Battle for Donetsk airport became the bloodiest battle of this insane and criminal Russian-Ukrainian war. In terms of the number of deaths, it far exceeded the battle of Ilovaisk, Saur-Mogila and the border battles of June-July.

It is noteworthy that on the Ukrainian side, Donetsk airport heroically and selflessly defended different time either natives of Kirovograd (almost all of them were baptized in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate), or Nikolaev (and these are not only almost all parishioners of the UOC-MP, but also mostly speak Russian). Although, let’s make a reservation, canonical discussions about Orthodoxy in Ukraine or even the theological discussion between Orthodox and Uniates have nothing to do with this deadly bloodshed. The airport showed us that Orthodox brothers are fighting to the death with other Orthodox brothers. We were told for a long time that the militia was supposedly on a victorious liberation march across Ukraine. But it turned out that the victory of some Orthodox brothers over others can only be very bloody and fierce. There will be no less price in such fratricide. It's not even a Pyrrhic victory. This is more trouble than victory.

The first battle for the airport took place on May 26, when Ukrainian troops defended it. From then until mid-September, the airport was subject to periodic shelling and attacks. Since mid-September, shelling and attempts to storm the airport became almost daily, and from October 1 they became especially fierce. On some days there were several attacks with quite large losses. It has been repeatedly reported that during the assaults the militia lost more than 500 people killed and stopped almost all offensive actions on other sectors of the front, concentrating only on this unattainable goal for many months.

What is this desired military goal for the self-proclaimed militia? Once a beautiful, modern terminal costing $875 million and handling 1 million passengers a year, it was well built by a Croatian construction firm. The airport building itself is almost a square with a side of only some 150 meters of glass and concrete, to which on the side of the airfield is attached a gallery 200 meters long and five boarding gates about 70 meters long, also made of a reinforced concrete frame, steel and glass. Thus, the entire defense was kept “on a patch” of 150 by 200 meters (4 football fields), however under several layers of concrete floors. The old airport terminal is even smaller. This building is 150 meters long and 20 meters wide with a small adjacent hall 50 by 50 meters. The old terminal is located just 70 meters from the new one. Besides them, in the distance stands the reinforced concrete airport tower, on which the Ukrainian flag fluttered for many months. That's all for what news reports usually call the big phrase "airport building complex." In size, the new terminal turned out to be comparable to the epic Troy, because this is exactly the size it has in excavations. Only the battle of Troy was fleeting, only about 1-2 weeks. Our battle turned out to be much longer. And instead of a fortress, there were simple buildings here. And these buildings turned out to be impregnable. In addition to the new and old terminals, not far away there is the Polet hotel, the Metro supermarket, hangars and fuel tanks that have long been empty, riddled and damaged by explosions. Behind the airport terminals there is a huge airfield with two runways (the length of the concrete road is more than 4 km). These runways could receive any aircraft available on planet Earth, including the supergiant Mriya and even the American space shuttle in the event emergency landing. The airport was wonderful. To the west of the airport is the village of Peski, occupied by the Ukrainian army. This village became a secondary site in the battle for the Donetsk air harbor.

However, let's return to the terminals. Based on the very modest size of the two buildings, we can conclude that they were hardly defended by more than 2 companies. A larger number would be difficult to deploy effectively for defense. Approximately 200 soldiers. Fewer than there were Spartans. Only the Spartans stood to the death against a huge army of interventionists, and here brother went against brother. It was this garrison size of 200 people that determined the success of the most effective defensive operation of the Ukrainian army. This is exactly how many Ukrainian army fighters with Orthodox crosses on their necks were bled dry by militia formations with the same exact Orthodox crosses on their necks.

The airport came under fire with increasing ferocity. In the summer it was only periodic shelling from grads and 120-mm mortars. In mid-September the fire intensified significantly. The phrases “artillery shelling with shots almost every second”, “fire from all sides at the airport”, “strong cannonade from several areas towards the airport” flashed in messages on Donetsk social networks. Immediately after the elections on November 2, according to messages on social networks in Donetsk, gunfire was fired at the airport all day with an average intensity of two rounds per minute, which means 120 shells per hour. Mortars usually fired at close range, covering residential buildings, artillery guns were installed in the city squares, and “grads” and “hurricanes” were fired across the entire city from the southwest, south and east. Judging by messages on social networks, each heavy shelling must have consisted of at least several hundred shells. And this is not so much, considering that one salvo of “hail” is 40 rockets of 122 mm caliber. And there were at least several dozen such strong shellings. In January the shelling became even more intense. Then tanks began to fire directly at the terminal. If we are based on estimates on social networks of Donetsk regarding the intensity of shelling and if we assume that most of the shelling was directed at the airport area, then we can, to a first approximation, estimate that this section of the front was hit by at least 5 thousand shells.

It is important to understand that with such a large number of shells fired into the airport area, and often even “over the head” of Donetsk from its southern or eastern regions, some small proportion of them inevitably undershot and fell in residential areas. These mistakes are, to a large extent, the answer to those very inexplicable attacks on residential areas of Donetsk, for which the parties blamed and continue to blame each other. But as a rule, this is not the result of malicious intent, but more often either the militia’s shells undershot, or retaliatory erroneous strikes by Ukrainian artillery on DPR artillery positions. From the building of the new airport terminal to Stratonavtov Street on the outskirts of Donetsk (this street suffered the most destruction) is only 700 meters. At the same time, the deployment of positions of multiple launch rocket systems and artillery to shell the airport required a significantly greater range, since shooting from short ranges is impossible. This made it inevitable for the DPR militia to shoot through the city from long distances. And it would be strange to expect that out of many hundreds of rockets and artillery shells, some small part would not fall short on a peaceful city. And some of the retaliatory shells of the Ukrainian army inevitably fell on residential areas.

The airport building itself, after prolonged shelling, was badly damaged by the beginning of January, some ceilings and columns collapsed, but the fortress still stood. Many shells fell around the terminal, and behind it, recently published video evidence shows at least a dozen pieces of equipment and vehicles, all destroyed by artillery fire. In front of the airport building you can also see numerous craters on the asphalt. A lot of shells were also fired at the village of Peski behind the rear outskirts of the airport. The village, 1 km by 2 km long, is almost destroyed.

A rough estimate of the number of 5 thousand shells that hit the airport and the surrounding area during the entire fighting inevitably evokes an association with the Brest Fortress. At the same time, it turns out that in terms of the number of shells fired, the assault by German troops on the Brest Fortress is comparable to the current battles of two fraternal peoples around the Donetsk airport. The report of the 45th Wehrmacht Infantry Division on the assault on the fortress (published by historian M. Solonin, translated by Vasily Risto) names relatively clearly the time intervals when artillery preparation was carried out on the Brest Fortress, as well as the number of artillery involved. For example, it is known that 2880 rocket artillery shells from six-barreled mortars, 31 shells of super-heavy mortars of the Karl type were fired at the fortress, and in addition 9 light, 3 heavy batteries and 210-mm mortars in the amount of 9 units and periodically two more were fired at the citadel divisions of the same mortars. The fire itself lasted only 15 minutes from 4 am on June 22, but on June 23 there were several powerful fire attacks on the fortress throughout the entire day, and on June 24 only until noon. After this, organized resistance to the fortress ceased, and resistance remained only in isolated pockets. During these 2 and a half days, about 6 thousand shells were fired at the fortress (the report does not give an exact final figure, but a rough estimate leads to such figures). Thus, in terms of the number of shells, the Brest Fortress and Donetsk Airport are comparable. However, the Brest citadel, which was mainly the target of fire on June 22-24, 1941, extends 700 meters in length and 300 meters in width. That is, the area under attack in Brest turned out to be 5 times larger than at the Donetsk airport, although on the other hand in Brest this happened in three days, and in air gates Donetsk - many months.

What else can this crazy assault by the Orthodox on other Orthodox be compared to? With Port Arthur? With Sevastopol? Based on the intensity of the fire, it is possible. But due to the absurdity of the attackers and unnatural bitterness, it is impossible. Foreign aggressors were attacking there. And here the Orthodox Russians stormed their Orthodox brothers. Dozens of attacks were repulsed one after another. This did not happen in the Brest Fortress. This happened only in Sevastopol and Port Arthur. Of course, the defense of this stronghold will be included in military textbooks around the world.

If you look at airport terminals, you will see that all the space around the buildings is open. These are either parking lots and entrances in front, or concrete pavement of the airfield in the back. It couldn't be worse for a frontal attack. When land mines explode, all the fragments fly, ricocheting off the hard surface at an acute angle and hitting everything in their path. At the same time, there are no craters at all on the concrete surface or almost none on the asphalt and there is nowhere to hide.

