In July 1942, the command of the Baltic Fleet attempted to capture Sommers Island. The lack of necessary experience and lack of strength did not allow success then. For many years, the details of this landing were kept in the depths of the archive...

Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. The situation in the Baltic deteriorated again in the summer, when Soviet submarines began operating on enemy communications. However, their path from the Gulf of Finland ran past Sommers, a small rocky island*.

During the second half of 1941, there was a Soviet garrison on it, but then at the end of December the island was abandoned by our units and the Finns soon settled there. However, they were unable to sit for long on the windswept rocky piece of land and Sommers became a “no-man’s land.” But this did not last long: during the capture of Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuters, the island was occupied by units of the Finnish 22nd Coast Guard Company. The white nights allowed enemy posts to monitor the surface situation around the clock. And therefore, under the general leadership of the commander of the Main Fleet Base**, Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko developed a plan for his capture, approved by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko. By the beginning of the war, he had the rank of vice admiral and was deputy people's commissar of the Navy, and participated in organizing the defense of Nikolaev and Odessa. On October 22, 1941, by decision of Headquarters G.I. Levchenko was appointed commander of the Crimean troops. But the battles that unfolded there were unsuccessful for the Soviet units, and on the night of November 16, the troops of the 51st Army left Kerch. On November 19, the post of commander of the Crimean troops was eliminated, and on December 1, Levchenko was arrested by the NKVD. On January 24, 1942, he was expelled from the CPSU (b), and on January 29 he was sentenced to 10 years with deprivation of all awards. But unlike many commanders whose fates were tragic, the admiral’s request for clemency on January 31 was granted. On February 2, he was reinstated in the party (though with a severe reprimand). And although the former deputy people's commissar was demoted to captain 1st rank, deprived of all awards and ordered to be used in a lower job, his criminal record was cleared. In March 1942, he headed the Leningrad naval base. He was appointed commander of the Kronstadt naval base on June 25, 1942. So Gordey Ivanovich desperately needed success, as they say...

Unfortunately, a number of miscalculations were made when developing the operation plan. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. In fact, the Finns had a garrison of 92 people on Sommers with twelve guns (of which two 75-mm, which were superior in power to the guns of Soviet boats, three 45-mm and seven 20-mm anti-aircraft guns), two 81-mm mortars, seven heavy and five light machine guns. To capture the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in men, the landing party was noticeably inferior to it in firepower.

The reconnaissance also failed to reveal the enemy’s defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The peculiarities of the island's coast were not taken into account, which led to tragedy - during the landing, the well-armed and equipped soldiers who left the boats often drowned under the weight of the ammunition. The interaction with aviation was also not worked out, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and communication between the paratroopers (as well as the sailors) and the pilots was not provided for at all.

July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was headed by captain 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the diagram.

By the end of July 7, all forces intended for the operation were fully prepared, and at 23:33 the landing of troops and the loading of ammunition and special equipment began on Lavensaari. At 00:11 on July 8, the landing on the boats was completed, and two minutes later the ships began to enter the roadstead. At 00:30, the landing groups moved towards Sommers. Their transition was ensured by patrols, and from 00:35 - by four fighters. By one o'clock in the morning the covering detachment reached the target area. At the same time, from 00:40 to 00:59, 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, attacked the island in two waves from an altitude of 2300-4000 m. They bombed not very accurately - out of 120 100-kg bombs dropped, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by 2 raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, attacking from low altitudes in groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by 20-mm Oerlikon fire.

The plan for landing on Sommers Island

At 01:20, the landing groups turned around and went to the landing sites. The sea was relatively calm (swell up to three points), and visibility was simply excellent (oh, those white nights). At a considerable distance - 20-30 cables - the Finns discovered Soviet boats and opened fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 m and began the landing, which was completed within just five minutes. But at the same time, torpedo boat No. 152 and the “hunter” MO-110 were damaged.

Group II also had a hard time. Approaching the shore under fire, the sailors and paratroopers became convinced that the boats could not get close to it. Some of them had to repeat this several times, trying to find convenient landing spots under fire. When unloading the radio station, it either got wet or the batteries drowned and it could not work. The commander of the landing party refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 04:04 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade. The losses were growing - the hull of torpedo boat No. 62 was damaged, and the superstructure of the MO-402, the commander was killed, and 4 crew members were injured.

"Moshki" on patrol

III group was met with particularly intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and on TKA No. 121 the engines with the clutches turned on in forward stalled, and when starting the engines, it sat down on the rocks while moving. An attempt to save him after the landing was unsuccessful and he remained on the rocks. Fortunately, we managed to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of MO-413 from this group apparently showed indecisiveness and landed the fighters later than the others, and he needed an additional order from V.A. Salamatina.

But group IV found itself in the most difficult situation. Her ships were unable to suppress enemy firing points, encountering strong resistance. The commander made the decision to land the fighters at the point intended for the III group. But when the boats with the landing force began to go around, from the west, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 fell behind. It had to land the paratroopers “anyhow.” During the departure, it was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and its crew, under incessant shelling, transferred to torpedo boat No. 152. Torpedo boat No. 131 also suffered - its commander was killed, 3 paratroopers were killed and 4 were wounded.

In total, of the 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers ended up on the island, another 7 were injured on board the torpedo boat, and the patrol boat MO-402 did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned during the landing. It was also not possible to deliver some of the machine guns to the shore (apparently a large number, since sailing with the Maxims was simply unthinkable).

Torpedo boat with landing force

The Finns' reaction to the actions of the Soviet fleet turned out to be very quick and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Sommers garrison, all available forces were sent to its aid: the gunboats Uusimaa and Hämeenmaa, as well as 5 patrol boats. The first to arrive at the battlefield was the Uusimaa, which managed to repel the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then the Hämeenmaa and patrol boats arrived. During the battle with Finnish gunboats, torpedo boat No. 113 (commander - senior lieutenant A.I. Shumratov), ​​which attacked the enemy together with boat No. 73, was killed. The sailors reported the sinking of one of the gunboats, but this information turned out to be unreliable.

Finnish gunboat "Uusimaa" (same type "Hämeenmaa")

During the battles at Sommers, messages that flocked to the headquarters of both sides contained, as a rule, greatly exaggerated information about the enemy’s losses, but for the Finns (who overestimated their successes by only two times!) this did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was confident that heavy damage was being inflicted on the enemy and his ability to continue the fight was diminishing. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats received varying degrees of damage, not one of them was sunk.

At approximately 03.18, a prearranged signal was received from the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, which meant: “We have gained a foothold, please send a second echelon.” However, in response to Salamatin’s request, Levchenko responded half an hour late that the second echelon would be sent after occupying the island. And on Sommers there was a fierce battle. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Itapaya, all of whose guns were destroyed, and out of 26 defenders, only three managed to join their own. The rest were killed or wounded.

The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet planes carried out several attacks on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while fighters repelled raids by Finnish planes that carried out bombing attacks on support forces. During one of them, torpedo boat No. 33 from the covering detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat were also damaged.

Boat KM No. 911 puts up a smoke screen

Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, realizing that the battles were much more serious than planned, ordered the gunboat Kama to go to Sommers. Four torpedo boats and five patrol boats were sent to Lavensaari from Grafskaya and Battery Bays to reinforce the fighting forces.

In the morning hours of July 8, the activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats were running out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats, which provided great assistance to the island’s garrison, shot almost all of their ammunition. But the first of the German ships to take part in it, the minesweeper M 18, approached the battle site.

German minesweeper type M. “M 18” and “M 37” belonged to this type

At 08.48, the Soviet fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers, torpedo boat No. 22, which was trying to deliver ammunition to the paratroopers, caught fire and exploded from shell hits. By 11.30, the Finns managed to transfer a company to the gunboat "Turunmaa" and eight boats to help their garrison. consisting of 109 people. The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation; the Soviet landing force found itself in a difficult situation. Now the enemy side had not only firepower, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his gunboats supported their troops with fire from medium-caliber guns, while Soviet boats had only small-caliber guns. The Kama sent to Sommers was escorted by minesweeper boats, the speed of which with the installed trawls was very low. And although the Soviet coastal battery from Lavensaari entered the battle in the afternoon, its fire was not adjusted and was unlikely to bring much benefit to the paratroopers. The approaching Kama was forced to direct almost all its firepower against the Finnish ships.

At 14.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, which was part of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin, ordered the landing of the reserve in the amount of 57 machine gunners, the loading of the radio station and food onto torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101. At about 16.00 they headed to Sommers and after about 45 minutes, under fire from Finnish ships, they approached its eastern shore and began landing soldiers and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that it happened during the day, everything was organized extremely poorly - again, as at night, the radio station was drowned, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, they managed to remove 23 wounded from the shore. It became known from them that there was a heavy battle on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy’s mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other soldiers on the shore. Already on the way out, torpedo boat No. 31 was hit and exploded.

Torpedo boat at the pier of Lavensaari island

It seems that the Soviet command was not preparing for serious battles for Sommerse and there were no units on Lavensaari that could be sent to help the landed units without the threat of weakening the defenses of the base itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing in a timely manner, and then it was too late - German and Finnish planes, ships, boats and guns of the island garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supplies, removal of the wounded, and then the evacuation of the surviving soldiers impossible.

By the evening of July 8, instead of the gunboat "Kama", on which both main caliber guns were out of action, the patrol ship (according to the Western classification - destroyer) "Storm" and base minesweepers (specially built ships with strong artillery armament) entered the battle. -205 "Gaff" and T-207 "Shpiel". But their help was clearly too late. By this time, the Finnish minelayers "Riilahti" and "Routsinsalmi", and German ships - the floating battery "SAT 28" ("Ost"), the floating base (tender) "Nettelbeck" and the minesweeper "M 37", which replaced its brother, approached Sommers. M 18", which suffered greatly from Soviet air raids. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times, he approached the shore at 500 m. Its crew decided to demonstrate to the Finns their “brotherhood in arms”: a strike force of 10 people formed on the ship was sent ashore, as well as several boxes with hand grenades, which the garrison needed.

Soviet base minesweepers

On the night of July 9, the Soviet command made a last attempt to correct the situation. Torpedo boats launched by the patrol boat "Burya" together with the minesweeper T-207 were launched to attack the enemy ships. Three boats managed to fire one torpedo each, but they did not reach their targets, and two boats were hit. An attempt to deliver ammunition to the island on three patrol boats also ended in failure. When hit by a shell, it exploded and died along with everyone on board, including the commander of the landing detachment, Captain 2nd Rank K.A. Shilov, MO-306. And although firefights between enemy ships continued all day, the position of the landing force on the island became hopeless. True, in the morning the pilots reported that they had torpedoed two enemy ships five miles north of Sommers, but this message was not true and could not change the situation. On July 9 at 12.30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector radiogram reported to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, and the commander of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, about the situation in the area of ​​the islands of Lavensaari and Sommers. The report said that there were no forces and means to continue the operation, and on Sommers itself there had been no hostilities since zero hours on July 9. At 19:20 G.I. Levchenko received a new message, which, in particular, said: “...No movement was detected on the island. If a landing party is detected, I will continue the capture operation.”

