The principle of creating a continuous radar field. On some problems of monitoring compliance with the procedure for using airspace Radar control of airspace

A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective intelligence and control system airspace. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of radar reconnaissance units and means has led to the fact that today there are open areas over the territory of the Russian Federation state border and interior regions of the country. JSC NPP Kant, part of the state corporation Russian Technologies, is conducting R&D to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced radar system for semi-active location in the radiation field of the systems cellular communication, radio broadcasting and television based on land and space (Rubezh complex).

Today, the manifold accuracy of guidance of weapon systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AEA), and toughened requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow Peaceful time“to pollute” the populated areas of the country using ultra-high frequency radiation (microwave radiation) from high-potential radar stations (radars). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological welfare of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards are established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars exceeds these standards many times over. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying stealth targets, which requires compacting the battle formations of the traditional radar fleet and increasing the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (LSRF). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MVRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP alone will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in conditions of active use of electronic jamming (ERS) by the enemy, traditional standby location systems can be significantly suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

Save the expensive resource of radars, increase their capabilities in peaceful and war time, and it is also possible to increase the noise immunity of MVRLP by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

To detect air and space targets

Research is being widely carried out abroad on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze signals reflected from targets from TV broadcasting (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio communications have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system.

Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA are developing their own versions of passive radars. Active work on this topic is being carried out in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

Similar work on detecting targets in the illumination field of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA Air Defense) named after Govorov. However, the significant practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources to solve problems of semi-active location turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communications technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with third-party illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced semi-active radar system "Rubezh" being developed by OJSC "NPP Kant" is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such an illumination field is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of monitoring airspace in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detection various types goals. In this case, there is no need to spend money on emitting your own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (RMs) spaced apart in the area are used, which together with radiation sources create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of camouflage coefficient is at least 1.5-2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource consumption limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or switched off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional transmitters of hidden noise radiation (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known models presented in the State Armament Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) for cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite transmitting centers for radio and television. Therefore, the central task for Kant was the creation of receiving modules for external illumination signals reflected from targets and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small weight and dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular communication masts, using the power lines of this system and, due to their low power consumption, not having any impact on its operation.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for determining the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, a state border) by a low-altitude target with the subsequent issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and line of appearance of the intruder.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a separation between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an ESR of 1 m2 in the “clearance zone” with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of false alarm of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on detecting low-altitude targets, conducted by JSC NPP Kant with the assistance of JSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints" and the participation of employees of the VA East Kazakhstan region named after G.K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS cellular communication systems of the GSM standard. When removing the receiving module at a distance of 1.3- 2.6 kilometers from the base station with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected from various observation angles in both the front and rear hemisphere in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible forefield for monitoring low-altitude air and ground space in the illumination field of the BS network of the GSM communication network in the border strip.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50-100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200-300 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base spaced (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using Stealth technology.

Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense

From detection line to detection line, the number and direction of flying targets is clarified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmically (calculate) determine the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined throughput channels for transmitting information over cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out based on direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - based on the image of targets.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
provide means of control of air and ground space on the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar equipment (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around control centers major airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower limit is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along main airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);
significantly reduce installation and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;
solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense (increasing the duty low-altitude radar field in threatened areas), the Federal Security Service (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor airborne terrorist threats or control the use of ground space ), ATC (light flight control aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in aircraft small aviation general purpose is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of the state border), Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring fire safety, searching for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Help "VPK"

The Kant Research and Production Enterprise has been developing, producing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels for more than 28 years. The company's products are supplied to almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC NPP Kant has a modern laboratory and production base, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering and technical specialists, which allows it to carry out a full range of scientific and production tasks: from R&D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

Radar field is a region of space with a given height and lower boundary, within which the radar grouping ensures reliable detection, determination of the coordinates of air targets and their continuous tracking.

The radar field is formed from the radar visibility zones.

Visibility area(detection) is the area of space around the radar within which the station can detect and track air targets with a given probability.

Each type of radar has its own visibility zone, it is determined by the design of the radar antenna and its tactical and technical characteristics (wavelength, transmitter power and other parameters).

The following important features of radar detection zones are noted, which must be taken into account when creating a grouping of reconnaissance units:

The boundaries of radar visibility zones show the target detection range depending on the target's flight altitude.

The formation of the radar direction diagram, especially in the meter and decimeter range, is significantly influenced by the earth's surface.