If you look closely at the photographs of the Donetsk airport terminal during its construction, you can see that the entire structure tall building is based on a large number of vertical powerful reinforced concrete columns, on which reinforced concrete floors lie in several levels. These several levels are visible everywhere except the main hall. In the main central hall you can see the reinforced concrete roof slabs and underneath them is the floor of the upper departure zone. At the same time, the arrival zone was located below the overpass and also under powerful reinforced concrete floors. Below the arrivals area there were basements on two or more levels.

This design of the airport building made it difficult to hit by artillery fire. Any high-explosive shells falling on the building from above should not have caused much damage to it. Even high-explosive 152 mm caliber shells, exploding on the concrete roof slabs, should have left only small potholes in the high-strength concrete. This did not harm the defenders below much. Concrete-piercing shells could hardly have been more effective. A concrete-piercing projectile is designed to pierce a concrete ceiling and hit the confined space of a bunker or dugout. Then he disables the bunker's grison. But in this case, when in front of us is a reinforced concrete box with a roof, open on all sides, the impact of such a projectile should only lead to making a small hole in the roof. It turns out to be very difficult to hit a supporting structure during mounted shooting. DPR units attempted to destroy load-bearing reinforced concrete pillars while firing tank guns at direct fire. But this is also difficult. After all, getting from a tank into a load-bearing reinforced concrete pillar 70-80 cm wide is not so easy. And if a tank shell does hit, then the pillar can only be destroyed with a few hits. But this turned out to be the only way to attack. This is what happened in January, when tanks and direct-fire artillery fired at the terminal many times. But the terminal itself could not respond with artillery, because it did not have its own artillery weapons and there was nowhere to place it.

Only on the evening of January 21, after many days of shelling, did Ukrainian troops leave the new terminal. By this time he was already shot through and through. The militia declared victory, but the victory is doubtful. It was not for nothing that the militia leaders spoke in front of video cameras near residential buildings 700 meters from the terminal behind the slope. Ukrainian troops have remained in positions around the airport airfield and they can shoot through the ruins of the new terminal in the same way as the militia did before. Most likely, the ruins will be located in no man's land. It is unlikely that the militia will be able to gain a foothold in them.

These ruins will be a monument to the shame of our country. But they will soon become a monument to Russian repentance. Repentance for fratricide.
And such repentance is not far off.

All events are described from the point of view of a direct participant entirely without edits, as it came. All conclusions and arguments that will be presented below are based on personal communication with direct participants in the events described. Some evidence contradicted each other in details and diverged in numbers, but nevertheless made it possible to reconstruct a holistic overall picture of a number of tragic militia operations on the territory of the DPR. Some things, for certain reasons, will not be called by their proper names. Knowledgeable people- they will understand.

The surviving militia fighters had little time to take photos and videos in combat conditions, so the accompanying illustrative material was borrowed from open sources. Initially, the goal was to investigate the operation to storm the Donetsk airport on May 26, 2014, which resulted in the death of more than 50 militiamen (not counting the losses of the relief detachments), most of whom were volunteers from the Russian Federation. This fact has already received official recognition by the leadership of the DPR, so there is no point in hiding it, including the presence of Russian volunteers.
This operation can be considered the most disastrous of all those carried out by the DPR militia, both in terms of the results achieved and the losses incurred. The next battle, the leadership and planning of which was carried out by Khodakovsky, was the battle near the Marinovka checkpoint, as a result of which the militia suffered losses in manpower and equipment and did not complete the assigned task. The abundance of commanders and leaders in Donetsk and the lack of a single headquarters have a negative impact on the organization of the defense of Donetsk itself. The city is completely unprepared for all-round defense. What is being done is completely insufficient to hold Donetsk in the event of a full-scale assault with the massive use of armored vehicles, which are now being actively reactivated in Kharkov at the Malyshev plant, artillery and aviation.
Russian volunteers.
The militia formations of the South-East include a significant number of volunteers from the Russian Federation, fighting there according to their personal convictions. Many of them have combat experience in Afghanistan, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and two Chechen campaigns. The detachment, which suffered heavy losses during the breakthrough from the Donetsk airport, began to gather in mid-May 2014 in the Rostov region. The collection of volunteers took place through social media and personal contacts, on-site assistance was provided by one of public organizations. Its Rostov branch was headed by a certain person, let's call him “Sergei Ivanovich”. Soon 3 groups were formed, the senior ones of which were commanders with the call signs “Granit”, “North” and “Old”. By the decision of “Sergei Ivanovich”, “Iskra” was appointed commander of the detachment (he died during the breakthrough). “Iskra” was a former riot police officer and did not have sufficient combat, let alone command, experience, or the intellectual level to manage a detachment. He was prone to making rash decisions, which was already revealed in a combat situation. To 3 groups in the Rostov region. Volunteers from Crimea and Chechnya were added. The total number of the combined detachment was 120 people. The command of the detachment, at the insistence of “Sergei Ivanovich”, was carried out by former officer Boris Sysenko, who in a critical situation removed himself from command of the detachment. On the night of May 24-25, the combined detachment moved towards Donetsk in 5 KAMAZ vehicles. The detachment was supposed to join the Vostok battalion and come under the command of Khodakovsky.