Soviet torpedo boats launch an attack

On the night of July 10, an attempt was made to deliver two scouts to Sommers, but the blockade of the island by enemy ships was too dense and Soviet boats were unable to approach it. Skirmishes between ships also did not bring results. The pilots again reported sunk and damaged ships, but this had no effect on the activity of the German-Finnish forces. In the afternoon, they again tried to organize a reconnaissance group landing on Sommers, but then postponed this operation for the night. At 01:00 on July 11, Captain 1st Rank G.I. Levchenko, believing that the fighting on Sommers was over and trying to avoid new losses, decided to stop the operation.

In these battles, seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were lost. The base minesweeper was damaged, and the gunboat "Kama" was practically out of action due to technical faults - although one of the guns was able to be put into operation, the boat's steering failed and the steering was inactive for a long time and it had to be towed. On the first day of fighting alone, 10 torpedo, 5 patrol and 5 other types of boats were damaged.

But even this seemed not enough to the Finns, so they “included in the list of their victories” 8 ships and boats sunk by coastal artillery, the fleet reported 7 destroyed Soviet boats, and chalked up another gunboat (Volga) and 2 boats Finnish aviation. The Finns and Germans acknowledged damage to the minesweeper M 18, the gunboats Hämeenmaa and Turunmaa, and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army suffered 15 killed and 45 wounded, while the navy suffered 6 killed and 18 wounded. They estimated the Soviet losses in people as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and approximately another 200 people who drowned along with the lost ships. After the end of the fighting, the Finns covered Sommers with minefields and it remained under their control until Finland left the war in September 1944.

Although the operation to capture Sommers failed, it is unlikely that anyone today would dare to speak disrespectfully about the direct participants in the battles. Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the lack of provision of Soviet soldiers with special landing craft, the passivity of large ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ineffectiveness of the fire of coastal batteries, the Swiss historian J. Meister, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet Union, was forced to admit: “Russian landing units, although not numerous enough, as well as The crews of the torpedo boats fought very bravely, but they were unable to save the situation in this misguided operation."

* The length of the island is about 950 m, the width is about 450 m.
** So from June 1942 the Kronstadt naval base began to be officially called

It is not visible on the scale of all of Russia...

He is a torn piece of native land...

(C) Victor Garikov 2004.

Historical reference.

The lines from the song about Nevsky Piglet are absolutely suitable for this small rocky piece of land in the middle of the Gulf of Finland. The battle for the small island of Sommers was of great strategic importance for control of the sea communications of the Gulf of Finland. Possession of this island would allow our ships and submarines to significantly expand their operational space. On the contrary, the Finns could control a large territory, restraining the actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The significance of the battle was such that Comrade Zhdanov personally monitored this operation on our side, and Marshal Mannerheim personally on the Finnish side. And both in the evening, almost simultaneously, during the most dramatic period of the battle, around 17:00 on July 8, 1942, they gave orders to take the island at any cost and, accordingly, hold the island at any cost. To understand the scale of the battle, you need to know that 72 combat boats, 8 warships and up to 100 aircraft took part in the battle on our side. On the Finnish side, 15 combat boats, 3 auxiliary vessels and 10 warships, including German ones, and up to 50 aircraft took part. The Battle of Sommers Island is still one of the most significant victories at sea among the Finns. Despite the fact that the Marines, all 258 landing men were volunteers with combat experience with very experienced commanders, many of whom were medal bearers, the battle for the island cost us the loss of 350-358 people of all types of troops. Almost all those killed and captured as a result of the operation are still listed as missing. It's time to fix this mistake...

Mid-June 2014. Another call to my cell phone. Sasha Skrobach is calling. – Ilyukha, get ready, we’re going to Sommers Island at the end of July! The Russian Geographical Society (RGS) and the Search Movement of Russia (PDR) are organizing large-scale expeditions to godforsaken islands in the Gulf of Finland, where there were battles during the Great Patriotic War, which only narrow specialist historians know about. Task: not only to clarify the historical events related to the search work, but also to find burials that were not transferred to the mainland. A month flew by in preparing documents for the border zone and permits for search work. We studied all available information about the islands. The magazine “Military Archeology” No. 3 for 2014 helped greatly, in which Artem Khutorskoy, in the article “Forgotten Islands of the Gulf of Finland,” very interestingly described and illustrated the expedition to the islands in May of this year. Of course, Sommers is not Big Tyuters, all strewn with military equipment, but it will be all the more interesting and honorable to find traces of the war on this island. We called many times to coordinate the preparatory work with the representative of the Russian Geographical Society in St. Petersburg, Alexander Vlasov, and with the executive secretary, Elena Tsunaeva. We bought groceries. Most of which were paid for by the organizers of the expedition. We came to gather at our base, at the Museum of Military Archeology, which is now located on the Bolshaya Nevka embankment near the Petrovsky stadium, on the territory of the former Ecostroy plant. We pull out search equipment and equipment from all corners. In addition to shovels, on the advice of Artem Khutorskoy, a representative of the Russian Geographical Society from Moscow, they armed themselves with a pickaxe. He told us that there were only stones there. They even took climbing equipment with them, since part of the southeastern coast is an almost vertical cliff, about 15 meters high, which is not always possible to approach from the water. While we were packing and carrying backpacks and boxes to one place, we looked and were very surprised to see that one of the river buses, pulled ashore by a floating crane for short-term repairs and standing right next to us, had the name “Sommers” on the stern. Apparently this is a sign from above that the expedition will be successful.

Day one is Monday.

It's finally July 21st, Monday. 5:30 am. We are loading on Petrovskaya Spit, on the territory of the former yacht club. We drag our backpacks onto a small gray boat that looks like a hydrograph boat.

A round, white sticker with an experienced sperm whale on the wheelhouse reads: Expedition vessel RK-625.

We fill the holds with countless luggage. While we are carrying backpacks and bags, TV crews from the “My Planet” program are filming all kinds of reporting material.

Finally, at seven in the morning we leave the shore. The boat, with something clinking and dully tapping in its belly, rolls away with its stern from the quay wall. Having made a circle to shoot the TV crew who stayed on the pier specifically for filming, we sailed back to the parking lot and picked them up. Now our course is into the open bay.

To the right floats the gloomy frame of the stadium under construction on Krestovsky Island.

And here is Kronstadt.

On the left is the three-tier fort “Alexander”, also known as “Chumnoy”, the walls smoked from top to bottom to black, reminiscent of the filming of the film “Gunpowder” in 1987. Lenfilmovites then set fire to the fort to give the scene an entourage look. Until now, the fumes have not been washed away by rain. On the right side, next to Fort Kronshlot, there are two brand new light gray corvettes of the latest construction and two anti-submarine boats.

On the granite quay walls of the ship demagnetization station there are huge, three meters high, white bearing numbers for installing marine compasses.

At the approaches to the dam, the water becomes yellow-muddy. We approach Fort Constantine and moor at the newly opened, first in Russia, border crossing for small vessels and yachts to pass border control. We gave the documents to the friendly border guard. The border guards showed no interest in us, taking away copies of documents for study.

We were obviously lucky with the weather. Light breeze. Sunny. Slight rolling. The warm, steel, freshly painted, gray deck warms. There is something noticeably knocking and vibrating underfoot. Captain Andrei said that recently, a rope was wound around his four-blade propeller and the previously laboriously welded half of the bronze blade came off. Although it was welded using a piece of a bronze propeller from a raised German boat, just like our domestic bronze did not want to be welded. In general, I had to saw off half of the second blade with a grinder for symmetry. But the screw still wobbles a lot. At the stern, the sound is as if a fast train, passing by, is rattling on the switches. Therefore, the maximum comfortable speed is seven knots. It will take us at least 10 hours to get to Sommers this way. I'm studying our boat. Judging by the stamp on the rear hold lid, it was built in 1978. Almost the entire upper part is made of aluminum alloy for better stability. The deckhouse is riveted, like airplane structures. This raid boat was built according to Project 1415 “Flamingo”, for maritime anti-sabotage forces and means (PDSS). It could transport up to 15 tough paratroopers in the rear hold on special folding benches, but now it serves a completely peaceful purpose: delivering groups of researchers to the islands.
In the wheelhouse of the boat, Captain Andrey adjusts the boat's course with a miniature joystick. The crew got tired of turning the steering wheel thirty turns from right to left during various maneuvers, and they rebuilt the steering gear on their own, installing hydraulics instead of cables. In the cabin, painted white on the inside, two radio stations, mounted under the ceiling on the left, periodically broadcast loudly. The border guards are talking with the ships and the dispatcher.

The monitor of a small laptop standing to the left of the helm displays a nautical map and the position of the vessel. – Look at the computer! We pass on the starboard side of the transport "Siberia", which died during the Tallinn transition in 1941. Alexey Mukhin reported that on August 20, 1941, the transport VT-514 "Siberia" (captain Chugunov) was traveling from Tallinn to Leningrad, having 890 wounded on board and 410 people evacuated. The ship had Red Cross insignia. Subjected to numerous attacks by enemy aircraft. In the area of ​​Rodsher Island, the ship suffered heavy damage in the engine room and caught fire. With the help of escort ships, about 900 people were transported to Gogland Island, incl. 690 wounded. Two hundred wounded and nine crew members were killed during the raids. The rescue ship "Signal" took in tow the damaged motor ship, which by that time already had a list of 30°, and took it to Kronstadt. At 11:40 p.m., after another air attack, the Siberia sank near Seskar Island at 60°02"N 28°17"E. Andrey shows on the monitor a mark with the location of the sunken ship. The depth is about 20 meters. It makes you feel a little uneasy, imagining how a civilian ship with people sank in this place. I walk out of the wheelhouse onto the deck. TV people are not sitting idle at this time. They film from different angles, the team, the waves and the boat itself. To bring the action camera closer to the surface of the water, it was tied with tape to a Fiskars shovel.

For the shot, they were forced to raise and lower the mast of the boat using a hand winch, on which three lanterns hung vertically: two red and a white one in the middle. Which, in maritime terms, means: the ship has limited maneuver capabilities. Zhenya Rotar clicks her fashionable camera left and right. He does reportage photography for us. After a few hours of sailing, on the left side, in the middle of the bay, is the tenth anchorage.

Seven tankers of different colors and sizes are anchored, awaiting commands to load in the port of Ust-Luga. The traffic in this part of the bay is like on Nevsky Prospekt.

We are regularly overtaken by various passenger ships, tankers and dry cargo ships.

From one particularly seasoned, marine class, a wave reached us and rocked so much that one of the wooden boxes with spare parts from the boat was thrown over the side and in a second the half-opened gray box disappeared under the waves, and miraculously a 300-liter plastic container with water did not fall overboard. TV crews rushed to collect and pack various video equipment, imposingly laid out on the roof of the engine compartment. In order to avoid. As they say.

Here comes Sommers.

A completely uninhabited island. Everyone gathered at the bow of the boat, eagerly awaiting its arrival. On the approaches to Little Sommers Island(micro patch of granite) sticks out the bow of a cargo ship that ran into the island in the 50s. The ship's cargo - barrels of oil - spread across the bay.

