In memory of the crews who died

on An-10 aircraft, dedicated to

Instead of a preface

By decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of November 30, 1955, design bureau No. 156 of Tupolev, No. 240 of Ilyushin and No. 473 of Antonov were entrusted with the creation of large long-haul passenger airliners with gas turbine engines. In February 1956, at the historic 20th Congress of the CPSU, in order to systematically improve the standard of living of the Soviet people, the task was set to increase the volume of passenger traffic by 3.8 times in the shortest possible time with the transition of Aeroflot to new technology, and they were supposed to complement the first-born jet Tu- 104.

This decision determined the development of Soviet civil aviation for many years. It was in accordance with it that the second post-war generation airliners Tu-110, Il-18 “Moscow”, as well as the passenger An-10 “Ukraine” and its transport version An-12 were designed. The unification of a passenger aircraft with a military and civilian transport was economically feasible, but, as is known, disadvantages are usually a continuation of advantages.

At first, the Tu-110 was considered the main one in this program, but it remained experimental. Ilyushin's plane still flies all over the world. The Antonovsky airliner quickly rose to its zenith, but its star set just as quickly. Its design and testing were completed in an unprecedentedly short time, but the haste later backfired.

The design of the An-10 "Ukraine" aircraft (according to the OKB - product "U") was headed by the Deputy Chief Designer of the State Union Experimental Design Bureau No. 473 N.S. Trunchenkov, but Oleg Konstantinovich Antonov himself took a direct part in the work, as did all the main specialists of the enterprise. TsAGI, VIAM, NIAT and others, developers of engines and equipment, manufacturers of materials and semi-finished products were involved. Other Chief Designers and, above all, Andrei Nikolaevich Tupolev provided great assistance to the young OKB: documentation on his OKB Tu-16 and Tu-104 aircraft was sent to Kyiv for review.

The An-10 project was presented to the country's top party leadership and personally to the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Khrushchev liked “Ukraine” at first sight, and he ordered to stop designing a passenger modification of the twin-engine An-8 (plane “N”), and concentrated all his efforts on the “ten”.

The experimental passenger airliner "U" was built in Kyiv. The first flight of the "Ukraine" took place on March 7, 1957, it was performed by a crew under the command of the most experienced pilot Ya.I., specially sent from the MAP Flight Test Institute. Vernikova.

The bulk of the factory tests of the An-10 aircraft were carried out by GSOKB-473 pilots I.E. Davydov and V.A. Kalinin. They assessed the aircraft positively, but at the same time identified a number of shortcomings. In particular, according to their comments, the transverse V angle of the wing was changed (it was made variable, as on the “T” plane), additional keel washers were installed on the stabilizer and the fork area was increased, which was associated with more stringent directional stability requirements imposed on passenger aircraft. aircraft, a number of other important improvements were introduced.

The experimental An-10 was equipped with Kuznetsov NK-4 turboprop engines, and the An-12 was equipped with AI-20 engines designed by Ivchenko. The first ones were already in mass production, had less weight and better specific characteristics. But the higher reliability and serviceability of the AI-20 decided the dispute in its favor, and it was with them that it entered the An-10 series. Not the least role was played by the fact that the NK-4 were developed at the Kuznetsov Design Bureau in Kuibyshev and were produced there, the AI-20 was made in Zaporozhye, and Khrushchev sought to decentralize the national economy of the USSR and support republican industry, including Ukrainian.

Factory tests of the An-10 were completed in June 1958, but even before that, a decision was made to begin State tests and begin mass production of both the passenger An-10 and the transport An-12. According to the plan of the Ministry of Aviation Industry for 1957, three serial An-10s were to be built with serial numbers from 7400101 to 7400103.

Construction of the An-10 began at plant No. 64 in Voronezh. To support the series and ensure operational communication between production and product developers, OKB specialists were sent to the plant, endowed with significant powers in resolving constantly arising issues. The representative office of GSOKB-473 at this plant was headed by Leontyev, and then by the future Deputy Chief Designer Goloborodko. The first serial An-10 No. 7400101 (USSR-L2573), also known as the 2nd prototype, first took off from the runway of the Voronezh aircraft plant on November 5, 1957 under the control of I.E. Davydova. His flight was timed to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The first experimental An-10 was accepted for State tests in January 1959, and soon the first production aircraft joined it.

