Eastern Siberia. In recent years, Russian civil aviation has seen an intensive increase in the number of registered aircraft and aviation operators. general purpose(AND HE). As of 2015, over 7 thousand aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that in Russia as a whole, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) are registered by legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft. The remaining 70-80% fly without an operator's license or without registering aircraft at all.

According to GLONASS NP estimates, in Russia annually sales of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) increase by 5-10%, and by 2025, 2.5 million of them will be purchased in the Russian Federation. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS could account for about 3-5% of the global total.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we approach with an open mind the means of creating continuous monitoring of PMV in peacetime, then this problem can be solved by accessible, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such means are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. SNS Research has published a report, Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 2013-2023, and expects that by 2023, both sectors will see more than 100,000 investments in the development of such radar technology. 10 billion US dollars, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will be almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the illumination transmitter and radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. A bistatic radar consists of a companion illumination transmitter and a radar receiver, spaced apart from the base.

Emissions from transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used as accompanying illumination. The illumination transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and a delayed echo signal from the target relative to it.

If there is a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PAL is the vast coverage areas of broadcasting and communication signals. Thus, the zones of various operators cellular communications almost completely overlap, mutually complementing each other. In addition to the cellular communications illumination zones, the country's territory is covered by overlapping radiation fields from terrestrial TV broadcast transmitters, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position radar monitoring network in the PMV, an extensive communication network is required. Dedicated secure APN channels for transmitting packet information based on M2M telematics technology have such capabilities. Typical characteristics bandwidth of such channels at peak load is no worse than 20 Kb/sec, but according to application experience, it is almost always much higher.

JSC NPP KANT is conducting work to study the possibility of detecting targets in the illumination field of cellular networks. During the research, it was found that the widest coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is provided by the communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication at speeds of up to 170 Kb/sec between elements of a multi-position radar , separated by regional distances.

The work carried out within the framework of R&D showed that typical suburban territorial frequency planning of a cellular communication network provides the ability to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflective surface of less than 1 square meter. m.

The high height of the suspension of base stations on antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems make it possible to solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using stealthy STEALTH technology using spaced location methods.

As part of R&D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular communication networks, a passive receiving module (RPM) detector of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field testing of a PPM model within the boundaries of a cellular communication network of the GSM 900 standard with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the possibility of detecting at the designed flight range a Yak-52 type aircraft, a UAV - a DJI Phantom 2 type quadcopter, was achieved , moving automobile and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial-energy detection characteristics and the capabilities of the GSM signal to resolve targets were assessed. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping information from the test area to a remote surveillance indicator has been demonstrated.

Thus, to create a continuous round-the-clock multi-frequency overlapping location field in the surface space on the PMV, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the integration of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcasting) to short UHF (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data for this are available. We can safely say that the developed information base, technologies and the very principle of hidden PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: “Scheme of a bistatic radar.” As an example, the current coverage area of ​​the borders of the Southern Federal District by the signal of the cellular operator "Beeline" is given.

To assess the scale of placement of backlight transmitters, let’s take the average Tver region as an example. It has an area of ​​84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people there are 43 radio broadcast transmitters broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analogue transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters for television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio communication facilities of various types (mainly cellular base stations) with radiation power ranging from a few mW in an urban area to several hundred W in a suburban area. The height of the backlight transmitter suspension varies from 50 to 270 meters.

Ashuluk training ground. Radar station "Sky-UE". This three-dimensional radar has no foreign analogues. Photo: Georgy DANILOV Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects
At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a unified radar field for the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and equipment, often duplicating each other and consuming colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

Ending. Beginning in No. 2, 2012

At the same time, due to limited spatial and functional capabilities, the current FSR and KVP do not provide a sufficient level of integration of departmental radar systems and are unable to fulfill the full scope of the tasks assigned to it.