Our boat enters one of the Sommers bays. The V-12 diesel engine began to slow down, then turned the propeller backwards and the boat poked its nose into the dilapidated concrete parapet of some white brick booth.

Holding the boat near the shore with the rotation of the propeller, we begin to unload countless luggage. Standing up along the chain, we transfer expedition equipment and food to the shore.

Having given a farewell siren to our colleagues, they waved to us and left for Bolshoi Tyuters.

Control time - I look at my watch. It took eleven and a half hours to get to the island. We gather the participants who have spread across the island to hold a quick group meeting. There are eight of us: three military correspondents from VGTRK television who have just returned from Donetsk: Alexander Sladkov, Igor Uklein and Vladimir Rybakov, military historians Alexey Mukhin and Alexander Skrobach, who is also a search engine from the association “St. George” and search engines from the association "North-West": Rotar Evgeniy, Irina and Ilya Durinsky. - Well, where will we stay? Who has an opinion?

I propose to explore the former three-story border guard barracks made of white silicate brick. - Yes, attention! This expedition commander, Sasha Skrobach, has returned from reconnaissance and commands: “We’re moving things to the second floor!” We carry our luggage through the central front door.

The barracks are in chaos. All the cabinets are wide open, parts and equipment, documentation and all sorts of rubbish are lying on the floor. We walk around and take photographs of the premises.

Here on the third floor is room No. 5 “Leisure Room”.

There are varnished light yellow desks, like in a classroom. The back wall of the classroom is decorated with a poster of a sailor looking out to sea through binoculars, next to a striped red and green border post.

At the bottom there is a large inscription: “The borders of Russia are sacred and inviolable.” Next to the poster is a mini-collage on a military theme.

There are pebbles, barbed wire, shell casings and fragments. And in the background is a painting, “The Battle of Sommers Island,” painted by some local craftsman in watercolors on whatman paper. Whatman paper was all warped from the dampness. This masterpiece must be saved. After all, border guards also honored the memory of heroic sailors.

On the second floor, on the landing, on a white painted door, there is another red sign, wrapped in hard transparent film, with the inscription: “No. 15. Sleeping room.” This is what we need. The most decent of all. And the main thing is that the name matches. We choose this former location for border guard soldiers to live in, sweep and wash the floor.

We bring beds, tables and chairs from other rooms. Fortunately, there is plenty of furniture in the barracks.

Now we need to carry out electrification. Without light, life is boring and uninteresting. The fluorescent ceiling lamps look quite functional. I'm looking for somewhere to get them. The only place is the distribution box under the ceiling. You have to reach up to the ceiling and disconnect the twists so as not to apply voltage to the entire floor. We twist the wires borrowed from local irons from the locker.

We connect through a long orange extension cord to the generator, in the form of a large red plastic suitcase, prudently placed outside so that its rattling cannot be heard. I pull the starter. ABOUT! Shaitan! The lamp on the ceiling started working! With a generator it's a completely different story. Shortly before the trip, the detachment generator insidiously “gave a blow.” Because of old age, he “had enough of a wedge,” and without a generator it’s hard for a modern person. Countless cameras, flashlights, phones and computers all require charging. And we have been without electricity for almost a week. Sergei Vladimirovich Kharlantyev helped out, not for the first time. For that, special thanks to him. Sergey has been helping search engines for a long time. Despite his constant workload, he himself sometimes goes into the forest to search. In general, on our uninhabited island it became quite comfortable and even homely.

Let's go check out the barracks.

There was a radar post.

Marine overcoats are still hanging in the clothing warehouse, and irons and boots are lying on the floor.

No machine guns were left in the armory. Just a couple of grenade pouches...

In the office, curious people tried to look into the safes. However, without much fanaticism.

The hotel turned out to be a great name.

In fact, the room is about ten square meters with one bed.

The premises of the soldiers' canteen.

WHO IS A WALKER IN A FIELD WITH A PLOW IS AN EATER AT THE TABLE!

Stock.

We go on reconnaissance to the well, which we learned about from the Russian Geographical Society report. Near the lighthouse keeper’s house, we actually find a working well with completely potable water. Or not drinkable. Gurgle! This bucket scooped up water inside the concrete rings of the well. I lift the bucket by the rope. The water looks pretty good. Doesn't smell. I'll taste it. Quite drinkable. At least let's hope. In half an hour, I think it will become clearer. In the house itself, the front door is wide open, hanging only on one top hinge. Nice little wooden house. We go up to the porch. Birds live in the rooms. Work clothes hang in the hallway. In the kitchen, a 50-liter gas cylinder is connected to a rusty gas stove. Almost full of gas. Perhaps it will be useful to someone in the future, in a difficult moment. Well, we’ve settled in and are cooking dinner on tourist gas stoves. Finally, you can relax and take a breath. What a beauty! It's a complete blast. Light, water, food, weather, nature! Frankly, no one expected such comfort. There are still a few hours before dark. We explore the surroundings.

The island is home to seagulls and cormorants. All the stones are covered with their white markings. Just in case, they flew together to the far side of the island and are now there, on the rocks, screaming like victims.

The stones themselves, especially in the coastal part, as soon as they get wet, become slippery, as if they were covered in ice or thickly coated with soap. Therefore, you need to approach the water here with extreme caution so as not to overhang and hit the rocks. There are no sandy beaches on the island. However, there is no forest either.

Although, sorry. There are trees.

Looking back from the highest point of the island, on which the lighthouse stands, I counted as many as 20 trees near the former Finnish house. According to local concepts, a whole forest.

Considering that the rest is almost all bare. The diversity of vegetation is amazing.creeping Juniper, heather, lingonberry, strawberry, blueberry, a bunch of all kinds of wildflowers.

Aspen and birch trees grow on the island, and there is even a real pine tree, as tall as a person.

Overwhelmed with emotions, we fall asleep only in the morning.

Day two is Tuesday.

After breakfast, we are going to explore the island. According to today's plan, we are interested in the coastline. Our task, having Finnish, Soviet data and historical photographs, is to determine the landing sites and battles of the paratroopers.

Our military historians Alexey Mukhin and Sasha Skrobach, armed with archival information and the manuscript of their own book “The Battles for Sommers Island,” lead us to a possible landing site.

Along the way we find the remains of a GAM-34 engine half buried in the shore pebbles and two rusty and crooked three-meter propeller shafts. The engine is split.

In fact, all that was left of it was a crankshaft with connecting rods. Lonely, oxidized, half-cracked pistons stick out in all directions. This is the place where the Finns pulled out our wrecked patrol boat Maly Okhotnik with tail number 306 for dismantling. Its bow sticking out of the water can be seen in archival photographs. We are discussing where the remains of other wrecked boats may be located. Alexey reads out the archived data. We are standing on a rocky beach and see a white and blue MI-8 helicopter flying towards us.

Descends over the helipad near the barracks. Sits down. Slowly, the propeller stops rotating. Several people got out of it and unloaded boxes and some white plastic plates onto the ground.

These are installers who have arrived to install real-time FSB tracking equipment on the tower with the FSB locator. Let's get acquainted. The guys arrived for three days, with the intention of working and relaxing, after which a helicopter would take them back. The island temporarily ceased to be uninhabited. Border guards left the island in 2008. They were replaced by a remote automated communication and observation post with the call sign “Razliv” - installed on a lighthouse-like, red and white tower, with a flat, board-like locator rotating on top, working both in the interests of the Rosmorport organization and the border service of the FSB of Russia .

- This is a multifunctional radio tower of the regional vessel traffic control system (VTS) in the Gulf of Finland . One of the installers enlightens us. Height 72 meters. Just like the title of a movie about submariners.

The tower is under construction.

The island as photographed from space between 2000 and 2005.

Towerdeveloped by the Lenproektstalkonstruktsiya design institute and commissioned in June 2005. The tower equipment operates from diesel generators in automatic mode. Two diesel fuel tanks provide it with work for a year. Once a year, specialists arrive on the island to fill the tanks and carry out maintenance.

Staircase of 25 flights. Generators hum quietly at the bottom of the tower.

There are no border guards in sight. No, everything's fine. Here they are, easy to remember.

A small border boat is coming towards us. Moored at the approaches to the island. A group of FSB officers arrives on a rubber boat with a motor. Apparently, cursing everything in the world, they are climbing towards us along a dilapidated and soiled L-shaped pier, balancing on bare iron channels. The senior group introduces himself: - Captain of the second rank Shchepochkin. Please show your documents. They contact their colleagues by radio, checking lists and passport data. Finally, everything is checked, there are no problems. Half an hour later, having refused the rich borscht, the border guards depart, wishing us good luck.On the former border flagpole, next to the barracks there is a mini-parade, lined with small concrete slabs. In a place of honor there is a border post, with a torn-off plaque, which once bore the coat of arms of the USSR, and later of Russia. There is an iron flagpole nearby. It even has a string for raising the flag, but at the top it came off the roller and got jammed. “Let’s fix the mechanism and raise the expedition’s flag,” I suggest. Zhenya quickly climbs onto the flagpole and tries to wedge the rope. In five minutes everything is ready. I'm going to get the flag.

I tie it tightly with small ropes so that it doesn’t get torn off by the wind. I solemnly raise the khaki flag of our association with a red star, St. George’s ribbon and the inscription “North-West”

We set out to explore the coastal part of the island. Half a day later we find the remains of the bottom and small parts of the engine from torpedo boat GK-5 No. 121. We return to the barracks for lunch. Irina prepares lunches and dinners and feeds us every day with all kinds of goodies: borscht, potatoes, salads, compotes.

The second half of the day was devoted to the task of finding out directly on the ground where the second landing group landed in the southeastern part of the island, where 30-35 people and a Maxim machine gun drowned. We spent a long time jumping over rocks, exploring crevices, checking maps and aerial photographs.

Here are the rocks at the northeastern tip, on which the paratroopers tried to land in three-point excitement.

The stones in the surf are all perfectly rolled by storms and polished by ice. They are covered with a thin, almost invisible layer of blue-green algae that live in dry form, waiting for storm waves to bring them life-giving moisture. But as soon as water gets on them, that’s it, amba - your legs move apart. It is almost impossible not to walk or get out of the water without outside help when there is excitement.

Slippery coastal stones played their evil role during the landing on the rocky south-eastern coast. It becomes clear why most of the Maxim heavy machine guns were sunk during the landing. And all the paratroopers were loaded with weapons and ammunition. In addition, they were fired at from mortars, cannons and machine guns by the entire Finnish garrison of the island of 93 people from land, and Finnish gunboats from the sea.

Traces from shell explosions are still visible on the granite rocks.

That day there were waves of force three - this is a wave height of up to 0.75 m. With masks and fins, Zhenya and Sasha examine the underwater coastal part of the landing site. We are looking for items related to the landing in order to find out the landing site and clarify the history of the events that took place here.

Alexey compares our and Finnish data on losses in people and weapons. How many Maxim machine guns were captured by the Finns. Like two. This means that the remaining eight were sunk during the landing. And no wonder. The weight of the assembled Maxim is 70 kg, even if you remove the body of the machine gun from the machine, then individually each part still weighs more than 30 kg.