Due to the lack of proper counterintelligence cover, the detachment already included at least one enemy intelligence officer on Russian territory. It turned out to be, as it turned out later, a fighter with the call sign “Schumacher”. This means that even on Russian territory the enemy seeks to conduct active intelligence work, introducing spies into groups of volunteers. This man came along with the Crimean militias; he himself, in his words, comes from the Nikolaev region. He said that he did not serve in the military anywhere, but is on the territory of Ukraine under criminal investigation by order of the current Ukrainian government. I applied for the position of driver. Subsequently, in his backpack, which was accidentally opened (after the battle for the airport on May 26), the following characteristic items were found: 1) a walkie-talkie for communication with aviation, 2) an ICOM scanner, 3) an AK magazine, stuffed with tracers (one of the methods “illuminate” the target in battle - with tracers), 4) a 32GB flash drive, on which in electronic format there were special instructions on conducting sabotage operations behind enemy lines, including instructions on adjusting artillery and aviation fire. The presence of instructions and reference materials suggests that the enemy is conducting mass training of agents in connection with the developments in Novorossiya. A professional intelligence officer would not have had such clearly compromising documents with him. At the same time, in conditions civil war creating a network of spies and informants is much easier. "Schumacher", according to our information, was not detained and interrogated. Details are below. Perhaps he is still one of the “fighters” of the DPR militia and continues to conduct intelligence activities in the interests of the SBU. Close to “Schumacher” was a militiaman with the call sign “Odessa”, who may also be an agent of the SBU. Compared to the chloropicrin in DOGA toilets, which sickened militia members and employees, the activities of such spies cost human lives.
The first strange things.
The group was met by Khodakovsky's people. On the territory of Ukraine, one of the KAMAZ trucks, which was entirely loaded with ammunition and weapons (from the warehouses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), “suddenly” could not crawl up the mountain. 20 minutes. KAMAZ desperately pushed, delaying the movement of the detachment. After which it was abandoned so as not to interfere with the advance to its destination. We don’t know where KAMAZ itself and its cargo went. The militia were informed that it never climbed the mountain, so it was blown up along with its contents in order to avoid capture by the Ukrainian military. Neither the inevitable strong explosion nor the bright night flash was heard or seen. Most likely, the weapons and ammunition were stolen and sold, since the demand for this business in the Southeast is now very high. On May 25, the arriving militia detachment took part in an impromptu parade at a rally in front of the DOGA building, where it was medially included in the Vostok battalion. Formally, they were not part of Vostok, but obeyed the orders of Khodakovsky and Sysenko. The latter was called “General” by the soldiers; in the past, he most likely served as a senior officer before retiring.
The operation to “capture” the Donetsk airport.
The operation to seize the Donetsk airport was initially a crime because it contradicted the fundamentals of tactical operations. Its organization and planning was carried out by Khodakovsky, who declaratively prioritized the existence of certain informal agreements with representatives of the SBU and the command of a unit of the 3rd Special Forces Regiment (Kirovograd) guarding the airport. He tried his best to convince B. Sysenko and the group commanders that these “agreements” existed. On the evening of May 25, a group of scouts advanced to Airport area Donetsk. “Granit” and “Stary”, on the basis of agreements reached by Khodakovsky, met with the SBU officer who headed the SSB international airport. The latter informed them of the situation in the airport area and showed them a diagram of the new terminal. Upon arrival at the headquarters, “Granit” and “Stary” went to a meeting, which was attended by Khodakovsky, Sysenko and other officers. This group of people, while planning an operation to seize a complex infrastructure facility, drank alcoholic beverages. The report of the group commanders who carried out reconnaissance of the area was not heard to the end. Their arguments that observation and reconnaissance of an object before its capture should last at least 3 days in order to compile a complete picture of the situation at the airport and in its environs were not heard. The scouts were ordered to leave the meeting. At the same time, the group commanders were given only a diagram of the building of the new airport terminal; they did not have a general diagram of the airport, plans for other buildings, or a diagram of the underground communications of the new terminal, in which the detachment soon found itself in a fire trap. The planning of the operation was based on dubious information, the validity of which Khodakovsky tried to convince the commanders. Firstly, he tried to convince everyone that the Kirovograd special forces, located in the area of ​​the airport, due to certain “agreements” reached, would not open fire on the militias. Making the success of an operation dependent on agreements with the enemy is a sign of either betrayal or dementia. Secondly, by order of Khodakovsky, the groups that moved to the airport area did not take with them the MANPADS that were available. As he would later say in an interview with RIA-Novosti, “the militias had MANPADS. But no one could have imagined that the Ukrainian army would dare to launch an air strike on the airport, on the reconstruction of which so much money was spent in 2012,” so he ordered the MANPADS with him do not take. http://ria.ru/interview/20140604/1010528204.html
In conditions of military operations for an airport, control of the runway and airspace around the airport, but not the airport terminal itself. The enemy will be able to freely land reinforcements in the form of troops from both helicopters and transport aircraft. Without air defense systems (at least MANPADS), it is impossible to carry out an operation to capture an operating airport. At the same time, the seizure of the terminal, which was carried out on May 26, 2014, could only have a vaguely understandable psychological effect. The actions of the militia in Lugansk showed that it is effective to create a no-fly zone over the airfield using light air defense systems, such as MANPADS and ZU-23, which are effective when planes and helicopters take off and land. The militias had with them at the Donetsk airport only 1 dummy MANPADS. The operation began in the absence of full reconnaissance of the situation and with total misinformation on the part of its organizer.
Around 2.00 On May 26, Khodakovsky gave the order to prepare to move part of the detachment to seize the airport. In his words, the main task of the detachment will be to “pose in front of journalists’ cameras,” since a 100% agreement was reached with the Kirovograd residents (3rd Special Forces Regiment) not to fire at each other.
Around 3.00 detachment of approximately 80 people. moved to the airport to complete the assigned task. The fighters partially occupied the building of the new airport terminal. The occupation of the airport terminal building took place without clashes.
Around 7.00 Reinforcements moved to the terminal, which included, among other things, volunteers from Chechnya.
Around 10.00 Khodakovsky completed negotiations with the command of the Kirovohrad special forces and, together with the fighters of the former Donetsk Alpha, left the airport. Direct command was then exercised by Sysenko.
After Khodakovsky’s departure, taking into account the reinforcements that arrived at 07:00, the number of militias occupying the airport was about 120 people. The further actions of the Kirovograd special forces were very different from the “agreements” that were communicated by Khodakovsky to the militia personnel. Ukrainian special forces positions were located in the old airport terminal building and in its surroundings. Without hiding and slowly, the Kirovograd residents began to equip firing positions to fire at the terminal occupied by the militia. We brought up mortars, established positions for the AGS-17 “Plamya”, and dispersed the snipers. Soon, PMC fighters were landed on the airport grounds and took up positions in the control tower and the surrounding area of ​​the airport.
Around 11.00 the enemy opened fire on the militias who occupied the airport. The air strike was carried out by Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft, using NURS and automatic cannons. PMC snipers opened fire with sniper weapons. In fact, assigned to the groups to lead the operation, Sysenko withdrew from command after realizing what had happened, sending the soldier to a duty-free store to buy alcohol. While the detachment was fighting, he was drinking alcohol, not having the necessary moral and psychological characteristics to organize defense. Instead of the easy capture promised by Khodakovsky, he led the detachment into a trap. Subsequently, the actual leadership of the detachments was carried out by group commanders, who acted for some time at their own discretion. Kirovograd special forces also opened fire with mortars, AGS-17, machine guns and sniper weapons. Return fire was organized from equipped firing points. For this purpose, ATMs were even torn out and stacked in stacks to protect them from bullets and shrapnel. Then this became the basis for accusing the militia of looting, although the airport had been cleared by the Ukrainian military the day before. Some of the fighters, not knowing that the enemy would soon launch an air strike on the terminal, took up positions on the roof, placed firing points there, and brought up the AGS-17.


"Gypsy" with AGS and "Mir" on the roof. "Gypsy" will soon receive a slight wound to the head as a result of an air strike on the terminal, but will remain in service. He will die in one of the KAMAZ vehicles during a breakthrough. “Mir” will die during the breakthrough, his body will lie under sniper fire for 3 days before the militia can take it away.


When Ukrainian aviation began to attack them, the fighters began to retreat from the roof. The materials used in the construction of the airport, when hit by NURS, shells and mines, produced a huge number of additional destructive elements and provided very poor cover. The roof was strewn with gravel, which also acted as destructive elements when hit by shells. The first losses came from aircraft fire on the militias who had taken positions on the roof. The Chechens took the longest positions, trying to hide behind a smoke screen. This measure did not turn out to be very effective. Soon the detachment's losses amounted to 2,200 and several 300, 1,200 and almost all of the 300 were from the Chechen detachment. Some of the existing electronically controlled doors were blocked, although the power supply to the terminal was not interrupted. As a result, the withdrawal was carried out by creating an “artificial exit”. If everyone could come out at once, 300x could be less. After part of the squad left the roof, 200s and 300s remained there. It took a long time to get the 300x out due to heavy sniper fire coming from the control tower. Everyone was pulled out later under heavy fire only on the 3rd attempt. Aviation and artillery fire was very well adjusted. Through the channel of the Ukrainian radio that was given as a “gift”, negotiations between one of the spotters and the mortar gunners were intercepted.




The distance from the new terminal to the control tower, which dominates in height above all other buildings, was 960 m. Despite the considerable distance, the sniper fire was very accurate. It was fired from a sniper weapon with a caliber of at least 12.7 mm (M-82 Barrett or similar rifles). To do this, the dense fire of PMC snipers had to be suppressed with something. Of the heavy weapons, the detachment had only 1 82mm mortar and 1 AGS-17 “Plamya”, which was lowered from the roof. Mines attached to the mortar did not have fuses, so they turned the much-needed means of fire support into a pile of iron. The militia had to work on the control tower from AGS-17. The maximum firing range of an easel grenade launcher is 1700m, but the aiming range is much less. The fire on the tower had to be adjusted for a long time from the 2nd floor of the terminal until the first hits, which weakened the sniper fire. After that, they were able to take 300x from the roof. At the same time, the Kirovograd residents were verbally ready to provide a corridor for the evacuation of the wounded. PMC snipers fired at both the militias and the Kirovograd special forces. Perhaps this was due to poor coordination between the opponents, possibly due to agreements reached on the evacuation of 300x. As a result, the deputy commander of the Kirovograd soldiers actually gave the order to open fire from the ZU-23-2 at the control room, from where the snipers were working. One way or another, many militias were wounded by fire from Kirovograd. By this point in time, Donetsk already knew about the failure of the operation. An operation was hastily prepared to release the detachment that had occupied the airport. About 500 people took part in it. The main problem remained the lack of coordination and unified command. The battles in the vicinity of the airport on May 26 were carried out by: Khodakovsky's Vostok military base and a detachment of the former Donetsk Alpha, Boroday's fighters, Zdrilyuk's detachment, Pushilin's detachment, Oplot. These units also suffered significant losses from sniper fire and possibly from friendly fire in conditions of poor coordination. Snipers worked on almost all approaches to the airport: in the area of ​​the METRO store (2 mercenaries from the Baltic states were destroyed), from the side of SPARTAK (the sniper was working from a construction crane), from the side of the cemetery and runway, from one of the 9-story buildings on Stratonavtov Street. What followed were openly provocative actions. "Iskra" received mobile communications order ( from someone) go for a breakthrough, since the airport is surrounded by Ukrainian military. Don’t wait for the night and go out in small groups, but right now, before the “ring” is closed, load onto KAMAZ trucks and go out into the city, taking 2x 200x and numerous 300x. They will be provided with a corridor from the Donetsk side. In fact, there was a tight ring of encirclement only around the new terminal. On the territory of the airport, Kirovograd residents continued to fire at the militia, and there were PMC snipers in the vicinity. There were no significant enemy troops that tightly surrounded the airport. The militia were able to dive into only 2 KAMAZ trucks; access to the other 2 was tightly blocked by sniper fire. Therefore, KAMAZ trucks were loaded to the brim with people. Only the cover group remained at the airport. She will retreat later along the greenery and will not suffer casualties.
Around 18.30 2 KAMAZ trucks made a breakout from the airport. Having received information that they were surrounded, the KAMAZ trucks drove at full speed, the soldiers fired at everything that moved and even rested. The initiator of this exit tactic was Iskra. Perhaps this played a tragic role when entering the city. The cover group advanced on foot through the greenery near 19.15-19.20 . She suffered no casualties and returned safely to Donetsk, which is additional evidence that there was no tight encirclement around the airport. When the groups made a “breakthrough”, Sysenko remained in the cover group. He died of a heart attack on the eve of the group's retreat from the airport. Before breaking into the greenery, the group had to overcome 300m under fire from snipers and machine guns.
Shooting of KAMAZ vehicles with militias.
At the entrance to Donetsk from the airport at that time there were 80+ Vostok fighters concentrated in an ambush. from the 1st and 2nd bases of the battalion (established name of the units) and other parts of the militia. They received information that fighters of the National Guard of Ukraine were coming from the airport to break into Donetsk. The order was given to fire to kill. 2 KAMAZ trucks with militias leaving the airport were destroyed by fighters from the Vostok battalion with heavy fire from small arms and grenade launchers. There were no Ukrainian special forces in the ambush; there was an order to open fire on their own soldiers.