Consequently, the terrain will have a significant impact on the radar's visibility ranges. Moreover, the influence of the terrain in different directions from the radar station point is different. Consequently, the detection ranges of the same type of air targets at the same altitude in different directions may be different.

Detection radars are used to conduct reconnaissance of enemy air in a circular search mode. The width of the radiation pattern of such a radar in the vertical plane is limited and is usually 20-30°. This causes the presence of so-called “dead craters” in the radar visibility range, where observation of air targets is impossible.

The possibility of continuous tracking of air targets in the radar visibility zone is also influenced by reflections from local objects, as a result of which an illuminated area appears near the center of the indicator screen. Tracking targets in the area of local objects is difficult. Even if the radar is deployed at a position that meets the requirements for it, in moderately rugged terrain the radius of the zone of local objects reaches 15-20 km relative to the center of the position. Turning on the passive interference protection equipment (moving target selection system) does not completely “remove” marks from local objects from the radar screens, and with a high intensity of reflections from local objects, observation of targets in this area is difficult. In addition, when the radar operates with the SDC equipment turned on, the detection range of air targets is reduced by 10-15%.

The section of the radar visibility zone in the horizontal plane at a given height can be conditionally taken as a ring with the center at the point where the radar is located. The outer radius of the ring is determined by the maximum detection range air target of this type at a given height. The inner radius of the ring is determined by the radius of the “dead crater” of the radar.

When creating a radar grouping in the reconnaissance system, the following requirements must be met:

The maximum possible range of confident detection in the most likely direction of enemy air raids (in front of the front edge).

A continuous radar field must cover the space above the entire territory of the operational formation of troops, at all possible flight altitudes of the enemy air force.

The probability of detecting targets at any point in a continuous field should be no lower than 0.75.

The radar field must be highly stable.

Maximum savings in radar reconnaissance resources (number of radars).

You should focus on choosing the optimal value for the height of the lower boundary of the continuous radar field, since this is one of the most important conditions for meeting the listed requirements.

Two neighboring stations provide a continuous radar field only starting from a certain minimum height (H min), and the smaller the distance between the radars, the lower the lower boundary of the continuous field.

That is, the smaller the height of the lower boundary of the field is set, the closer the radar is required to be located, the more radar is required to create the field (which contradicts the above requirements).

In addition, the lower the height of the lower boundary of the field, the smaller the offset of the zone of confident detection at this height in front of the leading edge.

The state and trends in the development of airborne systems already at the present time require the creation of a radar field in the height range of several tens of meters (50-60 m).

However, to create a field with such a height of the lower boundary will require a huge amount of radar equipment. Calculations show that when the height of the lower boundary of the field decreases from 500 m to 300 m, the need for the number of radars increases by 2.2 times, and when decreased from 500 m to 100 m, by 7 times.

In addition, there is no urgent need for a single continuous radar field with such a low altitude.

Currently, it is considered rational to create a continuous field in the front (army) operating zone using ground-based radars with a lower boundary height of 300-500 meters in front of the front edge and in tactical depth.

The height of the upper boundary of the radar field, as a rule, is not specified and is determined by the capabilities of the radars in service with the RTP.

To develop a general methodology for calculating the values of intervals and distances between radar reconnaissance units and radar reconnaissance units in their unified grouping, we will accept the following assumptions:

1. The entire unit is armed with the same type of radar, each unit has one radar;

2. The nature of the terrain does not significantly affect the radar visibility range;

Condition: Let it be necessary to create a continuous radar field with a lower boundary height of “H min”. The radius of the visibility zone (detection range) of the radar at “H min” is known and equal to “D”.

The problem can be solved by positioning the radar in two ways:

At the tops of the squares;

At the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern).

In this case, the radar field at “Н min” will look like (Appendix 4 and 5)

The distance between the radars will be equal to:

With the first method d=D =1.41 D;

With the second d=D =1.73 D;

From a comparison of these figures, we can conclude that creating a radar field by placing radars at the vertices of equilateral triangles (in a checkerboard pattern) is more economically profitable since it requires fewer stations.

We will call a grouping of reconnaissance assets located at the corners of an equilateral triangle a grouping of type “A”.

Although beneficial from a cost-saving point of view, type A grouping does not provide other essential requirements. For example, the failure of any of the radars leads to the formation of large gaps in the radar field. Loss of air targets during tracking will be observed even if all radars are working properly, since the “dead craters” in the radar visibility areas are not blocked.