Zhenya surfaced and took out from under the water a six-kilogram bronze ring mount for the reversible gearbox. After some time I found the remains of an optical device and small parts from the engine. No traces of the paratroopers themselves have yet been found. What also hinders the search is light green algae, which, like a long-haired carpet, tightly covers the entire bottom near the coastal part. Fry and transparent shrimps scurry around. The water warmed up to 20-22 degrees. Then they found several more items: a bronze valve with a broken copper pipe, small fragments of an engine.

Torpedo boat G-5

Our historians have a discussion about how exactly the G-5 torpedo boat approached the shore. Alexey reads in the documents that during the withdrawal after the landing, the torpedo boat flew ashore, since the reverse clutch of the left engine was turned back, and the right engine was turned forward. We are trying to understand exactly what it looked like based on the crevice we saw where the boat was sunk. Could he have caught on a stone in the middle of the small bay in which Sasha and Zhenya were snorkeling? What was the wind like? Alexey immediately reads out that the sea is north and the swell is 3 points, which means there were problems approaching the shore.

And why are the remains of this boat lying in another part of the island? They came to the conclusion that after the war the Finns dragged the remains of the boats to a more convenient place for hauling them ashore and then cutting them up for recyclable materials.

The third day is Wednesday.

On Wednesday after breakfast, armed with Finnish war photographs, we set off to search for a mass grave.

For half a day we were engaged in georeferencing using Finnish military photographs. They thought this way and that. We were guided by the configuration of the stones and the location of the Finnish pillars and the shed for boat accessories. Now of course they are not. Therefore, they looked for hollowed-out holes in the rocks for installing pillars. We identified the probable location and began digging holes in the pebbles using picks and shovels.From the plexiglass found on the third floor in the locator post, we make a special tablet, scratching the main contours of the photograph using the tip of a knife. To directly overlay the outline of a photograph onto the terrain through plexiglass. That's what we did after lunch. Alexey Mukhin, by this time had already hollowed out a hole about a meter deep in the scree of cobblestones. For the sake of digging a hole, he even refused to go to lunch and was mercilessly burned in the sun. The outline on the plexiglass made it possible to more accurately determine the possible location of the mass grave.

Placed poles in the place where the boathouse stood

and telephone poles.

It was decided to dig another hole in the stones nearby, one and a half meters away.

They worked like this: one person loosened the stones with a pick, after which the large stones were thrown out by hand, and the small things were thrown out with a shovel.

While shoveling stones in a big way, the red-hot shovel made such a noise that it was difficult to talk to each other. A group of war correspondents filmed the process in the heat, dripping with sweat. Volodya and Igor took turns carrying a heavy camera and a tripod on their shoulders. Igor joined us and with a pickaxe, and then with a shovel in his hands, helped us as best he could. The hard labor continued until the evening and then Alexey came across a small phalanx bone from a human finger. A rotten steel cartridge case from a three-ruler gun was found nearby.

With tripled energy they began to tear off the lintel between the pits and after two hours the pits turned into a “trench for shooting from a horse while standing.” However, nothing more was found. It was clear that we were somewhere very close. But where? A mass burial cannot be small and it is difficult to lose it. More carefully examining the territory of the pebble isthmus littered by the border guards, they found four rotten soldiers' mugs with the inscription LMZ (Lysyevsky Metal Plant), the neck of a Soviet pre-war flask and several boots twisted and shriveled with time, suspiciously similar to sea boots from the war.

On the coastal part, under a pile of modern metal debris, pieces from a military boat were found.

High-speed screws made of steel. It looks like it was made during wartime. Two powerful steering shafts. Wooden body.

Sasha Skrobach suggested that these are remnants of the Germancoastal minelayer"KM" Kusten Minenläger ( Kusten Minenleger).

Next to him lay objects clearly associated with the landing: opened zinc from cartridges for a three-line rifle with heavy bullets mod. 1930 (there was a yellow stripe on the lid), a zinc lid for RGD-33 grenades and an insert in a zinc box with Kaveshnikov fuses for F-1 lemon grenades. We found two telecoils without a cable. It is unlikely that it was abandoned by post-war border guards, since all the items found were of pre-war production (except for one telephone coil produced in 1942). Stunned by the struggle with stones in the scorching sun, we wander “Home” to the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue to deepen and widen the hole in the morning.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time we noticed that there was a pile of bricks next to the torn up Namyyama. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

There was an assumption that perhaps our soldiers or border guards used these bricks to decorate the burial. With tripled energy we expand and deepen the hole. Nothing. No sign. Stupor ensues. It cannot be that the Finns would put up a cross and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. A meter away we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of test pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in the stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. The assumption arose that this was the desired place.

Perhaps the mass grave was moved, and ash and sawdust were poured into the hole so that they would not be blown away by the wind. But the finger bone remained on the surface and over time fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that there is a high probability that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of military sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941–1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters were transferred here. But this remains to be verified in military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater examination of the supposed site of the death of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, which was delivering ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers.
On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Deep crevices 4-5 meters deep begin right next to the rocky shore.

In them we were able to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, remains of wooden casing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shell casings from a 45 mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a 20 mm casing. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the boat's propeller shafts ashore.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out of the cracks with an improvised pry bar. Storms and ice, even at depth, hammer them into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at depth by huge boulders several times larger. These autumn and winter storms are terrible. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged to the depths by storms.

The stone appears in archival photographs.

Actually, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - we need to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with more small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, lead-insulated wires. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not so. Damn algae and slight excitement are getting in the way.

We take his finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing in a sophisticated manner, holds his elbow with his hand. He had already crashed onto the rocks twice before he came out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

A total of 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one MO type, five G-5 type torpedo boats, one D-3 type torpedo boat and one Sh-4 type) and 3 G-5 type torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Under the water, some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out in a crevice.

And here is a mysterious object close up, similar to a receiver from Maxim, among the fry and Baltic shrimp.

Separate parts of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, raised from under the water.

Remains of propeller shafts, with a bronze bushing.

During dinner, the whole team discussed how a modern Russian army would cope with such a task of capturing and holding the rocky Sommers Island. What if it were possible to actually conduct exercises of modern anti-sabotage forces and equipment, marines and other naval forces not on a flat pebble or sandy beach, in the absence of waves, but in conditions similar to those in 1942? War correspondent Alexander Sladkov called his friends at the General Staff about this, with a proposal to discuss this idea among the military.

In the sleeping quarters of the barracks, on the table covered with a green raincoat instead of a tablecloth, they set up an impromptu museum of finds.

A painting of local border guards was mounted on the wall above it.

And here is the place from which the artist painted the painting "The Battle of Sommers Island"

Day five - Friday.

Let's explore the island.

Our historians Alexander and Alexey plot the identified military structures on the diagram.

Their coordinates are recorded and photographs taken.

There are a lot of fortifications on the island.

The date 13 is scratched on the smooth rock (with a bayonet or something?) III/40.

Apparently our Red Army soldier thus immortalized the end of the “Winter War”.

The Finns, in turn, wrote in calligraphy on the still-uncured concrete of the pier they built the date “07/27/1943” and the abbreviated name of the military unit that apparently built the pier. There are machine gun nests everywhere, pillboxes made of stones fastened with concrete, trenches made of granite leading up to them. At one of the bunkers, war correspondent Igor found the front double leg from a machine gun mounting to MG-08/15.

In the middle of the island, right next to the lighthouse, a real concrete two-story bunker with an armored cap was built. At the bunker, after the war, border guards built an observation post made of white brick.

At the northern tip of the island, a battery for two guns was built from concrete, on the site of a coastal gun battery for 120 mm that was unfinished during the First World War (at that time only the foundations could be built). Vickers guns. Our historians determined this by 22 bolts sticking out in a circle from the concrete. And right under the lighthouse, in the rock, a huge L-shaped cave was carved out. The entire perimeter of the island is surrounded by barbed wire.

Along the shore along the perimeter of the island lies rusty, half-rotten barbed wire.

This was all set up by the Finns after the landing, as they were afraid of further attempts to storm the island.

All around there are picturesque piles of scrap metal left behind by border guards. All the crevices and slopes near the houses are filled with pipes of all types and sizes, boxes, barrels, the remains of various equipment, ropes, cables, masts from antennas and locators. What is there?

The remains of a border locator or jammer.

Perhaps it was a ground-based powerful jamming complex "Pelena-1"

Even the historical shelter cave under the lighthouse is chock-full of iron, and at any moment you might sprain your leg. Almost everywhere on the island there are parts from two-stroke diesel engines that served as diesel generators.

The generators themselves were dragged to the bay onto the beach and abandoned.

On the nameplate of one of them I read: “Yaroslavl Motor Plant YAZ 1992.”

It can be seen that they were once carefully covered with awnings while awaiting loading. But something has changed in plans.

And the unused units remained as part of the landscape. Now the radiators have been removed from them, the valve covers have been unscrewed, as I understand out of curiosity.

The wind left only white fragments from the awnings.

In the generator room near the barracks there are four quite vigorous generators. Fuel equipment and instruments are connected.

Oil filled.

One has a full tank of diesel fuel.

In supply tanks hanging on the wall, the indicator shows half the level.

There are only no batteries and the villains took away the radiators in the color met. I think some of them will start without problems. There are also generators in the lighthouse service house.

Countless spare parts for them are piled up in various workshops and storerooms. It's a sad feeling looking at all this mismanagement. I seem to understand that this is the twenty-first century, imported diesel engines have long replaced obsolete domestic ones. But still, something aches in my chest. Still, a lot of people's money was spent on this.

Here is the main fuel storage. Judging by the persistent smell, it still contains diesel fuel.

Hoses for refueling from a ship.

A labyrinth of fuel taps.

A beautiful plastic bucket filled with diesel fuel and a funnel.

And these are the remains of the DT-75 tractor. It is unknown when he got here.

Lastly, we dive at the L-shaped pier, where, according to our data from aerial photography, a German boat was sunk. Direct hit from IL-2.

But the pier was rebuilt after the war.

And the remains of the boat were dragged somewhere so that it would not interfere with the mooring. Again we remember about scuba gear. To scuba dive, you must obtain permission from the border guards in advance. Everything is strict with them. The very presence of scuba gear and other diving equipment on board a boat without the appropriate permission is considered by border guards as a provocation. And it is punishable by cancellation of the permit and deportation back to the city. In general, we will prepare for the next expedition in advance.

Day six is ​​Saturday, which is also the last day.

At seven in the morning, we go to the memorial plaque from the Russian Geographical Society to lay a wreath in the form of an anchor with ribbons on which it is written: “In memory of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland from the search association “North-West”.

We place a traditional soldier’s mug with vodka and bread on the stones, fire a flare salute and place a red flag on a long aluminum pole, thanks to which the mini-memorial, newly created this year, is now visible from afar.

War correspondents interview members of the expedition. From the top of the cliff we see our boat going to the island. It's time to get to the pier to load. We say goodbye to the island. During the time we spent here, we all became close to this uninhabited island and don’t want to leave here. I wish I could stay here for three more days. Goodbye Sommers!

We take photographs for memory.

It took 12 hours to get to St. Petersburg. Upon the arrival of our boat at the pier, we were solemnly greeted by the local ship broadcast of the “Farewell of the Slav” march. The expedition is over.