The limitations and disadvantages of the created FSR and KVP can be briefly defined as follows:
SITV TC EC ATM with air defense control bodies are deployed not throughout the country, but only in the Central, Eastern and partially North-Western and Caucasian-Ural zones of responsibility for air defense (56% of what is required for the full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL);
less than 40% of the RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia were modernized in order to perform dual-use functions, while the RLP DN of the Ministry of Defense of Russia ceased to be system-forming in the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP;
Information about the air situation on spatial, qualitative and probabilistic-temporal characteristics issued by the EC EC ATM and RLP often does not meet the modern requirements of air defense control authorities;
radar, flight and planning information received from the EC EC ATM is used in solving air defense (AOD) problems ineffectively due to the low level of equipment of the air defense control center (AOD) with adapted automation systems;
joint automated processing of data from various sources of information from the RF Armed Forces and the ATM Union is not provided, which significantly reduces the reliability of recognition and identification of air objects in peacetime;
the level of equipment of FSR and STOL facilities with high-speed digital means and communication and data transmission systems does not meet modern requirements for the efficiency and reliability of the exchange of radar, flight and planning information;
there are shortcomings in the implementation of a unified technical policy in the creation, production, supply and operation of dual-use equipment used in the FSR and KVP;
coordination of activities on technical equipment objects allocated to the FSR and KVP, within the framework of various federal targeted programs, including the modernization of the EU ATM and the improvement of control and communication systems of the RF Armed Forces;
existing regulatory legal documents do not fully reflect the issues of using SITV, RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense, involved for radar support of EU ATM centers, as well as the use of state identification means of the EU GRLO installed on the RLP of DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia;
The capabilities of zonal interdepartmental commissions on the use and air defense systems for coordinating the activities of territorial bodies of the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Russian Ministry of Defense on the use and operation of technical means of the FSR and air defense systems in areas of responsibility for air defense are practically not realized.

Mobile altimeter type PRV-13
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To eliminate these shortcomings and realize the national interests of the Russian Federation in the field of use and STOL, it is necessary to have a full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL in all regions of Russia, further integration with the EU ATM based on the use of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, modernized and advanced means of radar, automation and communication primarily dual-use.

The strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL is to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) problems, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, ensuring air traffic safety based on integrated use radar systems and equipment of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, equipment and resources.

In the weekly “Military-Industrial Courier” (No. 5 dated 02/08/2012), the commander of the East Kazakhstan region, Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko, drew public attention to the fact that the current state of the low-altitude radar field within the Russian Federation is not the best configuration.

Therefore, customers and performers are full of enthusiasm and find mutually acceptable solutions in the most difficult situations and the casuistry of modern legislation in the interests of implementing the Federal Target Program.

Based on the results of stage II of the Federal Target Program, a significant increase in the efficiency and quality of solving problems of air defense, protection of the state border in the airspace, radar support for aviation flights and air traffic management in important air directions should be ensured with a limited composition of forces, means and resources of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with the Aerospace Defense Concept for the period up to 2016 and beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in April 2006, one of the main directions for building the East Kazakhstan region is currently the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP throughout the country.

To ensure full integration of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport and the formation on this basis of a single information space about the state of the air situation as one of the main areas of concentration of efforts in building the country's aerospace defense further development It is advisable to conduct FSR and KVP in the following stages:
Stage III – short term (2011–2015);
Stage IV – medium term (2016–2020);
Stage V – long-term perspective (after 2020).

The main task of developing the FSR and KVP for the short term is the deployment of the FSR and KVP in all regions of Russia. At the same time, during this period, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive modernization of the EA radar in the interests of increasing the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM bodies of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation to solve air defense (AOR) problems and increase the area of ​​controlled airspace.

Radar station 22Zh6 "Desna"
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To create a radar field with improved parameters, a decision was required to continue work within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP (2007–2010)” for the period until 2015. The matter, which is necessary for the country’s defense capability, was not “babbled out” in the authorities, as is often the case , it received a logical continuation - the Federal Target Program was extended until 2015 in accordance with Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 2011 No. 98.

The main task of the development of the FSR and KVP for the medium term (after 2016) and long-term (after 2020) is the creation of a promising integrated dual-use radar system (IDLS DN) of the FSR and KVP in the interests of forming a unified information space about the state of the air situation for authorities air defense management (VKO) and EU ATM.