Grouping type “A” has unsatisfactory field characteristics in front of the leading edge. In areas that occupy a total of more than 20% of the width of the front strip, the extension of the reconnaissance zone in front of the front edge is 30-60% less than possible. If we also take into account the distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the nature of the terrain around the positions, then in general we can conclude that a type “A” grouping can only be used in exceptional cases with an acute lack of funds and in secondary directions in the depths of the operational formation of front troops, but not along front lines

The appendix presents a grouping of radars, which we will conditionally call a grouping of type “B”. Here the radars are also located in arshins of equilateral triangles, but with sides equal to the detection range “D” at the height of the lower boundary of the field in several lines. Intervals between radars in lines d=D, and distance between lines

C= D = 0.87 D.

At any point in the field created by a type “B” grouping, the space is viewed simultaneously by three radars, and in some areas even seven. Thanks to this, high stability of the radar field and reliability of tracking air targets is achieved with a detection probability close to unity. This grouping ensures the overlap of radar “dead craters” and areas of local objects (which can only be achieved with d=D), and also eliminates possible gaps in the field due to distortion of radar visibility zones due to the influence of the terrain around the position.

To ensure the continuity of the radar field over time, each radar involved in creating the field must operate around the clock. In practice this is not feasible. Therefore, at each point, not one, but two or more radars must be deployed, which form the radar station.

Typically, each RLP is deployed by one RLR from the ortb.

To create a continuous radar field, it is advisable to place the radar field in several lines in a checkerboard pattern (at the vertices of equilateral triangles),

The intervals between posts must be selected based on the given height of the lower boundary of the radar field (H min).

It is advisable to choose the intervals between radars equal to the detection range of air targets “D” at the height “H min”, the lower boundary of the field in this area (d=D)

The distance between the radar lines should be within 0.8-0.9 of the detection range at the height of the lower boundaries of the “H min” field.

A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective reconnaissance and airspace control system. Low-altitude location occupies an important place in it. The reduction of radar reconnaissance units and means has led to the fact that today there are open sections of the state border and the interior of the country over the territory of the Russian Federation. OJSC NPP Kant, part of the state corporation Russian Technologies, is conducting R&D to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced semi-active radar system in the radiation field of cellular communication, radio broadcasting and television ground-based and space-based systems (Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of guidance of weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AEA), and the stricter requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow “polluting” the populated areas of the country in peacetime with the use of ultra-high frequency radiation (microwave radiation) high-potential radar stations (radars). In accordance with the Federal Law “On the Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of the Population” dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards are established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars exceeds these standards many times over. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying stealth targets, which requires compacting the battle formations of the traditional radar fleet and increasing the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (LSRF). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MVRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, the cost of maintaining this section of the MVRLP alone will be at least three million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of radars, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with a third-party illumination source.

To detect air and space targets

With the development of digital broadcasting and communications technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with third-party illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced semi-active radar system "Rubezh" developed by NPP Kant OJSC is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. This illumination field is characterized by cost-effective airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, forming continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, there is no need to spend money on emitting your own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (RMs) spaced apart in the area are used, which together with radiation sources create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and to use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of camouflage coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional transmitters of hidden noise radiation (100–200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of external illumination during a special period. This will make it possible to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system based on the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime.

There are no analogues

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a separation between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an ESR of 1 m2 in the “clearance zone” with a probability of correct detection of 0.7 and a probability of false alarm of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on detecting low-altitude targets, conducted by JSC NPP Kant with the assistance of JSC RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints" and the participation of employees of the Higher Academy of East Kazakhstan region named after. G. K. Zhukova. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of BS cellular communication systems of the GSM standard. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected from various observation angles in both the front and rear hemisphere in the first resolution element.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines at a depth of 50–100 kilometers, along the front in a strip of 200–300 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base spaced (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times over, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using Stealth technology.

Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense

From detection line to detection line, the number and direction of flying targets is clarified. In this case, it becomes possible to algorithmically (calculate) determine the range to the target and its height. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the capacity of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (ICPC), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time characteristics, as well as when installing video recorders - by images of targets.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlap of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
provide means of monitoring the air and ground space of the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional radar means (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower limit is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along main airlines , which do not fall below 5000 meters);
significantly reduce installation and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;
solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense (increasing the duty low-altitude radar field in threatened areas), the Federal Security Service (in terms of ensuring the security of state security facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor airborne terrorist threats or control the use of ground space ), ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (monitoring fire safety, searching for crashed aircraft, etc.).