Results of the expedition:

We carefully examined the entire island, specifying the locations of the battles. We found the wreckage sites and the remains of all three dead boats, two torpedo boats and one small Okhotnik. Torpedo boats TKA G-5 No. 121, TKA D-3 No. 22 SKA MO No. 306 Patrol boat Maly Okhotnik. They dug up a stone isthmus where there supposedly should be a mass grave and found that the remains had been transferred. Where is a separate question for research. We collected historical artifacts related to the landing for museums. Conducted photo and video recording of historical places and buildings. Material has been collected for articles and a film that should attract public attention to the history of events on the islands in the Gulf of Finland. Well, they put forward an initiative for the Ministry of Defense to conduct tactical exercises to capture and defend Sommers Island with modern means under the conditions of 1942 through troops of the Western District or the Baltic Fleet, in order to test how successfully today’s troops can operate in real conditions, and not on show beaches for landing.

July 1942, Baltic Fleet

In July 1942 The command of the Baltic Fleet attempted to capture Sommers Island.
Stabilized in the winter of 1941-42. The situation in the Baltic deteriorated again in the summer of 1942, when Soviet submarines began operating on enemy communications. However, their path along the Gulf of Finland ran past the island (Finnish: Someri) - a small rocky island (dimensions 950 by 400 meters).

During the second half of 1941, there was a Soviet garrison on it, but then at the end of December the island was abandoned by our units and the Finns soon settled there. However, they were unable to sit for long on the windswept rocky piece of land and Sommers became a “no-man’s land.” But this did not last long: when they captured Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters in the spring of 1942, the Finnish command landed a garrison on the island (part of the 22nd separate coast guard company), equipped an observation point and a coastal battery. The island became an important point in the Finnish-German anti-submarine defense system in the Gulf of Finland. Its garrison was 92 people, armed with 5 guns (two of them 75-mm caliber, three 45-mm caliber), 7 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, 2 81-mm mortars, 7 heavy and 5 light machine guns. The Finnish command realistically assessed the possibility of a Soviet landing, so 4 strong defense points were equipped on the island, making up a single defensive system. The white nights allowed enemy posts to monitor the surface situation around the clock. When the command of the Baltic Fleet in the summer campaign of 1942 began massively sending submarines from Leningrad to enemy communications, it was decided to correct the mistake and return the island to the control of Soviet troops. The author of the idea and plan of the operation was the commander of the Kronstadt naval base - the main base of the Baltic Fleet, Captain 1st Rank G. I. Levchenko. And therefore, under his general leadership, a plan for his capture was developed, approved by the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet.
Before this, Vice Admiral Gordey Ivanovich Levchenko, as Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, participated in the defense of Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol and was the commander of the Crimean troops, but for the surrender of Kerch in January 1941 he was demoted in military rank to captain 1st rank (see). So Gordey Ivanovich needed success, as they say, desperately...
Unfortunately, a number of miscalculations were made when developing the operation plan. For example, the enemy forces were estimated at only 60-70 soldiers with two or three guns. To capture the island, a detachment of 250 people with ten heavy machine guns was allocated, that is, having a significant advantage over the enemy in men, the landing party was noticeably inferior to it in firepower.
The reconnaissance also failed to reveal the enemy’s defense system, which included four well-equipped strongholds. The peculiarities of the island's coast were not taken into account, which led to tragedy - during the landing, the well-armed and equipped soldiers who left the boats often drowned under the weight of the ammunition. The interaction with aviation was also not worked out, as a result of which the raid, which was supposed to suppress the Finnish defense, only led to the loss of the element of surprise, and communication between the paratroopers (as well as the sailors) and the pilots was not provided for at all.
July 5 in Kronstadt G.I. Levchenko played a tactical game. The command of the operation at sea was entrusted to the commander of the torpedo boat brigade, Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Salamatin, the landing detachment was headed by captain 2nd rank K.A. Shilov, the landing detachment was commanded by Major I.V. Pasko. Contrary to the initial instructions, they decided to act not in three, but in four points. In accordance with this, four groups were formed, the composition and location of which are shown in the diagram.

By the end of July 7, 1942 All forces intended for the operation were fully prepared and at 23-33 the landing of troops began on Lavensaari, loading of ammunition and special equipment.

At 00-11 on July 8, the landing on the boats was completed, and two minutes later the ships began to enter the roadstead.
At 00-30 landing groups moved towards Sommers. Their transition was ensured by patrols, and from 00-35 by four fighters.
By one o'clock in the morning The covering detachment entered the designated area.
At the same time, from 00-40 to 00-59 12 DB-3 bombers of the 1st Guards Mine and Torpedo Regiment, under the cover of fighters, attacked the island in two waves from an altitude of 2300-4000 m. They bombed not very accurately - out of 120 100-kg bombs dropped, 37 fell into the water. The Finnish garrison responded with anti-aircraft fire. This was followed by 2 raids by Il-2 attack aircraft, attacking from low altitudes in groups of 3 aircraft. It is not known what the effectiveness of the attack was, but two aircraft were damaged by 20-mm Oerlikon fire.
At 01-20 The landing groups turned around and went to the landing sites.

The sea was relatively calm (swell up to three points), and visibility was simply excellent (oh, those white nights). At a considerable distance - 20-30 cables - the Finns discovered Soviet boats and opened fierce fire on them. Despite this, the first group approached the shore at a distance of 10-12 m and began the landing, which was completed within just five minutes. But at the same time, torpedo boat No. 152 and the “hunter” MO-110 were damaged.
Group II also had a hard time. Approaching the shore under fire, the sailors and paratroopers became convinced that the boats could not get close to it. Some of them had to repeat this several times, trying to find convenient landing spots under fire. When unloading the radio station, it either got wet or the batteries drowned, and it could not work. The commander of the landing party refused to go ashore in such conditions and was landed on the island only at 04-04 on the orders of the commissar of the torpedo boat brigade.
The losses were growing - the hull of torpedo boat No. 62 was damaged, and the superstructure of the MO-402, the commander was killed, and 4 crew members were injured.


III group was met with particularly intense fire. It was not possible to approach the shore immediately, and on TKA No. 121 the engines with the clutches turned on in forward stalled, and when starting the engines, it sat down on the rocks while moving. An attempt to save him after the landing was unsuccessful, and he remained on the rocks. Fortunately, we managed to remove people, as well as documents and weapons. The commander of MO-413 from this group apparently showed indecisiveness and landed the fighters later than the others, and he needed an additional order from V.A. Salamatina.
But group IV found itself in the most difficult situation. Her ships were unable to suppress enemy firing points, encountering strong resistance. The commander made the decision to land the fighters at the point intended for the III group. But when the boats with the landing party began to go around, from the west, the damaged torpedo boat No. 71 fell behind. It had to land the paratroopers “anyhow.” During the departure, it was set on fire by artillery fire and died, and its crew, under incessant shelling, transferred to torpedo boat No. 152. Torpedo boat No. 131 also suffered - its commander was killed, 3 paratroopers were killed and 4 were wounded.
In total, of the 256 soldiers taken on board by the landing detachment, 164 soldiers ended up on the island, another 7 were injured on board the torpedo boat, and the patrol boat MO-402 did not land 15 people. The rest were killed or drowned during the landing. It was also not possible to deliver some of the machine guns to the shore (apparently a large number, since sailing with the Maxims was simply unthinkable).
The Finns' reaction to the actions of the Soviet fleet turned out to be very fast and energetic - immediately after receiving a message from the Sommers garrison, gunboats, as well as 5 patrol boats (Armament: 1 x 20 mm), were sent to his aid.
The first to arrive at the battlefield was the Uusimaa, which managed to repel the attack of Soviet torpedo boats on the way to the island. Then the Hämeenmaa and patrol boats arrived. During the battle with Finnish gunboats, torpedo boat No. 113 (commander - Senior Lieutenant A.I. Shumratov), ​​which attacked the enemy together with boat No. 73, was killed. The sailors reported the sinking of one of the gunboats, but this information turned out to be unreliable.
During the battles at Sommers, messages that flocked to the headquarters of both sides contained, as a rule, greatly exaggerated information about the enemy’s losses, but for the Finns (who overestimated their successes by only two times!) this did not have such serious consequences as for the Soviet command. After all, it was sure that heavy damage was being inflicted on the enemy, and his ability to continue the fight was decreasing. In fact, although many Finnish ships and boats received varying degrees of damage, not one of them was sunk.
Around 03-18 From the paratroopers fighting on Sommers, a prearranged signal was received, meaning: “It has gained a foothold, please send a second echelon.” However, in response to Salamatin’s request, Levchenko responded half an hour late that the second echelon would be sent after occupying the island.
And on Sommers there was a fierce battle. The paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds - Itapaya, all the guns of which were destroyed, and out of 26 defenders only three managed to break through to their own. The rest were killed or wounded.
The aviation of both sides was active. Soviet planes carried out several attacks on enemy positions on the island and attacked ships and boats, while fighters repelled raids by Finnish planes that carried out bombing attacks on support forces. During one of them, torpedo boat No. 33 from the covering detachment received minor damage, and its commander was killed. Two enemy boats and a gunboat were also damaged.

Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, realizing that the battles were much more serious than planned, ordered the gunboat (speed 8-10 knots) to go to Sommers. From Grafskaya and Batareinaya bays (the village of Shepelevo, 45 miles from Sommers to the southeast, where the Shepelevsky lighthouse is, see) four torpedo and five patrol boats were sent to reinforce the fighting forces.
In the morning hours of July 8 The activity of the parties decreased significantly, as the Soviet boats ran out of fuel, many of them were damaged, and the Finnish gunboats shot up almost all their ammunition. But a German approached the battlefield
At 08.48 The Baltic Fleet suffered a new loss: when approaching the eastern part of Sommers, torpedo boat No. 22, which was trying to deliver ammunition to the paratroopers, caught fire and exploded due to shell hits.
Finns by 11-30 To help their garrison, the Germans managed to transport a company of 109 people on a gunboat and eight boats.
The arrival of reinforcements finally changed the situation; the Soviet landing force found itself in a difficult situation. Now the enemy side had not only firepower, but also numerical superiority. In addition, his gunboats supported their troops with fire from medium-caliber guns, while Soviet boats had only small-caliber guns. Our gunboat “Kama”, sent to Sommers, was accompanied by minesweeper boats, the speed of which with the installed trawls was very low. And although the Soviet coastal battery from Lavensaari entered the battle in the afternoon, its fire was not adjusted and was unlikely to bring much benefit to the paratroopers. The approaching gunboat "Kama" was forced to direct almost all its firepower against the Finnish ships.
At 14-30 The commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector, which was part of the Kronstadt Naval Base, Captain 1st Rank S.D. Soloukhin, ordered the landing of the reserve in the amount of 57 machine gunners, the loading of the radio station and food onto torpedo boats No. 11, 30 and 101.
Around 16-00 They headed towards Sommers and after about 45 minutes, under fire from Finnish ships, they approached its eastern shore and began landing soldiers and unloading supplies. Despite the fact that it happened during the day, everything was organized extremely poorly - again, as at night, the radio station was drowned, and with it 13 paratroopers. True, they managed to remove 23 wounded from the shore. It became known from them that there was a heavy battle on the island and it was necessary to suppress the enemy’s mortar battery. But it was not possible to establish contact with the landing force, since, apart from the wounded, there were no other soldiers on the shore. Already on the way out, torpedo boat No. 31 was hit and exploded.
It seems that the Soviet command was not preparing for serious battles for Sommerse and there were no units on Lavensaari that could be sent to help the landed units without the threat of weakening the defenses of the base itself. Therefore, it was not possible to strengthen the landing in a timely manner, and then it was too late - German and Finnish planes, ships, boats and guns of the island garrison made the delivery of reinforcements, supplies, removal of the wounded, and then the evacuation of the surviving soldiers impossible.
By the evening of July 8 Instead of the gunboat "Kama", on which both main-caliber guns were out of action, a patrol ship and base minesweepers (specially built ships with strong artillery armament) entered the battle. But their help was clearly too late. By this time, Finnish minelayers "Riilahti" and "Routsinsalmi" (Armament: 2 x 75 mm, 2 x 40 mm, 1 x 20 mm, 3 bullets) and German ships - the floating battery "SAT 28" - approached Sommers "(Ost, 1 150 mm) - a converted soil hauling scow or bulk carrier. Officially, it was listed as a carrier of heavy artillery (Schwere Artillerie Trager - SAT). , the floating base (tender) "Nettelbeck" (4x105mm guns?) and the minesweeper, which replaced its brother "M 18", which suffered greatly from Soviet air raids. "M 37" took part in the evening shelling of the positions of Soviet paratroopers. At times he came within 500 m of the shore. His crew decided to demonstrate to the Finns their “brotherhood in arms”: a strike force of 10 people formed on the ship was sent ashore, as well as several boxes with hand grenades, which the garrison needed. On the night of July 9, the Soviet command made a last attempt to rectify the situation. Torpedo boats launched by the patrol boat “Burya” together with the minesweeper T-207 were launched to attack the enemy ships.

Three boats managed to fire one torpedo each, but they did not reach their targets, and two boats were hit. An attempt to deliver ammunition to the island on three patrol boats also ended in failure. When hit by a shell, it exploded and died along with everyone on board, including the commander of the landing detachment, Captain 2nd Rank K.A. Shilov, MO-306. And although firefights between enemy ships continued all day, the position of the landing force on the island became hopeless. True, in the morning the pilots reported that they had torpedoed two enemy ships five miles north of Sommers, but this message was not true and could not change the situation. On July 9 at 12:30, the commander of the Island Coastal Defense Sector radiogram reported to the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Tributs, and the commander of the Main Base, Captain 1st Rank Levchenko, about the situation in the area of ​​the islands of Lavensaari and Sommers. The report said that there were no forces and means to continue the operation, and on Sommers itself there had been no hostilities since zero hours on July 9. At 19-20 G.I. Levchenko received a new message, which, in particular, said: “...No movement was detected on the island. If a landing force is detected, I will continue the capture operation.”
On the night of July 10, 1942 An attempt was made to deliver two scouts to Sommers, but the blockade of the island by enemy ships was too dense and Soviet boats were unable to approach it. Skirmishes between ships also did not bring results. The pilots again reported sunk and damaged ships, but this had no effect on the activity of the German-Finnish forces. In the afternoon, they again tried to organize a reconnaissance group landing on Sommers, but then postponed this operation for the night.
At 01-00 July 11, 1942 captain 1st rank G.I. Levchenko, believing that the fighting on Sommers was over and trying to avoid new losses, decided to stop the operation.
In these battles, seven torpedo boats and a small hunter of the Baltic Fleet were lost. The base minesweeper was damaged, and the gunboat "Kama" was practically out of action due to technical malfunctions - although one of the guns was able to be put into operation, the gunboat's steering failed and was inactive for a long time and had to be towed. On the first day of fighting alone, 10 torpedo, 5 patrol and 5 other types of boats were damaged.
But even this seemed not enough to the Finns, so they “included in the list of their victories” 8 ships and boats sunk by coastal artillery, the fleet reported 7 destroyed Soviet boats, and another gunboat (“Volga”) of the same type “Kame” and 2 boats Finnish aviation chalked it up. The Finns and Germans acknowledged damage to the minesweeper M 18, the gunboats Hämeenmaa and Turunmaa, and several boats. According to Finnish reports, the army lost 15 killed and 45 wounded, and the navy lost 6 killed and 18 wounded. They estimated the Soviet losses in people as follows: 149 prisoners, 128 killed on the island and approximately another 200 people who drowned along with the lost ships. After the end of the fighting, the Finns covered Sommers with minefields and it remained under their control until Finland left the war in September 1944.
Noting the weakness of planning and organization, the lack of support for the landing with special landing ships, the inaction of large ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ineffectiveness of the fire of coastal batteries, the Swiss historian J. Meister, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet side, was forced to admit: “Russian landing units, although not numerous enough, as well as the crews torpedo boats fought very bravely, but they were unable to save the situation in this misguided operation."

ORDER ON CONDUCTING THE LANDING OPERATION OF THE KBF TO CAPTURE SOMMERS ISLAND

In the period from 07/08 to 07/10/1942 The Red Banner Baltic Fleet carried out an amphibious operation to capture the island. Sommers.
The operation was prepared and led by the commander of the Main Naval Base, Captain 1st Rank Comrade. Levchenko with his staff.
Despite the fact that the situation that prevailed at the beginning of the operation made it possible to carry it out successfully, the operation was a complete failure and the set goal was not achieved.
As a result of analyzing the operation report and studying the circumstances of the case on the spot, it turned out:
1. The planning and preparation of the operation were carried out poorly, since: a) the documents were sent to the performers only 34-36 hours before the start of the operation.
The preparation of personnel and material resources was unacceptably limited in time and turned out to be completely unsatisfactory;
b) during the development of the operation and documents, the commander of the landing detachment was not involved, the exact landing sites were not determined, the headquarters of the Main Military Directorate was not convinced and did not check how much Major Pasko understood the task at hand, and most importantly, how much he understood the need for speed and decisiveness of action on the shore.
The commanders of the TKA and boats of the Ministry of Defense were not sufficiently familiar with the nature of the depths and coastline of the island, as a result of which, during the landing, the boats did not take advantage of the depth of the island’s shores, which allowed the boats to approach the shore;
c) the documents developed for the operation did not meet the requirements of BUMS and NBDSHS. The combat order was drawn up unsatisfactorily (the first point of the combat order was formulated unclearly, the third point - the idea of ​​a solution - was completely absent, the tasks for the landing commander were not set in the order).
The organization of command for the operation was not clearly defined, there was no combat control scheme, which led to the unsatisfactory state of combat control during the operation.
According to the combat order and in fact, the management of the operation was carried out by two persons: captain 1st rank comrade. Levchenko and his 2nd deputy, by order of captain 1st rank comrade. Soloukhin, but the operation was actually commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Salamatin, who was entrusted with command of the operation at sea.
Communications in the operation worked unsatisfactorily and did not provide clear control.
2. The operation, designed for surprise and swiftness of action, was not properly ensured either during preparation or during its execution. There was no consideration of the possibility of counteraction by enemy gunboats, destroyers and patrol ships, although there was information about their presence in the Aspe area and in the skerries north of the island. Sommers were at the headquarters of the main naval base. Therefore, sufficient forces were not allocated for cover. Artillery support for the landing was extremely weak. Aviation actions were envisaged only during landings.
3. The use of TKAs for landing troops was incorrect, because the experience of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet confirmed that TKAs were of little use for this purpose due to their weak artillery. weapons and low survivability. The task of landing troops ashore in these conditions could be successfully carried out by boats of the Ministry of Defense and even KM, the loss of which would be less noticeable for the fleet than the loss of a TKA.
4. TKA actions against enemy ships were ineffective due to the fact that
a) the tactical training of the boats was low;
b) after reloading, when ready, the boats were immediately sent to attack in 1-2 boats at a time, and not in groups, as a result of which the enemy ships repelled these attacks, successive and with a large gap in time, by concentrating the fire of all ships.
5. The support ships (CL Kama and the SKR Burya and 2 BTSh that arrived the next day) were used hesitantly and did not achieve their goals.

6. While the landing party on the island lay low and did not advance, the enemy sent up reinforcements in the morning at 6.00 on July 8th. The speed and suddenness of the operation were lost. The command (Comrade Soloukhin and Comrade Salamatin) did not show the necessary determination to strengthen and support the landing. The reinforcement of the landing force was landed only at 16.37 on July 8, the gunboat "Kama" came for support at 14.20 on July 8, and the BTShch and SKR arrived on July 9, 42. The 4 gunboats located in Kronstadt did not participate in the operation.
7. The personnel of the landing detachment were not prepared for this type of operation, which required courage, speed and decisiveness of action. The detachment commander, Pasko, himself showed criminal passivity and cowardice. After the death of the commissar of the airborne detachment, political instructor Comrade. Bunarev's detachment remained without proper control throughout the entire operation.
Commander of the naval operation, captain 2nd rank comrade. Salamatin, being the first to notice the cowardice of the landing commander Pasko and knowing that the detachment was left without control, did not take the necessary measures to restore this control, placing one of the commanders at his disposal at the head of the detachment.
8. On the use of the Air Force:
a) in the planning table of the GMB headquarters for the operation, the tasks in stages are reflected not for the Air Force as a whole, but are detailed down to the regiments and individual groups of aircraft.
The command and headquarters of the Air Force had to make their own calculations for solving the assigned task;
b) the tasks of the Air Force were set only for the period of transition and landing, the use of aviation was not envisaged in the future, and the Air Force commander was not oriented to the entire depth of the operation;
c) Air Force strikes were ineffective.
9. The Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet exercised general leadership without properly involving its headquarters. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet headquarters was ignored by both the Military Council and the GMBB command.
Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral Comrade. Rall and the head of the operational department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet headquarters, captain 1st rank comrade. Petrov did not show personal initiative in leading the preparation of the operation.
The failure of the operation and the large losses of the fleet in people and combat boats were the result of: a gross operational miscalculation (underestimating possible opposition from enemy ships and overestimating one’s own forces), poor training of people and equipment, and a completely unsatisfactory organization of command and combat control. The vast experience of the fleets, and especially the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, in conducting landing operations in the current war, apparently passed by the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the commander of the GVMB and their headquarters. I order:
1. The Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet should, as soon as possible, organize a study of the experience of landing operations carried out in the current war in the Black Sea, Northern Fleets and especially in its Baltic theater, and draw the necessary conclusions.
First of all, commanders and chiefs of staff of formations and naval bases should be involved in the study. Implementation should be reported by September 10, 1942.
2. The military councils of fleets (flotillas) take the necessary measures to put an end once and for all to the harmful phenomena of indifference of higher headquarters, and, first of all, the headquarters of the fleet (flotilla) in operations carried out by units or formations, regardless of their scale, as well as cases of ignorance individual commanders of formations of their own and higher headquarters. Stop the irresponsibility of commanders and staffs in preparing and conducting the operation. Increase responsibility for the development of documents, avoiding such operational and tactical miscalculations. Any operational and tactical miscalculation in an operation and in battle should be considered as an irresponsible performance of a combat mission, bringing the perpetrators to trial in a Military Tribunal.
I demand that the military councils of fleets and flotillas organize their work, both on the march and on the coastal FCP, so that the headquarters of the fleets are truly combat control bodies, and not retroactive recorders of events, so that not a single issue related to combat operations or their provision, would not have been decided without the knowledge and opinion of the fleet headquarters and, first of all, its operational department.