For the timely completion of the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP, it is necessary, first of all, not to miss the organizational and technical issues:
creation of a permanent interdepartmental working group of representatives of interested ministries and departments, scientific organizations and industrial enterprises under the Interdepartmental Internal Affairs Committee of the IVP and KVP for the purpose of promptly resolving problematic issues and preparing proposals on current issues;
preparation of proposals for the formation of a specialized department in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as the formation of a new 136 KNO FSR and KVP Air Force to coordinate work to improve the federal system on the part of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Implementation of the concept by 2016 should allow:
carry out the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP based on the creation of fragments of the EA radar in all regions of the country and thereby provide the prerequisites for the deployment of an reconnaissance and warning system for an aerospace attack;
improve the quality of solving problems of ensuring national security, defense capability and the economy of the state in the field of use and air defense of the Russian Federation;
bring regulatory legal documents in the field of use and control of airspace into compliance with the current legislation of the Russian Federation, taking into account the reform of the RF Armed Forces, the creation and development of the Air Navigation System (ANS) of Russia;
ensure the implementation of a unified technical policy in the development, production, deployment, operation and application of dual-use systems and equipment in the field of use and airborne spacecraft;
create conditions for the accelerated development of domestic science and technology in the field of exploration and surface-to-air missions;
reduce the total state costs for the maintenance and development of radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport.

In addition, the implementation of the concept until 2016 will ensure compliance with ICAO requirements for the level of air traffic safety (according to the criterion of disaster risk).

In the near future (until 2016), priority activities for the development of the FSR and KVP, in addition to work within the framework of the Federal Target Program “Improving the FSR and KVP (2007–2015)”, as well as scientific and technical support for FTP activities, should be carried out in the following areas :
Research work commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at conducting advanced systemic research on the modernization and development of the FSR and KVP;
R&D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at the practical implementation of the main provisions of this concept in two main areas: comprehensive modernization of the EA radar and the creation of the head section of the promising IR DN radar;
serial deliveries of new equipment, including dual-use equipment, to FSR and KVP facilities that are part of the RF Armed Forces.

Federal Target Program “Modernization of the EU ATM (2009–2015)”.

With such a distribution of activities for each area of ​​work, the implementation of its specific, but interconnected tasks with other work is ensured, and duplication between them is eliminated. In addition, it seems necessary to also organize:
introduction of new means and technologies for identifying and identifying air objects, taking into account modern conditions for airspace control in peacetime;
improvement of interspecific interaction of surveillance and control systems of air and surface space based on the use of over-the-horizon radar (OG radar), automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) systems and promising sources of information;
implementation of integrated digital communication systems based on advanced telecommunication technologies for prompt and sustainable exchange of information between objects.

Solution to the problem of automatic remote delivery of key information for equipment for determining nationality using a hardware-software method using existing communication channels intended for issuing radar information.

Implementation of the concept in the medium and long term (after 2016) will allow:
achieve the strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL - to ensure the required efficiency of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving air defense (VKO) tasks, protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, as well as the required level of air traffic safety in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources;
create an air traffic control system and form on its basis a unified information space about the state of the air situation in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and other ministries and departments;
ensure the introduction of promising means and technologies for identifying air defenses and automatically identifying the degree of their danger;
significantly reduce the cost of operating dual-use surveillance and control equipment due to their operation in automatic mode.

The implementation of the concept will also contribute to the integration of the Russian ANS into the Eurasian and global air navigation systems.

The goal of the development of the FSR and KVP after the completion of the main stages of development, it seems, may be the creation on the basis of the EA radar of a promising IRL DN, ensuring the unification of departmental radar systems of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Transport and the formation on this basis of a single information space about the state of the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia and other ministries and departments.

The creation of IRLS DN will eliminate departmental and systemic contradictions through the introduction of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, the use of modernized and promising radar, automation and communications equipment, primarily dual-use, as well as the implementation of a unified technical policy in the field of use and STOL.