B.C./ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M.Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, have evolved to have long ranges ranging from 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The stealth of such targets during flight requires their detection and identification along the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to detect such a target at a great distance either with over-the-horizon radar stations (ZG radars), or with the help of satellite-based location or optical systems.

Attack unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles most often fly at speeds close to the speeds of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This confronts airspace control systems with the task of detecting and identifying such attack weapons from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by airborne forces. To solve this problem, it is necessary to use all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external sling of an aircraft, or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian cargo ship, car trailer, or railway platform. Missile attack warning system satellites already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine plume in the acceleration area. Consequently, missile attack warning system satellites need to track not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The deployment of radar systems on satellites to control aerospace is today associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and relays of the received information to ground-based airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet’s airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft over fairly large areas.

Information about airspace coming from ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over oceans and in terrain folds mountain ranges continents. This information will allow us to select air attack weapons from the flow of commercial aircraft and subsequently identify them.

ADS-B identification information about commercial aircraft received via satellites will create the opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aircraft accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let's evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems to receive flight information from aircraft using the ADS-B system and relay this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information via the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. ADS-B system transmitters located on board aircraft have limited power, therefore, receivers located on board satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Airplane-Satellite satellite communication link, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the satellite line used is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and energy consumption of both the aircraft’s on-board transponder and the satellite’s on-board transponder.

To determine the maximum range at which the ADS-B satellite can receive messages, we use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems in the earth-satellite section:

Where

– effective signal power at the transmitter output;

– effective signal power at the receiver input;

– gain of the transmitting antenna;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving station;

– wavelength on the “DOWN” line

waves on the “Down” line;

– effective aperture area of the transmitting antenna;

– transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the spacecraft antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute into the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite line is 2256 km. Such an inclined transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is only possible when working through low-orbit satellite constellations. At the same time, we use standard aircraft avionics without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly fewer restrictions on weight and dimensions than the on-board equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receiving devices and high-gain antennas. Consequently, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

where H is the height of the satellite’s orbit;

– radius of the Earth’s surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at various geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	Globalstar	Signal
Orbit altitude, km				1400	1414	1500
Radius of the Earth north pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Radius of the Earth Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Radius of the Earth 80°, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Radius of the Earth 70°, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Radius of the Earth 60°, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Radius of the Earth 50°, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Radius of the Earth 40°, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Radius of the Earth 30°, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Radius of the Earth 20°, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Radius of the Earth 10°, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Radius of the Earth equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link for the Orbcom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum slant range of the data is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range of the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relay of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based centers for summarizing flight information. Such a surveillance system will allow increasing the range of controlled space from a ground point to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will ensure an increase in the airspace control area. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 “Airspace control using satellites”

Fig. 2 “Airspace control with inter-satellite communications”

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of the airspace control system, including to the oceans and mountain ranges up to 4,500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an intersatellite communication system, it is possible to control the Earth's airspace globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by 3D radar based on the degree of their danger at long-range detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation." M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya. Kantor.” M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. "Order of the Federal Service air transport RF dated October 14, 1999 No. 80 “On the creation and implementation of a broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance system in Russian civil aviation.”

4. Traskovsky A. “Moscow’s aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management.” "Air panorama". 2008. No. 4.

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1 Scientific and technical problems in the development of the federal system for reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation and ways to solve them Major General A.Ya. KOBAN, candidate technical sciences Colonel D.N. SAMOTONIN, Candidate of Technical Sciences ABSTRACT. The main scientific and technical problems and directions of development of the Federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation and the country's air navigation system in the context of the creation of aerospace defense of Russia are identified. KEY WORDS: federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation, air navigation system of Russia, radio technical troops, radar support, unified automated radar system. SUMMARY. Rey scientific and technical problems and areas for developing the RF Federal system of air space reconnaissance and control and Air navigation system of the country in terms of creation of the Aerospace Defense of Russia. KEYWORDS: RF Federal system of air space reconnaissance and control, Air navigation system of Russia, Radio Technical Troops, radar support, unified automated radar system. The FEDERAL system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP RF) was created on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 14, 1994 146, is an interdepartmental dual-use system and is intended to provide radar information about the air situation of points and control centers (CP, Central Command) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) in the interests of solving air defense (air defense) tasks, including tasks of protecting the state border and suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace of the Russian Federation, ensuring flights of state, experimental and civil aviation, as well as for radar support of organization centers air traffic air navigation system of the Russian Federation (ANS of Russia) through the integrated use of radar systems and equipment available in the RF Armed Forces and ANS of Russia. The information and technical basis of the FSR and KVP of the Russian Federation is the unified automated radar system (URLS). To solve the tasks assigned to the FSR and KVP, the EARLS involves the forces and means of radio technical units and subunits of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as dual-use radar positions (RLP DN) Federal agency air transport (Rosaviation). In order to develop the EARLS, in the period from 2007 to 2015, the federal target program “Improving the federal system