State tests are the most important stage in the life of an aircraft. During these tests, the Customer not only checks the characteristics of the machine declared by the Developer, but also determines its reliability and safety, checks the OKB recommendations on actions in critical situations and operating restrictions. Since 1941, in the USSR, the conduct of State tests was entrusted to the State Red Banner Scientific Testing Institute of the Air Force - the State Research Institute of the Air Force. Only after the war were tests of passenger aircraft transferred to the Civil Air Fleet itself. But by 1959, the State Scientific Testing Institute of Civil Aviation (GosNII GA) still had sufficient material resources and State tests of the An-10 passenger aircraft were carried out by the Air Force Research Institute. There, test pilots Kuznetsov and Fedorov, test navigators Zhitnik, Zatsepa and Vasiliev were appointed as the leaders of the An-10. The lead testing engineer was Sorokin. In addition, test pilots from the Air Force Research Institute Golenkin, Azbievich, Yakovlev, and Dedukh flew the aircraft. During the GI, Aeroflot pilot A.N. from Kiev had the opportunity to fly the first production An-10. Zakharevich.

The volume of work carried out during the State Tests according to the plan approved and agreed upon with the MGA was large, but they were carried out at an accelerated pace and already in June of the same 1959, the Act on their results was signed by a government commission. At the festive tables set for this occasion, few people thought how much anxiety Antonov’s new brainchild would bring.

The first An-10

Officially, production of the An-10 began in 1957, which was recorded in the serial numbers of the vehicles. Their first digit coincided with the last digit of the planned year of production, for example, “7” - 1957. The second digit “4” symbolized plant No. 64, the 3rd digit (zero) did not carry information, the 4th and 5th digits indicated the series number, and, finally, the 6th and 7th digits indicated the aircraft number in series.

What was this airship, now almost forgotten, not even included in many authoritative aviation reference books?

It didn’t even look like its brothers in appearance: its high-mounted wing, powerful, wide fuselage, squat landing gear and strange three-fin tail immediately distinguished it from the ranks of “air cabs”.

The unification of passenger and transport modifications entailed an increase in the mass of the structure, a decrease in range and weight return. The passenger An-10 inherited from the An-12, for example, bomb bays for lighting and orientation-signal bombs, as well as installations for aerial cameras. This was such a peaceful ship.

The first cabin had 25 seats. Passengers who bought tickets for seats 1 and 2 were sitting with their backs to the direction of the flight, which created some discomfort for them. The second salon had 46 seats, most of which, like the first, were folding. In the first row there were two double seats, and next to them there were folding bassinets. The third compartment had 5 double chairs and a four-seater sofa. The cabins were striking in their spaciousness, but the height of the ceiling was determined not by calculating the heroic height of any passenger, but by the dimensions of standard military cargo.

The salons opposite the engines and propellers were separated by a wardrobe, a luggage room and a buffet-kitchen - passengers were provided with hot meals. There were also two toilets.

The plane's cabins were pressurized and air-conditioned, but just in case, the equipment also included portable oxygen devices - for the pilots and several passengers, in case there were cores in the plane crashing at high altitude.

The number of seats could be increased to one hundred by reducing the seat pitch. Until the OKB allowed increasing the take-off weight, in this case refueling was supposed to be limited. On some routes in the central part of the country this was quite rational, but there were fewer amenities for those traveling by air.

Using the thrust-to-weight ratio and strength reserves built into the An-12, the Design Bureau allowed Aeroflot to raise the take-off weight of the An-10, although the operating conditions in military transport and civil aviation were completely different. In the passenger version, the total mass of the paid load (85 passengers with luggage and cargo) reached 14 tons, and the weight return was 42% with a take-off weight of 54 tons. At the same time, a range of 3080 km was achieved, which was at the world level. True, in order to get them, we had to make all sorts of savings and considerable risks, although a number of safety measures were taken.

The first of these was the thrust-to-weight ratio, based on the operating conditions from short unpaved runways at provincial airports and advanced air force bases, and would have been excessive under normal conditions.

The plane could continue to take off if one engine failed, and in flight even turning off three AI-20s (this happened extremely rarely) during normal operation of the propeller feathering system did not lead to disaster. Under standard atmospheric conditions (+15°C, 760 mmHg) on ​​three engines with a mass of 51 tons at the ground, the aircraft climbed at a speed of 8.3 m/s, and on two engines - 1.6 m/s. True, in the heat these figures decreased noticeably: when one engine was turned off at +35°C, the rate of climb at the ground was only 2 m/s.

All major systems were duplicated. Powerful flight and navigation equipment reduced dependence on the weather.