The first KAMAZ was hit and overturned on the Kievsky village near the Magnolia store. There were more survivors in it than in the 2nd. The 2nd KAMAZ was hit on Stratonavtov Street in the area of ​​the Putilovsky Bridge. When the KAMAZ was riddled and smashed, and the movement around them stopped, the Vostok fighters crawled closer and saw St. George’s ribbons on the corpses. The driver of the 2nd KAMAZ received numerous wounds and blew himself up with a grenade. The 2nd explosion was carried out by one of the wounded militiamen who remained conscious (he had fought in Afghanistan in the past). They thought that the fire was fired by Ukrainian soldiers. Of the 46 fighters traveling in two KAMAZ vehicles, 35 survived. A few days after the treacherous operation, volunteers from Chechnya left the DPR. A significant part of the Vostok battalion, realizing the consequences of the tragic operation, deserted in the coming days.
Departure.
After arriving at the base, the fighters who survived the breakout from the airport discovered strange facts. The personal property and also the remaining weapons of the victims were stolen by the time they returned. AGS-17, traveling in one of the blown up KAMAZ trucks, soon surfaced in Pushilin’s detachment. The realization that they had been betrayed and sent by the command in the person of Khodakovsky to slaughter forced them to disperse throughout the city. Further more. “Schumacher” and “Odessa” (spies) came out to attack several fighters who were camping on leave on the outskirts of Donetsk. They checked on the fighters in a friendly manner and urgently (ostensibly on orders) left for the location of the Vostok battalion. After some time, the militia's attention was attracted by children's crying and women's cries of "Don't shoot!" from the yard of a neighboring house. Jumping out into the bushes, they saw armed men in camouflage surrounding a neighboring house. The arriving Sonderkommando most likely confused the buildings in the dark. Most likely, their task was to clean up the surviving participants in the massacre. After this, the surviving soldiers had only one option - to leave Donetsk. We decided to break through to Bezler in Gorlovka. Some of the wounded who survived the massacre at the airport were able to be transported to Gorlovka in order to avoid “accidents.” New interesting details were also revealed there. It turns out that Bezler himself prepared the operation to seize the Donetsk airport, developed it for 5 days, and conducted reconnaissance. The enemy became aware of this; most likely, Bezler also has Ukrainian agents working for him. Instead of an assault, they decided to make an “assault” on Khodakovsky, at the same time sending a special forces detachment of volunteers. People with experience in conducting special operations were thrown like infantry to treacherous execution. “Mole” with the call sign “Schumacher” was identified by chance from Bezler. The militias who retreated to Gorlovka from Donetsk were able to organize the transportation of their belongings. By chance, as often happens, the transporters caught the Schumacher backpack. When they opened it, they discovered very interesting contents (see at the beginning). Further more - demands were received to return the backpack and its contents. There was a refusal.
Betrayal.
Why should what happened during the departure of the militia detachment from the Donetsk airport be considered precisely as a betrayal? In conditions of poor organization and chaos, losses from friendly fire in war are inevitable. The fact that this was precisely a betrayal, in addition to many other signs, is evidenced by the subsequent coverage of events. Look at this photo.


The worst thing about it is not the pile of militias riddled with bullets and shrapnel, the worst thing is the lenses of professional cameras on the right. A video of a crowd of journalists, including Ukrainian and Western media, being launched into a Donetsk morgue to film corpses. For what? For the report. There is a strict rule - to hide your losses, especially - never show them in all the bloody details. First of all, it undermines the morale of its soldiers and the civilian population, who count on protection from the military. Here, the footage of the mutilated bodies of the militias, which has spread all over the media, is deliberately and massively replicated. This not only allows you to report to the customer, but indeed for many it becomes a signal to think about whether it is worth fighting for the DPR.
We don’t presume to judge whether it’s a coincidence or not, but back on May 20, the “DPR leadership” (a strong abstraction in itself) intends to nationalize the enterprises of Akhmetov (Khodakovsky’s supervisor). http://youtu.be/8JhpQucgeT0 But by June these plans were publicly abandoned http://ria.ru/world/20140531/1010121645.html It is possible that this comes from the realization that the DPR power bloc, if not completely, it is partially controlled by Akhmetov. The same can be said about the political bloc.
Marinovka.
Additional evidence of this is the battle for the Marinovka checkpoint. June 5, 2014. There, planning and leadership are again carried out by Khodakovsky. The legend is the same: the border guards are demoralized and want to surrender. The operation is top-secret, but it involves journalists from the Western newspaper Sunday Times, who have been with the militia detachment for 3 days, of course, having mobile communications and Internet access. Subsequently, this operation will become the basis for one of the best reports of the Ukrainian Border Guard Service during the entire ATO period. The fighters arrived at the position to attack the border guards. They begin to unload from armored personnel carriers and vehicles. The first mines immediately arrive, exactly in the area where the convoy stops. The experienced gaze of one of the soldiers fixes sighting pegs for mortars at the landing site. Instead of border guards willing to surrender, there is a dense wall of fire. The flanks are covered by units of the Vostok and Oplot battalions. Very soon the cover on the flanks was blown away like the wind. The militia entered into a difficult battle with the enemy located in pre-prepared firing positions. An air strike was carried out from the air. Not one of the 4 MANPADS fired... As a result, we had to make a breakthrough in the direction of the Russian Federation. Sunday Times journalist Michael Franchetti, accompanying the detachment, describes with gusto how a detachment of 80 militiamen freely enters the territory of the Russian Federation, which is nothing more than another official confirmation of the Russian Federation’s support for terrorists operating in the SE. Photo report of the Ukrainian border service about the victorious battle:



Then very strange things happen. Khodakovsky is among the militias who crossed over to Russian territory as a result of the battle. He stays there for about 4 days. After which he calmly returns to Donetsk. By this point in time, our special services should have already had complete information about what happened at the Donetsk airport, incl. about Khodakovsky’s role in these events. This person should not only have been interrogated and released, but also detained as a traitor. Why this didn't happen, we don't know.
Border.
After the treacherous operation to seize the Donetsk airport, several wounded militiamen from the Russian Federation are in the DPR. Their evacuation does not require any official recognition or action. But, nevertheless, it is not carried out. The wounded are being transported on the initiative of Russian militias who survived the battle for the airport. At the border with the Russian Federation, transport with wounded people is held for 5 hours. Among them are people with severed lower limbs; one of the wounded in the arm developed gangrene; many require painkillers. There is a total interrogation and verification. Although it is clear that even Ukrainian spies without legs will not run away anywhere. Transportation of the wounded is done at the expense of the militia, transportation of the dead - at the expense of relatives. “Sergei Ivanovich,” who went on a drinking binge in Rostov, does not provide the slightest assistance in organizing the placement of the wounded in medical institutions. The slightly wounded inevitably appear at the volunteer base, thereby unmasking its location. “Sergei Ivanovich” drives them away from there. Their placement in hospitals and support fall on the shoulders of the surviving militias, who have retreated to the Russian Federation for rest and recovery.
Conclusions.
Why do the leadership of Russian militia units arriving in Novorossiya initially turn on traitors like Khodakovsky? Why are their provision and support so poorly established? There are several working answers to these questions.
Version one. "Fifth column".
The Russian leadership really unofficially supports the DPR and LPR, not limiting itself to working in the information space. At the same time, responsible employees of the involved “public organizations” and “charitable foundations” are either conducting subversive activities, since they were recruited/bought by the enemy, or are completely incompetent from a professional point of view. There is nothing unusual in this version; the columns were sold in both the 1st and 2nd Chechen campaigns. In this sense, the approach of “Sergei Ivanovich”, the actions of Sysenko and the fact of Khodakovsky’s return to Donetsk after being detained by Russian border guards are evidence in favor of this version. If it is fair, immediate personnel decisions should follow, but, first of all, the organization of high-quality counterintelligence cover for everything that Russia is doing in Novorossiya. The situation when units are led by traitors, and SBU agents are infiltrated into groups on the territory of the Russian Federation, is unacceptable.
Version two. Cleaning up passionaries.
According to this version, the Russian leadership really drew “conclusions” from the Kyiv Maidan. From this point of view, the war in Donbass is used not as a means of creating a buffer republic of Novorossiya on the fragments of the former Ukraine, but not least as a way to dispose of an explosive mass inside the Russian Federation. Despite the growth of Putin’s rating, the level of corruption within the country remains extremely high, and the growth in the standard of living of the main segments of the population is extremely low. In order to avoid Maidan within the Russian Federation in a situation of worsening socio-economic crisis, it is better to immediately eliminate the most ardent groups of the population who are ready to take up arms and go to the barricades at the first call. The recovery of the Russian “elite” in recent years has been declarative nature and was not accompanied radical redistribution economic leverage within the country. It is extremely doubtful that the main part of the Russian “elite” (far not Russian, as everyone knows very well), supports the idea of ​​​​gathering Russian lands, which Strelkov advocates. For these people, at best, we can only talk about collecting new markets, which is by no means equal to the first. Since the war-ravaged DPR and LPR may turn out to be not so much economic assets as a social burden, dealing with this issue may seem inappropriate to many. But if at the same time there is a chance to get rid of potential dissenters who are ready to reformat the existing political landscape by force, then they will have corridors to Donbass and the Khodakovskys as commanders.
What to do?
In a situation of uncertainty and lack accurate information about the decisions taken by the Russian leadership, however, it is necessary to formulate a certain position on the Ukrainian issue. Incl. for those people who have certain military experience and intend to take part in hostilities in Novorossiya. Regardless of the moods of the Russian “elite,” the future of the Russian Federation is now being decided in Ukraine. Very soon, it may also be resolved on the country’s Central Asian borders. If you do not have experience participating in combat, or at least serving in the army, then it is better to abandon the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe trip. Unprepared romantics are the first to die. Try to acquire basic military skills, fortunately, now there is such an opportunity without the need to serve in the army, even if it involves some expenses. They will still be useful to you to protect the Motherland in near future. If you have experience and motivation, check the transition channel that is offered to you by employees of “public organizations” and “charitable foundations”. No “Sergei Ivanovichs”, Khodakovskys and “Vostoks”. You must know exactly where and under whose command you will fall, if you do not want to return home as a broth in zinc, which, however, is not excluded in any case. The most order and decency in the LPR militia units, in the DPR Strelkov is a reliable commander, but the situation around Slavyansk, which is in an operational environment, may change in the coming days. It is better to advance not individually, but in organized and pre-coordinated groups. Discuss in advance with the “helpers” the conditions for leaving for rest and treatment. Consider getting life insurance and leaving a will. With your loved ones, consider creating a mini-fund to help the families of the dead and support the wounded; the group’s losses will be at least 300.
How to stop betrayal?
On this moment losses as a result of betrayal and actions in Novorossiya by the agents of the SBU, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Western intelligence services are comparable to the losses of the militia in open hostilities and as a result of air and artillery strikes by Ukrainian troops. Without a real, rather than media, organization of counterintelligence activities, the situation will only get worse. At the same time, inclusion in its composition former employees The SBU, which quickly “changed its shoes” to the DPR and LPR format, will inevitably be associated with new failures. Directly in the database area, the enemy actively uses agents, incl. of women, young people, children. It is unlikely that without the help of the Russian Federation, the LPR and DPR will be able to organize full-fledged counterintelligence work. The same applies to the activities of the special services of the Russian Federation, if their task is to really support the LPR and DPR, and not to send Russian militias to slaughter.
Continuation and update here

Three years ago, on May 26, 2014, a grandiose battle for the Donetsk airport began, which became one of the most important in the fight of the newly created DPR militias against the Ukrainian Armed Forces and nationalist battalions. The airport, located in the suburbs, near the village of Spartak, was not just a key combat position - whoever owned it controlled the entire situation in the region. The battle for the airport continued with varying success for 242 days and ultimately ended in victory for the Donetsk militias, most of whom did not really have a professional military education. The victory was snatched out of nerves.

I had a chance to visit the Donetsk airport named after Sergei Prokofiev, built for the 2012 European Football Championship, in the last days of March 2014. There was bad weather due to thick fog, the flight was delayed for four hours, so there was more than enough opportunity to explore all the terminals. I was struck by the scale of the airport building and its splendor - a lot of money was invested here; according to experts, about $200 million was spent on its construction. Even for a million-plus city, such as this large regional center Ukraine, it was more than a grandiose structure. It's a 15-minute taxi ride from the center of Donetsk, very close. And when the first reports of fighting at the airport came, it seemed that the war was going on in the city itself. And then photos and video footage showed what the creation of man’s hands can be turned into by the hands of a man-destroyer.


Donetsk airport - on the one hand, it is a symbol of the struggle for independence, on the other, as unjustified vandalism. Now there is no point in even restoring these ruins. The question just pops into my head: “Why?” It can be applied to Slavyansk, Ilovaisk, Gorlovka, and a dozen other Donbass cities and towns that are still subject to senseless shelling by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After all, any military operation, both offensive and defensive, must have its own meaning. Is it trivial to write off shells? But not at the expense of the lives of peaceful people! Fighting for the Donetsk airport, which is no longer valuable not only because of the destroyed terminals, but also is not suitable for aircraft take-offs and landings, can also be considered madness. The last flight of a scheduled plane from here was carried out at 7.10 am on May 26, 2014, after which both the “take-off” itself and the airport building were empty, turning into an arena of fierce battles.

“Probably not a single battle of the war in Donbass caused as much emotion and pain among participants and observers as the fight for the Donetsk airport,” says historian Evgeniy Norin. - The siege of the airport by the Donbass militia lasted for more than eight months. Slavyansk stood and fell, Novorossiya survived the crazy summer of 2014, a truce was signed and called for, and the airport continued to remain an elusive target of attack. Its long retention showed how dangerous an enemy the Ukrainian army can really be under favorable conditions and adequate leadership, and the victory over the “cyborgs” became a truly hard-won success for the militia, indicating a serious qualitative growth of the troops of Novorossiya. At the airport, the Ukrainian army was represented by good strong units; on the other hand, it was ultimately the most combat-ready militia units that achieved success. In the war for Donbass there were larger, more dynamic battles, but perhaps none were more brutal and uncompromising.” As in any war, the battles for the Donetsk airport gave birth to their own heroes. It is likely that in Kyiv the names of those who died under its ruins were named and ranked with a certain rank of courage - the dead have no shame. On the part of the DPR militia fighters, such famous people even outside the Donbass as Mikhail Tolstykh and Arsen Pavlov, known by their call signs Givi and Motorola, found their glory here, confirmed in further battles. Then, in 2014-15, their names only appeared on the lips, during many other important military operations, but mostly during the knocking out of Ukrainian nationalists from the Donetsk airport.


The militiaman became one of the most skilled commanders of the DPR and a real living legend. It was Givi at the Donetsk airport. A native of Ilovaisk, Mikhail Tolstykh became one of the organizers of the “Ilovaisk cauldron” when, with his company, he held the city from daily attempts to break through for two weeks.

Who took the call sign Givi in ​​honor of his grandfather, who fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War (Givi’s Georgian roots are from his great-grandfather), there were legends. He did not duck under shots, carried out the most desperate and, at first glance, insane operations and invariably achieved military success. Journalists called this young colonel (Mikhail Tolstykh was 36 years old on the day of his death) the Georgian reincarnation of the famous general of the war of 1812, Peter Bagration.

was buried twice at the Donetsk airport - first according to rumors that were circulated by the media. But he died much later, after an explosion in the elevator of the building in which he lived in Donetsk with his family. They tried to destroy him not only physically, but also in the information space, which is why they circulated messages about injury and death. And then, in 2015, he and his fighters managed to literally dig out Ukrainian nationalists from the basements of the Donetsk airport and

Donetsk airport has become a key position for a number of reasons. Initially, the Ukrainian Armed Forces planned to use it as a landing site for military transport aircraft capable of transporting reinforcements to the area of ​​growing hostilities. But after May 26, 2014, not a single plane was able to land here. At first, the Ukrainian army transported reinforcements by helicopters, but they also subsequently stopped flying due to the threat of being shot down by militia MANPADS. The control tower was of some value, from the height of which it was possible to adjust artillery fire, but after it was recaptured by the militia, Ukrainian guns completely destroyed it.

Attempts to storm the airport continued throughout October and November with varying degrees of success,” says historian Evgeniy Norin. - The fighting at that time unfolded quite chaotically. On the “three-dimensional” battlefield, opponents were mixed. The militias used their most seasoned units in battle - Motorola's "Sparta" and "Somalia" under the command of Givi. Gradually, although extremely slowly, they cleared the airport buildings of the enemy. All methods were used to annoy the enemy. Gradually, the Ukrainians lost ground. True, two circumstances did not contribute to optimism on the militia side of the front. Firstly, the main prizes remained in the hands of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: the control tower and the new terminal. Secondly, the initially irregular nature of the militia detachments often manifested itself. The fighting qualities of the rebel groups turned out to be very uneven. If some units demonstrated high level morale and training, others may have made sadly amateurish mistakes. Sometimes this led to great tragedies."