2 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FSR AND STOL OF THE RF AND WAYS FOR THEIR SOLUTION 15 reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Program (), approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 2, 2006 345. Analysis of the results of the implementation of the Program ( ) shows that the goals stated in it to increase the efficiency of airspace control, reduce the overall costs of maintaining radio engineering units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and increase aviation safety have been largely achieved. At the same time, the absence of conceptual and regulatory legal documents regulating the issues of functioning, ensuring activities and development of the FSR and STOL, changes in the conditions and factors influencing the construction and application of a unified radar system and control system for the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, determined a number of scientific and technical problems in the development of the FSR and STOL for the period until 2025: insufficient level of automation of information and technical interaction Air Defense Control Center (PU, CP) with the operational bodies of the Unified Air Traffic Management System (US ATM) to implement effective joint processing of radar, flight and planning information about the air situation when solving problems of monitoring the use of Russian airspace; non-compliance of the principles of construction and operation of the EARLS with the requirements for its integration with the EU ATM, the formation and maintenance of a unified information space about the state of the air situation in the context of the creation of the Aerospace Defense System of the Russian Federation and the Russian ATS; discrepancy between the principles of development, operation and application in the control system of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) of automation equipment for monitoring the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation with the requirements placed on them in modern conditions; discrepancy between the performance characteristics of outdated radar equipment and the modern information needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense when solving the tasks assigned to them, taking into account the increasing threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the airspace. The formulated scientific and technical problems made it possible to substantiate the following main directions for the development of FSR and KVP in the context of the creation of the aerospace defense system of the Russian Federation and the ANS of Russia. First direction. Development of new and modernization of existing airspace reconnaissance (surveillance) means. Analysis of the predicted target and interference environment for the period up to 2025 necessitates a significant increase in the requirements for the radar equipment used in terms of their spatial and information capabilities. Considering that all manned aircraft, as well as many unmanned enemy aircraft, are equipped with jamming transmitters to make it easier to overcome the air defense system, the requirements for noise immunity of radio technical troops (RTV) groups are significantly increasing. In the context of a shortening time interval between the detection of targets and the delivery of a strike on them by enemy air attack means, the main way to preserve the RTV group will be maneuver by forces and means of radar reconnaissance. Consequently, the requirements for the mobility of promising radars are increasing. Considering that air defense combat duty tasks are carried out continuously (in peacetime and wartime), and the operating conditions of radar equipment in peacetime and wartime are different, then

3 16 A.Ya. KOBAN, D.N. SAMOTONIN requirements for standby radar equipment in peacetime and wartime will be different. To solve peacetime problems, relatively inexpensive radars with integrated secondary radar equipment and additional automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-V) equipment are needed. In order to reduce cost, these radar equipment can be stationary (transportable), but at the same time they must have high reliability (assigned service life of more than one hundred thousand hours, mean time between failures of thousands of hours), maintainability (block-modular design principle, built-in diagnostic and troubleshooting equipment , technical condition forecasting), low operating costs (automatic radar modules without calculations). Taking into account the need to use information about the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Russia when solving ATM problems, these radar equipment must be certified in accordance with the established procedure. One of the main directions for the development of standby radar systems that perform tasks in peacetime should be to bring them to the level of automatic radars. This requirement is also due to the need to recreate the radar field in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. Based on the conditions of use in wartime, the following requirements are additionally imposed on standby radar equipment: automatic reconnaissance of types of interference and adaptation to the air and electronic environment, including the ability to concentrate energy on interference-hazardous and other important areas; high secrecy of operation ensured by the development of passive (semi-active) radar equipment; high mobility, ensured by a reduction in the time of folding (deployment), switching on and monitoring the functioning of the radar; automatic topographic reference and orientation. At the same time, standby radars intended for air defense combat duty in wartime must be multi-band, providing, at low energy costs, the required characteristics in terms of detection range and accuracy in determining the coordinates of enemy air defense systems. Taking into account the analysis of potential threats to the Russian Federation in the aerospace sphere, the relevance of detecting airborne attack systems operating at low and extremely low altitudes is increasing. Differences in the conditions and tasks of using low-altitude radars predetermine their division into duty and combat mode radars. The main requirements for promising low-altitude standby radars are: the ability to detect and track low-flying, small-sized and low-speed air targets (CR, UAVs, hang gliders, etc. ) against the background of intense reflections from the ground, local objects, hydrometeorological formations, intentional passive and asynchronous impulse interference; the presence in the radar complexes (RLC) of remote radar modules located outside the RTV units and operating in automatic mode; the possibility of placing antenna systems on high-altitude supports (in some cases on tethered balloons). Low-altitude radars in combat mode are primarily required to have high maneuverability, sufficient energy