It is interesting that the communication systems for Aeroflot airliners of that period provided for the possibility of their use not only by the crew. Each passenger had to have access to them and, if necessary, could use the on-board radio - for example, when arriving at their final destination at night, call a taxi to the airport. True, in practice this did not work for everyone.

The An-10 could be used in a combined or cargo version. The seats were removable, and mooring points were built into the floor and sides of the cabin for securing cargo. There were three options for partial load of passengers - 71, 50 and 30 people. At the same time, the mass of the remaining cargo increased to 7200, 8600 and 11300 kg, respectively. In addition to the lower compartments, the cargo was placed in the second and third salons. And finally, any production aircraft could be operated in a purely cargo version, when all of its useful volumes could be used to accommodate 1.45 tons of cargo.

With a paid load of over 13.8 tons, not only did the range drop to 2100-2350 km, but the alignment also shifted. Usually it was 25%, and in the most inconvenient case of combined loading, the position of the center of mass shifted back by 7.5%, which noticeably reduced the aircraft’s static stability margin and made it more difficult to pilot.

The government assignment provided for the possibility of completing the An-10, which was laid down as a passenger aircraft, in the military transport version of the An-12. At the assembly stage, one of the “ten” laid down in Voronezh was rebuilt according to the An-12 standard, installing a tail section with a ramp and a firing point. No more such operations were carried out, since it was not profitable for economic reasons, but in the event of war, the backlog of unfinished passenger An-10s could be used for defense needs. Most often, the massive, up to several dozen aircraft at a time, conversion of passenger An-10s into transport and ambulance aircraft was carried out during demonstration exercises of the civil defense forces.

In 1959, the Air Force Research Institute tested the An-10 aircraft in a transport and sanitary version, which was named An-10TS. it was designed to transport cargo weighing up to 14 tons, 113 paratroopers for landing, 60 paratroopers or 93 wounded and 4 medical workers. Later, based on the results of this work, it was decided to convert 11 serial An-10s, which were used mainly as ambulance aircraft, for the needs of the Air Force.

Airborne landings during airborne exercises from An-10 aircraft:
they could be converted into transport and cargo vehicles as a military one,
and for national economic purposes
Photo: forumrostov.ru

At that time, much attention was paid to the development of the country’s civil defense system - the USSR (like the rest of the “civilized” world) then lived in constant anticipation of a nuclear cataclysm. In addition, many people still remember the terrible natural disasters that shook the whole world at that time. For example, the Tashkent earthquake claimed the lives of hundreds of people, thousands were injured and needed urgent operations, which were impossible to do on the spot. In such situations, the An-10TS and similar variants of the Il-18, along with military transport aircraft, have proven themselves to be an indispensable first aid tool.

The number of changes made to the design of the An-10, like any other aircraft, numbered in the thousands. Most of them were minor and did not affect the appearance or performance of the aircraft. In order for the reader to appreciate the work done to improve the machine by the engineers of the design bureau and the factory serial design department, we will give a number of examples of such changes, major and minor.

Compared to the prototype, the first production An-10 0101 already had a number of differences. The main thing is that it was equipped with a power plant unified with the An-12 with AI-20A engines. Detailed data on all the main modifications of the AI-20 are summarized in the table “AI-20 theater data”

Table 1. Characteristics of AI-20 engines

Modification	Year of issue	Takeoff power, e.h.p.	Specific characteristics		Air consumption, kg/s	Pressure increase rate	Temperature in front of the turbine, K
			Specific consumption max., kg/kgf*h	Specific cruise consumption, kg/kgf*h
AI-20	1956	4250	0,26	0,2	20	8,5	1200
AI-20A	1957	4000	0,26	0,2	20,9	7,3	1160
AI-20D	1958	5180	0,23	0,2	20,4	9,4	1200
AI-20M	1956	4250	0,25	0,19	n.d.	9,2	1173

Continuation of Table 1.

Modification	Gas generator					Mass characteristics
	Number of compressor stages	Combustion chamber type	Number of turbine stages	Length, mm	Diameter, mm	Weight, kg	Specific gravity, kg/e.h.p.
		ring
		ring
		ring
		ring

From the very first vehicle, hatches were introduced, making it easier to access the electronic equipment units. They remained on all aircraft until No. 2006, and then they were eliminated again, saving money on simplifying the cockpit floor. The hydraulic system pipes for the emergency shutdown of the engines in the cockpit were made of 20A steel, instead of the highly flexible but fragile aluminum alloy AMgM. During operation, according to the factory bulletin, starting with machine 0101 and continuing through 1101, the beams of the front landing gear niche were strengthened.