On January 21, 2015, the official Ukrainian media announced the failure of another attempt by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to seize Donetsk airport. The Ukrainian army and nationalist battalions retreated from the Donetsk airport with heavy losses. The next day, official Kyiv admitted that it had finally lost control over this territory. And in Donetsk itself there was a “parade” of captured Ukrainian soldiers from the airport, who were then handed over to the Ukrainian side along with the flags of their units and the coffins of the dead.

...Donetsk airport now looks like huge house Pavlova in Stalingrad (present-day Volgograd), which it was decided to leave in the form in which it remained after the war, as a monument to the fight against fascism. The airport will most likely be restored when the war against Ukrainian nationalism ends and Donbass can live a peaceful life, without daily shelling.

The history of the battles for the Donetsk airport came to an end with the operation that DPR forces carried out on the 20th of January 2015. Then, the already strengthened militia army was able to deliver a fairly significant blow to the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which were located around the cities of Novorossiya; the main blow was dealt by the soldiers of the “Sparta” and “Somalia” battalions.

The shelling of the control tower by Somali tanks after many months yielded results - it collapsed, depriving the Ukrainian military of the support of snipers and artillery spotters. The DPR tanks that made their way into the airport destroyed the fortifications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the Sparta strike group began clearing the new terminal. Having driven the “cyborgs” into a trap, the militia occupied the upper floors and basement of the new terminal. The Ukrainian forces were locked on the first floor, but they refused to surrender and responded to all offers of peace with fire.

Then the militia decided to do something differently: they planted explosives in the basement under the defense site and blew it up. Two explosions, on January 19 and 20, put an end to the assault on the DAP. Most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters died under the rubble, and on the afternoon of January 21, the surviving Ukrainian military were forced to surrender to the militia.

As a result of a months-long siege, the Donetsk airport turned into ruins, filled with explosives - mines and tripwires. The shelling of the territory did not stop for a long time.

* An organization prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Original taken from tipaeto to Donetsk Airport. A story of courage and betrayal.

The pride of Donetsk, the “air gate” of the city now looks like a pile of poorly burned street garbage, leaking plastic, smoked aluminum and sluggish smoke. Everything that could burn in the new terminal has already burned.

<Первый раз аэропорт пытались взять еще в апреле, мирно, с помощью безоружного восставшего народа, путем переговоров. На следующий день переговорщики были арестованы на улицах Донецка сотрудниками СБУ. The second assault on May 26 was bloody. The militia lost about 40 fighters. According to military science, the more assaults an object repels, the more difficult it is to take it later. Slavyansk confirmed this axiom. For several months, no one needed the airport - there were enough worries on other fronts. K But the airport still had to be dealt with - for political reasons.
The airport is not even a thorn. This is a big headache that cannot be solved with a simple attack. But it doesn’t seem possible to solve it quickly and efficiently now.

And even now, militias are fighting to the death in the twisted structures, although according to diplomatic papers it should be very quiet here.

The fighting for the Donetsk airport, part of the territory of which continues to be held by a large group of Kyiv security forces, has been going on for five months. On October 3, the DPR militia announced that they had taken control of the facility, but fierce fighting on its territory is still ongoing. The militias have repeatedly stated that the Donetsk airport is a point of special strategic importance, not only as a transport hub. >Donetsk Airport named after S.S. Prokofiev

The airfield in the city of Stalino was built on blood. The first bulldozers began leveling the area for the runway in 1933 - the hungriest year in the history of Ukraine. Even Russian historians who argue about Stalin’s guilt do not deny the very fact of the famine. First passenger aircraft We flew from Donetsk all the way to Starobelsk, a city in the Lugansk region, located 160 km from the airport.
1930s
July 27, 1931 By resolution of the Stalin City Council, the land department and the municipal services department were instructed to determine the territory for the construction of an airfield civil aviation in Stalino.
1933 Stalino airport was founded. In the same year, the first Aeroflot flight was organized on the route Stalino - Starobelsk. X.

Stalin airport. 1930s

On June 23, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the “Regulations on the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet (civil air fleet) for war time" All Civil Air Fleet personnel were drafted into the Red Army. The flight technical personnel became part of the 87th Guards Separate Stalinist Civil Aviation Regiment.

944 After the liberation of Donbass, the airport began work on air transportation of passengers, cargo and the production of aerial chemical works. 1950s In 1952, a squadron of Li-2 heavy aircraft was organized at the airport. In January 1957, a new air terminal designed by architect V. Solovyov opened its doors to passengers. throughput 100 passengers/hour. In 1961, the Stalino airport (like the city) was renamed Donetsk. Early 1950s


The rapid development of the airline occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the operation of the An-24, An-10, and Il-18 aircraft began.
In 1982, until the 1990s, on October 11, 1991, the Donetsk United Aviation Squadron was renamed the Donetsk Aviation Enterprise. In 2003, the enterprise was reorganized by dividing the airline (Donbassaero) and the airport, on the basis of which the Municipal Enterprise “Donetsk International Airport” was formed in accordance with the Ukrainian program for preparing Donetsk for Euro 2012 in 2011 construction company Construction of a new airport terminal has begun, the project of which was developed by specialists from Croatia. Airport project
g. Based on the decision of the Donetsk Regional Council dated November 24, 2011 No. 6/7-169, the municipal enterprise “Donetsk International Airport” was named after the famous composer Sergei Sergeevich Prokofiev. From that moment on, the airport began to be officially called the Municipal Enterprise “Donetsk International Airport named after S.S. Prokofiev”. On May 14, 2012, a new seven-story terminal with a capacity of 3,100 passengers per hour was opened at Donetsk airport.






Chronicle of events around Donetsk airport
On April 17, a group of citizens with the flag of Novorossiya came to the airport, as they approached, snipers appeared on the roofs of the terminals, and someone’s private jet took off from the runway. The conversation with the airport authorities did not work out; the SBU officers refused to communicate. It was not possible to resolve the matter peacefully; the airport began to be filled with military personnel, special forces, weapons and ammunition. Donetsk. 26 of May. Airport. Heroism and betrayal. Based on materials from Anatoly “El Murid”, . . Initially, our goal was to investigate the operation to seize the Donetsk airport on May 26, 2014, which resulted in the death of about 50 militiamen (not counting the losses of the relief detachments), most of whom were volunteers from Russia. . Russian volunteers. To three groups in Rostov region Volunteers from Crimea and Chechnya were added. The total number of the combined detachment was 120 people. The command of the detachment, at the insistence of “Sergei Ivanovich”, was carried out by former officer Boris Sysenko, who in a critical situation removed himself from command of the detachment. On the night of May 24-25, the combined detachment moved towards Donetsk in 5 KAMAZ vehicles. The detachment was supposed to join the Vostok battalion and come under the command of Khodakovsky.