4 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT OF FSR AND KVP RF AND WAYS TO SOLUTION 17 technical potential with the possibility of its concentration in a given direction (sector), increased accuracy of coordinate measurement and the ability to detect targets with a small effective scattering surface (ESR). One of the main requirements for promising radars is the need to interface them with existing and future automation systems, as well as the possibility of integration into a single information space about the state of the air situation. This includes, among other things, the use of unified protocols for the exchange of information on the state of the air situation, the integration of radar information from various sources about air objects, the exchange of this information for more high speeds using the means of the digital telecommunications network being created by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Second direction. Full-scale deployment of EARLS FSR and STOL and its comprehensive modernization in the interests of increasing the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from EU ATM units to solve air defense problems. Full-scale deployment of EARLS and its comprehensive modernization include: equipping (re-equipping) radio engineering units with modern and advanced radars (RLK); modernization of dual-use route radar positions of the Federal Air Transport Agency by deploying new airborne radar systems on them, as well as reconstruction of EU ATM centers, including in the interests of improving interdepartmental information and technical interaction; creation and deployment of unified automatic modules of software and hardware (MPTS), ensuring automatic exchange of planned, radar and additional information using unified protocols for information and technical interaction between dual-use en route radar positions and EU ATM centers with the control center (PU, CP) of the RF Armed Forces. To ensure information and technical interaction through digital channels and using unified protocols, Russian Ministry of Defense facilities provide for the purchase of advanced automation systems (CAS), which together will increase the efficiency of joint processing of radar, flight and planning information at command posts of radio engineering regiments. Third direction. Phased creation of an integrated radar system of the FSR and STOL in the interests of creating a unified information space about the state of the air situation using the resources of the deployed EARLS. The implementation of this direction is organized by equipping radio engineering regiments with complexes of automatic means developed within the framework of the development work (R&D) “Observer FSR and KVP”, and integrating on their basis all sources of radar information of the Russian Ministry of Defense and Rosaviation, stationed within the boundaries of the position area of the radio engineering regiment. Fourth direction. Organization of a unified system for automated control of the use of Russian airspace (ESKIVP) in the videoconferencing control system. The implementation of this direction is planned to be carried out within the framework of the state armament program, which provides for the development and adoption of unified MPTS for automation of solving the problem of monitoring the use

5 18 A.Ya. KOBAN, D.N. SAMOTONIN airspace of the Russian Federation. MPTS are intended for joint use with the control center control system (PU, CP) of aerospace forces associations, air defense formations, military units of the RTV in the interests of improving the quality of solving the problem of monitoring the use of airspace based on the implementation of modern system-technical principles for the exchange and processing of information coming from the EU ATM centers and PU radio technical troops. MPTS is being developed in various configurations with an open interface for information and technical interfacing for use at all levels of management in the automated solution of the problem of monitoring the use of airspace in conjunction with existing and future automation systems. Thus, in solving the main scientific and technical problems in the period until 2025, two stages can be distinguished: comprehensive modernization of EARLS in all regions of the Russian Federation, creation of the head site for the joint use of the integrated radar system (IRLS) FSR and KVP and ESKIVP years full-scale deployment of IRLS and ESKIVP in all regions of the country. Successful implementation of the stages of development of the SDF and CVP is possible with the unconditional implementation of GPV activities and the timely development (clarification) of conceptual and regulatory legal documents regulating the issues of construction, operation, support of the activities and development of the SDF and CVP.

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To detect air and space targets

There are no analogues

Increasing the capabilities of aerospace defense

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