KUZNETSOV

CVMA, f. 79, no. 39809, l. 250-256. Script.

The naval pilots assessed their actions in support of this landing operation as follows: “In accordance with an extremely poorly drawn up plan, 12 IL-4 bombed the island garrison an hour before the landing, thereby predetermining the loss of surprise and heavy losses of the assault groups. At dawn, the enemy command pulled a relatively large naval group into the area, which not only supported the garrison with fire, but also replenished it with people and ammunition. Subsequently, the enemy managed to completely block our landing, which ultimately led to his complete death. At noon on July 9, the ground battles ended. Having no connection with the shore, our boats tried several times during July 9-10 to land reinforcements on the island, but either could not break the blockade or died in battle. All this time, the Baltic Fleet Air Force, which had undeniable air supremacy, constantly attacked enemy ships. The torpedo bombers of the 1st GMT alone made 15 sorties (the crews of Drozdov, Bunimovich, Presnyakov and the deputy squadron commander, Captain V.A. Balebin) and dropped 12 torpedoes, reporting the destruction of 2 gunboats and three patrol ships. However, of the Finnish and German ships that took part in the operation (Finnish minelayers "Ruotsinsalmi", "Riilahti", gunboats "Uusima", "Hämenmaa", "Turunmaa", German minesweepers "M 18", "M 37", heavy floating battery "Ost" and floating base "Nettelbeck") not a single one was sunk. In most cases, torpedo attacks were perceived as dropping mines, but the morning attack on July 9, directed against Finnish minelayers, was described for the first time in enemy documents as a torpedo attack. The Germans perceived this Finnish report with a certain degree of skepticism - they themselves were still not convinced that the enemy had torpedo bombers in its arsenal. With a certain stretch, the results of the actions of the aircraft of the 1st GMTAP can only be attributed to the damage on July 11 to a gunboat, on which, while repelling another raid, a 20-mm gun exploded, killing two and wounding 8 people. Presnyakov's Il-4 was damaged by the retaliatory actions of Finnish fighters called to the battle area. The plane miraculously did not catch fire and, with its gas tanks riddled, landed on the island of Lavensari.
The command of the brigade and regiment was clearly dissatisfied with the results of the first strikes. The report of the 1st gmtap for the 13th month of the war (22.6-22.7.1942), in particular, said the following:
“12 sorties carried out to torpedo attacks on enemy ships were ineffective due to:
a) Insufficient training of flight personnel and lack of experience in combat torpedo attacks. As a result, the attack was carried out illiterately, with all aircraft on one side, which made it possible for enemy ships to easily evade the attack at speed by maneuvering.
b) The torpedo launching sight was not used by all crews when launching an attack; torpedoes were dropped by eye, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the strike (crews who neglected the PTN-5 sight: Major Kuznetsov, Lieutenant Kudryashov, Captain Litovchuk).
c) The approach to the target and the attack took place at an altitude of 50-30 meters, as a result, the crews did not sufficiently determine the location and formation of enemy ships, could not accurately determine the elements of their movement and choose the most advantageous approach for the attack.
d) Tasks for a torpedo strike were assigned to the duty crews 20-30 minutes before departure, which did not allow crews to be trained, and the crews went to complete tasks with general pre-flight preparation.”

(text by authors photo rep)
and here’s what fits into the psto:

Here are the rocks at the northeastern tip, on which the paratroopers tried to land in three-point excitement.

The stones in the surf are all perfectly rolled by storms and polished by ice. They are covered with a thin, almost invisible layer of blue-green algae that live in dry form, waiting for storm waves to bring them life-giving moisture. But as soon as water gets on them, that’s it, amba - your legs move apart. It is almost impossible not to walk or get out of the water without outside help when there is excitement.

Slippery coastal stones played their evil role during the landing on the rocky south-eastern coast. It becomes clear why most of the Maxim heavy machine guns were sunk during the landing. And all the paratroopers were loaded with weapons and ammunition. In addition, they were fired at from mortars, cannons and machine guns by the entire Finnish garrison of the island of 93 people from land, and Finnish gunboats from the sea.

Traces from shell explosions are still visible on the granite rocks.

That day there were waves of force three - this is a wave height of up to 0.75 m. With masks and fins, Zhenya and Sasha examine the underwater coastal part of the landing site. We are looking for items related to the landing in order to find out the landing site and clarify the history of the events that took place here.

Alexey compares our and Finnish data on losses in people and weapons. How many Maxim machine guns were captured by the Finns. Like two. This means that the remaining eight were sunk during the landing. And no wonder. The weight of the assembled Maxim is 70 kg, even if you remove the body of the machine gun from the machine, then individually each part still weighs more than 30 kg.

Zhenya surfaced and took out from under the water a six-kilogram bronze ring mount for the reversible gearbox. After some time I found the remains of an optical device and small parts from the engine. No traces of the paratroopers themselves have yet been found. What also hinders the search is light green algae, which, like a long-haired carpet, tightly covers the entire bottom near the coastal part. Fry and transparent shrimps scurry around. The water warmed up to 20-22 degrees. Then they found several more items: a bronze valve with a broken copper pipe, small fragments of an engine.

Torpedo boat G-5

Our historians have a discussion about how exactly the G-5 torpedo boat approached the shore. Alexey reads in the documents that during the withdrawal after the landing, the torpedo boat flew ashore, since the reverse clutch of the left engine was turned back, and the right engine was turned forward. We are trying to understand exactly what it looked like based on the crevice we saw where the boat was sunk. Could it have caught on a stone in the middle of the small bay in which Sasha and Zhenya were snorkeling? What was the wind like? Alexey immediately reads out that the sea is north and the swell is 3 points, which means there were problems approaching the shore.

And why are the remains of this boat lying in another part of the island? They came to the conclusion that after the war the Finns dragged the remains of the boats to a more convenient place for hauling them ashore and then cutting them up for recyclable materials.

The third day is Wednesday.

On Wednesday after breakfast, armed with Finnish war photographs, we set off to search for a mass grave.

For half a day we were engaged in georeferencing using Finnish military photographs. They thought this way and that. We were guided by the configuration of the stones and the location of the Finnish pillars and the shed for boat accessories. Now of course they are not. Therefore, they looked for hollowed-out holes in the rocks for installing pillars. We identified the probable location and began digging holes in the pebbles using picks and shovels.From the plexiglass found on the third floor in the locator post, we make a special tablet, scratching the main contours of the photograph using the tip of a knife. To directly overlay the outline of a photograph onto the terrain through plexiglass. That's what we did after lunch. Alexey Mukhin, by this time had already hollowed out a hole about a meter deep in the scree of cobblestones. For the sake of digging a hole, he even refused to go to lunch and was mercilessly burned in the sun. The outline on the plexiglass made it possible to more accurately determine the possible location of the mass grave.

Placed poles in the place where the boathouse stood

and telephone poles.

It was decided to dig another hole in the stones nearby, one and a half meters away.

They worked like this: one person loosened the stones with a pick, after which the large stones were thrown out by hand, and the small things were thrown out with a shovel.

While shoveling stones in a big way, the red-hot shovel made such a noise that it was difficult to talk to each other. A group of war correspondents filmed the process in the heat, dripping with sweat. Volodya and Igor took turns carrying a heavy camera and a tripod on their shoulders. Igor joined us and, with a pickaxe and then with a shovel in his hands, helped us as best he could. The hard labor continued until the evening, and then Alexey came across a small phalanx bone from a human finger. A rotten steel cartridge case from a three-ruler gun was found nearby.

With tripled energy they began to tear off the lintel between the pits and after two hours the pits turned into a “trench for shooting from a horse while standing.” However, nothing more was found. It was clear that we were somewhere very close. But where? A mass burial cannot be small and it is difficult to lose it. More carefully examining the territory of the pebble isthmus littered by the border guards, they found four rotten soldiers' mugs with the inscription LMZ (Lysyevsky Metal Plant), the neck of a Soviet pre-war flask and several boots twisted and shriveled with time, suspiciously similar to sea boots from the war.

On the coastal part, under a pile of modern metal debris, pieces from a military boat were found.

High-speed screws made of steel. It looks like it was made during wartime. Two powerful steering shafts. Wooden body.

Next to him lay objects clearly associated with the landing: opened zinc from cartridges for a three-line rifle with heavy bullets mod. 1930 (there was a yellow stripe on the lid), a zinc lid for RGD-33 grenades and an insert in a zinc box with Kaveshnikov fuses for F-1 lemon grenades. We found two telecoils without a cable. It is unlikely that it was abandoned by post-war border guards, since all the items found were of pre-war production (except for one telephone coil produced in 1942). Stunned by the struggle with stones in the scorching sun, we wander “Home” to the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue to deepen and widen the hole in the morning.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time we noticed that next to the hole we had dug up there was a pile of bricks. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

An assumption arose that perhaps our soldiers or border guards used these bricks to decorate the burial site. With tripled energy we expand and deepen the hole. Nothing. No sign. Stupor ensues. It cannot be that the Finns would put up a cross and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. A meter away we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of test pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in the stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. The assumption arose that this was the desired place.

Perhaps the mass grave was moved, and ash and sawdust were poured into the hole so that they would not be blown away by the wind. But the finger bone remained on the surface and over time fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that there is a high probability that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of military sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941–1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters were transferred here. But this remains to be verified in military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater examination of the supposed site of the death of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, which was delivering ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers. On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Deep crevices 4-5 meters deep begin right next to the rocky shore.

In them we were able to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, remains of wooden casing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shell casings from a 45 mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a 20 mm casing. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the boat's propeller shafts ashore.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out of the cracks with an improvised pry bar. Storms and ice, even at depth, hammer them into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at depth by huge boulders several times larger. These autumn and winter storms are terrible. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged to the depths by storms.

The stone appears in archival photographs.

Actually, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - we need to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with more small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, lead-insulated wires. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not so. Damn algae and slight excitement are getting in the way.

We take his finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing in a sophisticated manner, holds his elbow with his hand. He had already crashed onto the rocks twice before he came out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

A total of 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one MO type, five G-5 type torpedo boats, one D-3 type torpedo boat and one Sh-4 type) and 3 G-5 type torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Under the water, some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out in a crevice.

And here is a mysterious object close up, similar to a receiver from Maxim, among the fry and Baltic shrimp.

Separate parts of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, raised from under the water.

Remains of propeller shafts, with a bronze bushing.