Due to the lack of proper counterintelligence cover, the detachment already included at least one enemy intelligence officer on Russian territory. It turned out to be, as it turned out later, a fighter with the call sign “Schumacher”. . This man came along with the Crimean militias; he himself, in his words, comes from the Nikolaev region. He said that he did not serve in the military anywhere, but is on the territory of Ukraine under criminal investigation by order of the current Ukrainian government. I applied for the position of driver. Subsequently, in his backpack, which was accidentally opened (after the battle for the airport on May 26), the following characteristic items were found: 1) a walkie-talkie for communication with aviation, 2) an ICOM scanner, 3) an AK magazine, filled with tracers (one of the acceptable ways to “highlight” a target in battle - with tracers), 4) a 32 GB flash drive, on which in electronic format there were special instructions on conducting sabotage operations behind enemy lines, including instructions on adjusting artillery and aviation fire. Details are below. Perhaps he is still one of the “fighters” of the DPR militia and continues to conduct intelligence activities in the interests of the SBU. Close to “Schumacher” was a militiaman with the call sign “Odessa”, who may also be an agent of the SBU. Operation to “capture” the airport. The operation to seize the Donetsk airport was initially a crime because it contradicted the fundamentals of tactical operations. Its organization and planning was carried out by Khodakovsky, who declaratively prioritized the existence of certain informal agreements with representatives of the SBU and the command of a unit of the 3rd Special Forces Regiment (Kirovograd) guarding the airport. He tried his best to convince Boris Sysenko and the group commanders that these “agreements” existed. On the evening of May 25, a group of reconnaissance officers moved to the area of ​​Donetsk airport. “Granit” and “Stary”, on the basis of agreements reached by Khodakovsky, met with the SBU officer who headed the security service of the international airport. The latter informed them of the situation in the airport area and showed them a diagram of the new terminal. Upon arrival at the headquarters, “Granit” and “Stary” went to a meeting, which was attended by Khodakovsky, Sysenko and other officers. This group of people, while planning an operation to seize a complex infrastructure facility, drank alcoholic beverages. The report of the commanders of the groups that carried out reconnaissance of the area was not heard to the end. The planning of the operation was based on dubious information, the validity of which Khodakovsky tried to convince the commanders. Firstly, he tried to convince everyone that the Kirovograd special forces, located in the area of ​​the airport, due to certain “agreements” reached, would not open fire on the militias. Making the success of an operation dependent on agreements with the enemy is a sign of either betrayal or dementia. Secondly, by order of Khodakovsky, the groups that moved to the airport area did not take with them the MANPADS that were available. As he would later say in an interview with RIA-Novosti, the militias had MANPADS. Without available air defense systems (at least portable ones like the Igla MANPADS), it is impossible to carry out an operation to capture an operating airport. At the same time, the seizure of the terminal, which took place on May 26, 2014, could have only a vaguely understandable psychological effect. The militia had only one dummy MANPADS with them at the Donetsk airport. The operation began in the absence of full reconnaissance of the situation and with total misinformation on the part of its organizer. Around 2.00 On May 26, Khodakovsky gave the order to prepare to move part of the detachment to seize the airport. In his words, the main task of the detachment will be to “pose in front of journalists’ cameras,” since a 100% agreement was reached with the Kirovograd residents (3rd Special Forces Regiment) not to fire at each other. Around 3.00 a detachment of approximately 80 people moved to the airport to carry out the assigned task. The fighters partially occupied the building of the new airport terminal. The occupation of the airport terminal building took place without clashes. Around 7.00 Reinforcements moved to the terminal, which included, among other things, volunteers from Chechnya. Around 10.00 Khodakovsky completed negotiations with the command of the Kirovohrad special forces and, together with the fighters of the former Donetsk Alpha, left the airport. Direct command was further exercised by Boris Sysenko. After Khodakovsky’s departure, taking into account the reinforcements that arrived at 7.00, the number of militias occupying the airport was about 120 people. The further actions of the Kirovograd special forces were very different from the “agreements” that were communicated by Khodakovsky to the militia personnel. Ukrainian special forces positions were located in the old airport terminal building and in its surroundings. Without hiding and slowly, the Kirovograd residents began to equip firing positions to fire at the terminal occupied by the militia. We brought up mortars, established positions for the AGS-17 “Plamya”, and dispersed the snipers. Soon, PMC fighters were landed on the airport grounds and took up positions in the control tower and the surrounding area of ​​the airport. At about 11.00, the enemy opened fire on the militias who occupied the airport. The air strike was carried out by Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft, using NURS and automatic guns. PMC snipers opened fire with sniper weapons. In fact, Boris Sysenko, who was assigned to the groups to lead the operation, withdrew from command after realizing what had happened, sending the soldier to the duty-free store to buy alcohol. While the detachment was fighting, he was drinking alcohol, not having the necessary moral and psychological characteristics to organize defense. Instead of the easy capture promised by Khodakovsky, he led the detachment into a trap. Subsequently, the actual leadership of the detachments was carried out by group commanders, who acted for some time at their own discretion. Kirovograd special forces also opened fire with mortars, AGS-17 “Plamya”, machine guns and sniper weapons. Return fire was organized from equipped firing points. For this purpose, ATMs were even torn out and stacked in stacks to protect them from bullets and shrapnel. Then this became the basis for accusing the militia of looting, although the airport had been cleared by the Ukrainian military the day before. Some of the fighters, not knowing that the enemy would soon launch an air strike on the terminal, took up positions on the roof, placed firing points there, and brought up the AGS-17 “Plamya”.
(Photo. "Gypsy" with AGS and "Mir" on the roof. "Gypsy" will soon receive a slight wound to the head as a result of an air strike on the terminal, but will remain in service. He will die in one of the KAMAZ vehicles during the breakthrough. "Mir" will die during the breakthrough, his body will lie under sniper fire for three days before the militia can take it away.
When Ukrainian aviation began to attack them, the fighters began to retreat from the roof. The materials used in the construction of the airport, when hit by NURS, shells and mines, produced a huge number of additional destructive elements and provided very poor cover. The roof was strewn with gravel, which also acted as destructive elements when hit by shells. The first losses came from aircraft fire on the militias who had taken positions on the roof. The Chechens took the longest positions, trying to hide behind a smoke screen. This measure did not turn out to be very effective. Soon the detachment's losses amounted to two killed and several (one killed and almost all the wounded were from the Chechen detachment). Some of the existing electronically controlled doors were blocked (even though the power supply to the terminal was not interrupted). As a result, the withdrawal was carried out by creating an “artificial exit”. If everyone could get out at once, there might be fewer wounded. After part of the detachment retreated from the roof, the wounded and dead remained there. The wounded could not be rescued for a long time due to dense sniper fire, which was fired from the control tower. Everyone was pulled out later under heavy fire only on the third attempt. Aviation and artillery fire was very well adjusted. Negotiations between one of the spotters and the mortar gunners were intercepted through the Ukrainian radio that was given as a “gift.” (Photos of control room 1 and 2)

The distance from the new terminal to the control tower, which dominates in height above all other buildings, was 960 meters. Despite the considerable distance, the sniper fire was very accurate. It was fired from a sniper weapon with a caliber of at least 12.7 mm (most likely an M-82 Barrett or similar rifles). To do this, the dense fire of PMC snipers had to be suppressed with something. Of the heavy weapons, the detachment had only one 82-mm mortar and one AGS-17 “Plamya”, which was lowered from the roof. The mines attached to the mortar did not have fuses (!!!), and therefore turned the much-needed means of fire support into a pile of iron. The militia had to work on the control tower from the AGS-17 “Flame”. The maximum firing range of an easel grenade launcher is 1700 m, but the aiming range is much less. The fire on the tower had to be adjusted for a long time from the second floor of the terminal until the first hits, which weakened the sniper fire. After that, they were able to take the wounded from the roof. At the same time, the Kirovograd residents were verbally ready to provide a corridor for the evacuation of the wounded. PMC snipers fired at both the militias and the Kirovograd special forces. This may have been due to poor coordination between the opponents, perhaps due to agreements reached on the evacuation of the wounded. As a result, the deputy commander of the Kirovograd soldiers actually gave the order to open fire from the ZU-23 at the control room, from where the snipers were working. One way or another, many militias were wounded by fire from Kirovograd. By this point in time, Donetsk already knew about the failure of the operation. An operation was hastily prepared to release the detachment that had occupied the airport. About 400-500 people took part in it. The main problem remained the lack of coordination and unified command. The fighting in the vicinity of the airport on May 26 was carried out by: 1) the Vostok battalion of Khodakovsky and a detachment of the former Donetsk Alpha, 2) Boroday’s fighters, 3) Zdrilyuk’s detachment, 4) Pushilin’s detachment, 5) Oplot. These units also suffered significant casualties from sniper fire, as well as possibly from friendly fire amid poor coordination. Snipers worked on almost all approaches to the airport: in the area of ​​the METRO store (two mercenaries from the Baltic states were destroyed), from the side of SPARTAK (the sniper was working from a construction crane), from the side of the cemetery and runway, from one of the 9-story buildings on Stratonauts Street. What followed were openly provocative actions. “Iskra” received an order via mobile phone (from someone!!!) to make a breakthrough, since the airport was surrounded by the Ukrainian military. Don’t wait for the night and go out in small groups, but right now, before the “ring” is closed, load onto KAMAZ trucks and go out into the city, taking two killed and a few wounded. They will be provided with a corridor from the Donetsk side. In fact, there was a tight ring of encirclement only around the new terminal. On the territory of the airport, Kirovograd residents continued to fire at the militia, and there were PMC snipers in the vicinity. There were no significant enemy troops that tightly surrounded the airport. The militia were able to dive into only two KAMAZ vehicles; access to the other two was tightly blocked by sniper fire. That’s why KAMAZ trucks were loaded to the brim with people. Only the cover group remained at the airport. She will retreat later along the green line and will not suffer casualties. Around 18.30 two KAMAZ trucks made a breakout from the airport. Having received information that they were surrounded, the KAMAZs walked at full speed, the soldiers fired at everything that moved, and even rested. The initiator of this exit tactic was Iskra. Perhaps this played a tragic role when entering the city. The cover group advanced on foot through the greenery near 19.15-19.20 . She suffered no casualties and returned safely to Donetsk, which is additional evidence that there was no tight encirclement around the airport. When the groups made a “breakthrough”, Boris Sysenko remained in the cover group. He died of a heart attack on the eve of the group's retreat from the airport. Before breaking through into the greenery, the group had to overcome 300 meters under fire from snipers and machine guns. Shooting of KAMAZ vehicles with militias. At the entrance to Donetsk from the airport at that time, there were soldiers of the “Vostok” battalion concentrated in an ambush, numbering about 80 people from the 1st and 2nd bases of the battalion (the established name of the units) and other units of the militia. They received information that soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine were coming from the airport to break into Donetsk. The order was given to fire to kill. Two KAMAZ vehicles with militias leaving the airport were destroyed by soldiers of the Vostok battalion with heavy fire from small arms and grenade launchers. There were no Ukrainian special forces in the ambush; there was an order to open fire on their own soldiers. (Photo. Kamaz Kyiv Prospekt)
The first KAMAZ was hit and overturned on Kievsky Prospekt near the Magnolia store. There were more survivors in it than in the second. The second KAMAZ was hit on the street. Stratonauts in the area of ​​Putilovsky Bridge. When the KAMAZ was riddled and smashed, and the movement around them stopped, the Vostok fighters crawled closer and saw St. George’s ribbons on the corpses. The driver of the second KAMAZ received numerous wounds and blew himself up with a grenade. The second explosion was carried out by one of the wounded militiamen who remained conscious (he had fought in Afghanistan in the past). They thought that the fire was fired by Ukrainian soldiers. Of the 46 fighters traveling in two KAMAZ vehicles, 35 survived. A few days after the treacherous operation, volunteers from Chechnya left the DPR. Departure. After arriving at the base, the fighters who survived the breakout from the airport discovered strange facts. Personal property, as well as the remaining weapons of the victims, were stolen by the time they returned. AGS-17 “Flame”, traveling in one of the blown up KAMAZ trucks, soon surfaced in Pushilin’s detachment. The realization that they had been betrayed and sent by the command in the person of Khodakovsky to slaughter forced them to disperse throughout the city. Further more. Several fighters, camped on leave on the outskirts of Donetsk, were approached by “Schumacher” and “Odessa” (presumably spies). They checked on the soldiers in a friendly manner and urgently (ostensibly on orders) left for the location of the Vostok battalion. After some time, the attention of the militia was attracted by the crying of children and women’s cries of “Don’t shoot!” from the yard of a neighboring house. Jumping out into the bushes, they saw armed men in camouflage surrounding a neighboring house. The arriving Sonderkommando most likely confused the buildings in the dark. Most likely, their task was to clean up the surviving participants in the massacre. After this, the surviving soldiers had only one option - to leave Donetsk. We decided to break through to Bezler in Gorlovka. Some of the wounded who survived the massacre at the airport were able to be transported to Gorlovka in order to avoid “accidents.” New interesting details were also revealed there. It turns out that Bezler himself was preparing the operation to seize the Donetsk airport, developing it for five days, and conducting reconnaissance. The enemy became aware of this; most likely, Bezler also has Ukrainian agents working for him. Instead of an assault, they decided to make an “assault” on Khodakovsky, at the same time sending a special forces detachment of volunteers. People with experience in conducting special operations were thrown like infantry to treacherous execution. “Mole” with the call sign “Schumacher” was able to be identified by chance already from “Bes”. The militias who retreated to Gorlovka from Donetsk were able to organize the transportation of their belongings. By chance, as often happens, the transporters caught the Schumacher backpack. When they opened it, they discovered very interesting contents (see at the beginning). Further more - demands were received to return the backpack and its contents. There was a refusal. Betrayal. Why should what happened during the departure of the militia detachment from the Donetsk airport be considered precisely as a betrayal? In conditions of poor organization and chaos, losses from friendly fire in war are inevitable. The fact that this was precisely a betrayal, in addition to many other signs, is evidenced by the subsequent coverage of events. Look at this photo. (Photo. Corpses photo)
The worst thing about it is not the pile of militias riddled with bullets and shrapnel, the worst thing is the lenses of professional cameras on the right. . For what? For the report. There is a strict rule - to hide your losses, especially - never show them in all the bloody details. conclusions Why do the leadership of Russian militia units arriving in the Southeast initially turn on traitors like Khodakovsky? Why are their provision and support so poorly established? unacceptable. .