A promising IRLS should include:
a network of unified dual-use information sources (UII DN), providing acquisition, preliminary processing and delivery of information about the air situation in accordance with the requirements of consumers of various departments;
a network of territorial centers for joint information processing (TC SOI) about the air situation;
integrated digital telecommunications network (IDTN).

The main consumers of the information provided by the Air Traffic Control System are the Air Defense Command Center (VKO) and the EC ATM Center.

The DN IRLS should be built on a network principle, which will provide access to any information consumer to any DN UII or SOI TC (subject to restrictions on access rights).

The composition of the technical means of all DN IUIs must be unified and include the following information, processing and communication components (modules):
primary radars (PRL);
secondary radars (SSR), ensuring the receipt of information from the aircraft in all current request-response modes;
ground-based radar means of state identification of the EU GRLO (NRZ);
ADS system receiving devices;
devices for automatic processing and integration of information from the above sources;
terminal devices for interfacing with an integrated digital telecommunications network in order to provide various types communications (data, speech, video, etc.).

Means for obtaining information about the air situation (PRL, VRL, NRZ, ADS) can be integrated in various versions.

UII DN should be created on the basis of existing dual-use information elements of three types:
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces);
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces), solving the tasks of stolport and ensuring aviation flights (flights) in peacetime;
RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia (EU ATM).

Moreover, in the period 2016–2020. the head section of the IR DN should be created in one of the regions of Russia, and subsequently the deployment of IRLS DN should be ensured in all regions of the country. It is advisable to identify the most developed fragment of the federal system in the north-west of the country as the head section of the DN IRLS.

Within the framework of the head section of the GU IRLS DN, it is necessary to use the existing systems and means of the EA radar, ensuring information and technical interaction between air defense control bodies (VKO) and the EC EC ATM, as well as to deploy promising radar, automation and communication tools that implement new technologies for surveillance and STOL and ensuring the construction of UII DN and SOI TC.

Of course, it is highly desirable that plans are carried out. But the question naturally arises: how effective is the airspace reconnaissance and control system as a reconnaissance and warning subsystem of an aerospace attack of the Russian aerospace defense system?

It makes no sense today to restore the airspace radar control system that the mighty USSR once had. Modern-level air defense systems must ensure the solution of assigned combat missions without pushing the “forefield” to the limit. As a last resort, highly mobile long-range radar detection and control systems should operate.

In his article on national security issues, published on February 20, 2012 in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vladimir Putin drew attention to the fact that in modern conditions our country cannot rely only on diplomatic and economic methods of resolving contradictions and resolving conflicts.

Russia faces the task of developing its military potential within the framework of a containment strategy and at the level of defense sufficiency. The Armed Forces, intelligence services and other security agencies must be prepared to quickly and effectively respond to new challenges. This is a necessary condition for Russia to feel secure, and for our country’s arguments to be accepted by partners in various international formats.

The joint efforts of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and the military-industrial complex to improve the FSR and KVP will significantly improve the spatial and information capabilities of the East Kazakhstan region and the Air Force.

Already today, operational-strategic commands formed throughout the country can and should make maximum effective use of the spatial potential of the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP. Do they actually use and how do they improve the methods of combat operations of active branches of the armed forces, having such a system?

During the exercises, do the air defense forces on duty practice their actions aimed at suppressing airspace violations in those regions where today, through the reconstruction of the TDRP of the DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the reconstruction of the EU ATM centers of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation, equipping them with air defense control systems, the information capabilities of the lost in 1990s radar field? Have the issues of determining the nationality of air objects been resolved on the principle of “friend or foe”?

Probably, the widest circles of the Russian public and the country's expert community would be interested in knowing how effectively the created unified FSR and KVP radar system works within the current boundaries of responsibility for air defense. We should not be tormented today and in the historically foreseeable future by the question: is Russia in danger of radar blindness?
Sergey Vasilievich SERGEEV
deputy general director– Head of SPKB OJSC NPO LEMZ
Alexander Evgenievich KISLUKHA
candidate technical sciences, Advisor on FSR and KVP to the Deputy General Director - Head of the Special Design Bureau of JSC NPO LEMZ, Colonel