Next to him lay objects clearly associated with the landing: opened zinc from cartridges for a three-line rifle with heavy bullets mod. 1930 (there was a yellow stripe on the lid), a zinc lid for RGD-33 grenades and an insert in a zinc box with Kaveshnikov fuses for F-1 lemon grenades. We found two telecoils without a cable. It is unlikely that it was abandoned by post-war border guards, since all the items found were of pre-war production (except for one telephone coil produced in 1942). Stunned by the struggle with stones in the scorching sun, we wander “Home” to the barracks for dinner. Tomorrow we will continue to deepen and widen the hole in the morning.

Day four - Thursday.

We continue to expand the hole in the stone isthmus.

This time we noticed that next to the hole we had dug up there was a pile of bricks. There are no other bricks within a radius of 50 meters.

An assumption arose that perhaps our soldiers or border guards used these bricks to decorate the burial site. With tripled energy we expand and deepen the hole. Nothing. No sign. Stupor ensues. It cannot be that the Finns would put up a cross and write “128 paratroopers who landed on the island on July 8, 1942 are buried here.” just. We begin to carefully study the area around our pit. A meter away we find a suspiciously flat place overgrown with grass. Zhenya digs a couple of test pits and discovers a former hole, also dug in the stones, covered with a mixture of ash and sawdust. The assumption arose that this was the desired place.

Perhaps the mass grave was moved, and ash and sawdust were poured into the hole so that they would not be blown away by the wind. But the finger bone remained on the surface and over time fell through the stones to a depth of 20 cm. This means that there is a high probability that the bodies of the soldiers were transferred in the 50s to the Fraternal Cemetery of Red Army soldiers and Baltic sailors in Sosnovy Bor. The ashes of the sailors who died in the battles for Leningrad in 1941-1945 on the islands of the Gulf of Finland: Gogland, Sommers, Nerva, Bolshoi and Maly Tyuters were transferred here. But this remains to be verified in military registration and enlistment offices and archives.

They decided to devote the second half of the day to an underwater examination of the supposed site of the death of torpedo boat D-3 No. 22, which was delivering ammunition and a radio station to the paratroopers. On the shore, steel frames from a boat were found in the rocks. The Finns used one of them to build their pillbox in 1943. Let's examine the underwater part of the coast.

Deep crevices 4-5 meters deep begin right next to the rocky shore.

In them we were able to find parts from the boat: two propeller shafts, remains of wooden casing, a scattering of twisted dark yellow brass screws and white aluminum rivets, shell casings from a 45 mm cannon and a DShK heavy machine gun, a 20 mm casing. ShVAK guns, cartridges for TT pistols and Mosin rifles.

All finds are dented and scratched on stones, the shafts are bent.

Alexey pulls one of the boat's propeller shafts ashore.

Some small objects found in gloomy crevices had to be picked out of the cracks with an improvised pry bar. Storms and ice, even at depth, hammer them into the cracks under the stones.

Some parts of the boats could not be raised to the surface, as they were crushed at depth by huge boulders several times larger. These autumn and winter storms are terrible. Apparently everything that did not fall into the crevices was dragged to the depths by storms.

The stone appears in archival photographs.

Actually, here he is in the background. Photographed from the other side.

Eh - we need to conduct a full-fledged underwater expedition in the future. Zhenya swims to the shore with more small parts of the boat: some copper tubes, steel corners, lead-insulated wires. Trying to get ashore with exhibits. Not so. Damn algae and slight excitement are getting in the way.

We take his finds from him. Sasha Skrobach, cursing in a sophisticated manner, holds his elbow with his hand. He had already crashed onto the rocks twice before he came out of the water. We photograph the found artifacts. We conclude that this is the last of three boats that died in 1942 near the shore.

A total of 8 boats were sunk off the island in 1942 (one MO type, five G-5 type torpedo boats, one D-3 type torpedo boat and one Sh-4 type) and 3 G-5 type torpedo boats in the fall of 1941. Most of them still lie at the bottom of the island.

Under the water, some kind of copper box-shaped pipe sticks out in a crevice.

There were episodes in the history of the Great Patriotic War, information about which was stored for many years in the depths of archives, inaccessible to the general public. Often this was evidence of mistakes made by the command during combat operations, which cost the lives of many soldiers. One of these operations, the landing on Sommers Island, a photo of which can be seen at the beginning of the article, was only recently covered in the press.

Fire barrier at the exit to the Baltic

In 1942, Soviet submarines intensified their activity in the Baltic Sea, causing significant damage to the Germans on their main communications. But the passage of submarines from the Gulf of Finland into the combat waters was hampered by the enemy garrison, whose location was the small Sommers Island. How to get to the central part of the Baltic, bypassing this area fraught with mortal danger, was a task that required an immediate solution.

A year before, a Soviet unit was based on the island, but, due to a short-sighted decision by the command, it was abandoned, which the Finns who fought on Hitler’s side immediately took advantage of. They placed a garrison there, consisting of ninety-two well-armed soldiers, brought in artillery pieces and built four strongholds, thus turning the small island into

Demoted Admiral

The weather in the summer of 1942 was clear, which allowed the Finns to constantly conduct visual control of the surface of the bay and timely record the movements of Soviet submarines. The command of the Baltic Fleet decided to land troops on Sommers Island and take possession of it. The development of the landing plan was entrusted to captain first rank G.I. Levchenko, who had previously been demoted from admiral for abandoning Kerch.

To rehabilitate Levchenko, a successfully carried out military operation under his leadership was necessary, so organizing a military expedition to Sommers Island was very important for him, and he set about executing the order with all haste. But his haste failed him. In preparation for the capture of the island, many important factors were not taken into account, which subsequently played a fatal role.

Garrison guarding the island

Based on erroneous intelligence data, which they did not consider necessary to double-check, the developers proceeded from the fact that the garrison consisted of only seventy people, armed with two guns. As it turned out later, Sommers Island in the Gulf of Finland was defended by ninety-two people.

At their disposal were twelve guns (two of which were superior in caliber to the guns of Soviet boats), two large mortars, two anti-aircraft guns, as well as light and heavy machine guns. The Soviet landing force on Sommers Island outnumbered the enemies - two hundred and fifty people, armed with ten heavy machine guns, took part in the landing, but was significantly inferior to it in firepower.

Factors not taken into account when developing the plan

Intelligence failed to cope with its task. The data she transmitted did not give a complete picture of how Sommers Island was defended. The internal structure of the protective structures erected on it was not presented when developing the plan for the landing of paratroopers. This greatly complicated the position of the paratroopers. In addition, the natural features that Sommers Island possessed were not taken into account.

Its internal geostructure is very complex. The broken coastline is a pile of rocks protruding from the water, the depth around which reaches five meters. Landing boats could not come close to land, and many soldiers, under the weight of their equipment, sank without ever reaching the shore. This led to a completely unnecessary loss of human life. Radio communication with aircraft supporting the landing from the air was also not ensured.

Landing ships going to sea

The operation began late in the evening of July 7, 1942. The ships with the marines left Lavensaari and headed for Sommers Island. The Gulf of Finland along their route was continuously monitored by a group of aircraft, whose duty was to warn the sailors in the event of an enemy appearance. At this time, Soviet bombers, accompanied by fighters, struck strike after strike on the island. They were replaced by attack aircraft, which carried out attacks from low altitudes. In response, the Finns opened powerful anti-aircraft fire.

In the unsteady light of the white night, the boats approached the island, and the landing began. It turned out that it was impossible to land on the rocky shore, and the boats repeated the attempt several times under enemy fire. During unloading, the radio was drowned, thus being left without radio communication. Before even setting foot on the island, the detachment suffered its first losses. Two boats were damaged by enemy fire.

Failed start of operation

The landing force landed on Sommers Island in several batches as the ships approached. The white night, glorified by poets, did the sailors a disservice. The surface of the bay was visible from a great distance, and every approaching boat was met by Finnish artillery fire. One of them, trying to escape enemy shells, ran into rocks. With great difficulty it was possible to remove the crew and weapons from it.

Others had to, suffering losses, land fighters in places not provided for by the previously drawn up plan. The beginning of the operation did not foretell a favorable outcome - of the two hundred and fifty-two participants in the operation, only one hundred and sixty-four landed on Sommers Island. The rest either died under enemy fire or drowned in the Baltic waves.

The Finnish command, having received a message about the attack by Soviet sailors, immediately sent significant reinforcements to help the island garrison. Two and five patrol boats were sent to the combat zone. On the way to the island, they began a battle with Soviet torpedo boats, which, having received damage, were unable to stop the enemy.

Capture of a Finnish stronghold and air battles

By this time, the paratroopers managed to capture one of the strongholds with which the Finns fortified Sommers Island. The bunker was captured, and as a result of a fierce battle, out of twenty-six defenders, only three remained alive. The rest were killed. According to the plan, at this stage the commander of the operation, Levchenko, was supposed to send them help, but, for unknown reasons, he did not do this, which put the attackers in a difficult situation.

By mid-day, active hostilities were taking place in the air. Soviet pilots carried out massive attacks on enemy positions and on their ships. Finnish aviation tried to attack the boats approaching the island, some of which received significant damage. As a result of air raids, ships of both sides received significant damage.

The second day of the assault on the island

By the morning of the next day, combat activity had decreased somewhat. This is explained by the fact that the Soviet boats ran out of fuel, and the Finnish sailors by that time had shot all their ammunition. But at this time the first of the German ships rushing to help the Finns approached the island. It was the minesweeper M 18.

By nine o'clock in the morning events began to unfold in a direction unfavorable for the paratroopers. When approaching the island, it was hit and sank while trying to deliver ammunition, which by that time was running out. The Finns managed to transport a reinforcement company consisting of one hundred and nine people to Sommers Island on the gunboat Turunmaa and additional boats. Their appearance immediately changed the balance of forces, providing the enemy with not only firepower, but also numerical superiority.

In the middle of the day, the landing of the reserve that had arrived by that time began, but it was carried out, according to military historians, so unprofessionally and ill-considered that the result was only new unjustified casualties. On the island itself the battle continued with the same intensity. There was an urgent need to suppress the enemy's mortar battery, but due to lack of communication, the paratroopers could not contact either the aircraft or the crews of the boats located nearby.

In the ring of enemy ships

Meanwhile, Sommers Island was surrounded in an increasingly dense ring by Finnish and German ships that approached almost closely. Their massive fire fell on both the Marines fighting on the shore and the ships supporting them. According to data available to military historians, during the failed operation to capture this strategically important island, seven Soviet torpedo boats and one “small hunter” boat were sunk. In addition, the Kama gunboat, the base minesweeper, as well as many torpedo and other vessels were seriously damaged. Four planes were shot down in the sky over the island.

Sad outcome of the operation

This incompetently prepared and planned landing ended tragically. The island remained in Finnish hands until 1944. The losses on our side, information about which were published only in recent years, amounted to three hundred and fifty-nine people killed and about a hundred wounded. The Finnish side lost one hundred and twenty-nine people in this battle.

Despite the fact that the operation to capture the island was a complete failure, its direct participants cannot be blamed for this. They fulfilled their duty to the end. The blame lies with those who sent people to certain death without providing them with the necessary means of combat and without providing adequate support for the large ships of the Baltic Fleet.

Today this island, which has become a monument to all those who died on its rocky shores, is visited by groups of excursionists whose trips are organized by Russian and Finnish travel companies.