After the assault, the airport stopped working for its intended purpose. The militia made no further serious assault attempts.

10.julia.2014 Militias have encircled the airport in Donetsk
The army of the Donetsk People's Republic surrounded the airport named after Sergei Prokofiev. The Vostok battalion conducted an reconnaissance operation, which showed that the Ukrainian military continues to control the airport territory and is at the same time blocked there. The soldiers may try to break through towards the village of Karlovka, and the task of the militia is to prevent this.

The intensity of hostilities increased on August 10, and began in full force on the morning of August 24. Offers to surrender and irregular shelling followed. The special forces responded with dense, targeted fire. The Kirovograd group was reinforced by other troops.The DPR militia began shelling the airport with artillery on August 20. Until this date, fire was conducted on Marinka and Avdeevka - the largest settlements, controlled by Ukrainian troops near Donetsk. After this date, the shelling did not stop.

First full-scale assault

The first serious assault on the airport took place on the night of September 1, simultaneously with the attack on Lugansk airport.

Artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were in use. Tanks and other armored vehicles were used. But the defenders managed to repel this attempt, like all the others.

Other attempts

The DPR announced assault attempts on September 28, October 2, 3 and 6. After which they announced the capture of the airport. In fact, assault attempts were made every day, starting from the first of September.

Three answers to one naive question: “Why can’t the militias take Donetsk airport?” 1. Geographical location As intelligence commanders of the DPR Ministry of Defense told KP correspondents, the airport occupies an extremely profitable geographical position. It is located on a flat plateau that hangs over Donetsk and the surrounding area. Thanks to this, the closest point where the militia can approach - the so-called Putilov interchange - is located 1.5 kilometers from the airport terminals. We went with the scouts to this junction, made a video of the airport using a quadcopter, and ten minutes later we were spotted, shot at by snipers and covered with a salvo of mortars. Automatic grenade launchers fired from terminals, and mortars - from the territory of military unit A-1428 of the 156th anti-aircraft missile regiment of the Ukrainian air defense. This part is adjacent to the take-off field and is literally stuffed with caponiers, bunkers, tunnels and shelters, including anti-nuclear ones. The unit houses artillery, which in recent months has shelled Donetsk and suppressed all militia activity in the vicinity of the airport. The artillery also provided the “supply corridor” for the group sitting at the airport; the militia were unable to cut off the supply. The checkpoints that were set up at night were destroyed by artillery fire in the morning. And the militias also failed to suppress the artillery using counter-battery warfare. In the USSR, they knew how to build military installations and did not spare concrete. Infographics General plan of Donetsk Prokofiev Airport 1 - military unit A1428 air defense; 2 - Plant and base of the company that built the new terminal; 3 - military unit A1402, also air defense.

Infographics detailed plan of Donetsk Prokofiev Airport

1 - Monastery; 2 - Metro Supermarket; 3 - Toyon/Lexus Auto Center; 4 - New terminal; 5 - Bus station; 6 - Oil depot; 7 - Cemetery of old aircraft; 8 - Under construction VIP terminal; 9 - Hangars; 10 - Control tower (located outside the plan); 11 - Old terminal; 12 - Operating VIP terminal; 13 - Donbassaero Control Center; 14 - Hotel "Polet"; 15 - Civil Aviation Headquarters; 16 - Aviation repair center; 17 - Boiler room; 18 - Command and control tower.

Objects not related to airport infrastructure are circled blue outline.

. Donetsk airport - byword. He doesn’t want to disappear from the reports. I asked several questions on this topic to knowledgeable people from the DPR. This is the picture we got.

It is not punitive forces from special battalions who are stationed on the airport grounds, but military personnel. Moreover, from the most prepared units. They don’t expect anything good from us (justifiably so, by the way), so they will hold out until the end. The airport itself - a masterpiece of the Stalin era.

Givi and Motorola commanders of the Somalia and Sparta detachments And many others

Bridgehead for the attack on Donetsk
If you think that a narrow strip of bare land decides anything in modern warfare, you should at least read a little, even the simplest military literature. This version is for the little ones: Why Donetsk Airport is really needed. Both sides need the airport to demonstrate their victory in the conditions of a truce. Memorable the last word, each side wants to leave the last military victory for itself. This is very important for the masses; the airport will go down in history for centuries. This fact alone justifies all the sacrifices of the heroes. All other reasons are just dirt that it’s better not to even know. Elections must be held both in Ukraine and in new states. Therefore, no one wants to completely stop hostilities. After all, war is such a good distraction from other problems; even a small military victory raises ratings better than thousands of billboards and commercials. Here the opinions of the parties converge - for everyone, the airport is like a small theater on which the war is played out for news releases. Former Minister of Defense of Donetsk people's republic Igor Strelkov explained why the militias have not yet managed to take Donetsk airport. According to Strelkov, the difficulty lies in the fact that the punishers are not holed up in civilian buildings, but in an air defense unit where a bunker is equipped that is designed to carry out a nuclear strike. This was told by KP military correspondent Dmitry Steshin, who spoke with the commander. In this regard, it becomes clear why artillery strikes do not cause critical damage to the enemy - soldiers and armored vehicles on the surface are destroyed. Moreover, Strelkov notes, the Ukrainian army performs well in defense. These are Russians, the commander stated.