Based on the results of endurance tests, the fastening of the navigator's cabin glazing to the frame on production aircraft, except for machines 0402 and 0503, was strengthened. But later, starting with machine 1101, the An-10 again began to be produced with lightweight glass fastening. At the same time, the cockpit frame had to be strengthened. Another such modification that did not justify itself was the introduction of new fuel system drain valves from the first production aircraft, which, starting with aircraft 1503, again became the same as on the experimental aircraft. The same was observed in the use of finishing materials. For example, the beautiful and light lining of the luggage compartment with 1.2 mm KAST fiberglass, introduced in Voronezh from the very beginning of the series, was forced to be replaced by heavy and archaic six-piece plywood with greater wear resistance. The last aircraft with plastic lining of the luggage compartment floor was aircraft 1603. Even earlier, on aircraft 1401, the fiberglass lining of the rear cargo compartment partitions was replaced with 5 mm plywood. Later, both plywood and textolite were replaced with duralumin.

The An-10 aircraft differed from the “conservative” Il-14 in the abundance of automation, electrical and hydraulic mechanisms. Their trouble-free operation was given special importance. The An-10 had two independent hydraulic systems; an emergency hand pump was also installed, which ran not only on AMG-10 hydraulic fluid, but also on kerosene from the fuel tanks. It ensured that the landing gear was released even in the event of a leak of working fluid from both systems. But the hydraulics also required improvement. This was first done on a single aircraft 0801, and then starting with aircraft 2101. The general hydraulic circuit was changed on them, and many of the most important units were replaced with more reliable ones.

In addition to the main doors, five side and one bottom emergency hatches, the An-10 aircraft also had an upper hatch for evacuation in case of an emergency landing on water. Moisture accumulated on the skin not protected by thermal insulation near it, causing corrosion of the panel. Starting with aircraft 1201, the panel in this area was also insulated. True, having barely implemented the modification and reported, the manufacturer managed to deliver the next car, 1202, without it. But in the future, the skin covering at the top hatch was regularly installed on all aircraft, and the previously delivered An-10s were gradually modified.

Photo: Archive of the Kharkov State Aviation Production Enterprise

Antonov stated that the passengers of his An-10 talk to each other without raising their voices, but on the Tu-104 this is prevented by the roar of the engines pressed to the sides of the cabin. The AI-20 theater engines themselves were not as noisy as the AM-3 turbojet engines, but four AB-68 propellers contributed to the noise spectrum, imparting powerful and extremely unpleasant vibrations to the panels of the front part of the passenger compartment. Although the auxiliary premises took the brunt of the blow, passengers also suffered. Khrushchev himself experienced this when he flew on the An-10 during his visit to Kyiv. Without hesitation, he gave the designers valuable instructions - to install thicker duralumin sheets in the rotation zone of the screws.

The designers tried to protect the sides from sound waves by placing special volumetric panels against the propellers, but the “Khrushchev belt” mounted on the An-10 No. 1501 did not solve the problem. On production aircraft, starting with 1102, reinforcement of the middle part of the fuselage had already been introduced, although not at the expense of the thickness of the skin - 8 half-frames were added, and this was considered sufficient. True, it was necessary to introduce an overlay on the skin of parts of the An-10, but for a different reason: when icing occurred, the ice fell off the blades and hit the sides exactly where the finger of the First Secretary of the Central Committee pointed.

Attempts to solve the noise problem have also been made on a scientific basis. At LII, a lot of work was done to study the acoustics of the Tu-104, Il-18 and An-10, for which they purchased the latest equipment from Brühl and Kjær. For the first time, an acoustic experiment was carried out on a regular Il-18, and then on an An-10. The work culminated in the release in 1963 of an industry standard for noise in the cockpits of MGA aircraft, and in 1974 the corresponding GOST was issued. The Antonov Design Bureau began collecting statistics on the topic “what is noise and how to deal with it” and came to disappointing conclusions: the noise in the An-10 cabin reached 122 decibels, worse than any other Aeroflot aircraft. The Il-18, from which all heat and sound insulation (TSI) and decorative trim were removed for the experiment, “hummed” in the cabins up to 125 decibels, but a normal plane, which had 640 kg of various sound-absorbing materials, had a maximum noise level in the cabin of already 119 db. For piston engines Li-2, Il-12 and Il-14, the noise level did not exceed 103...107 dB.

Aeroflot's largest and most powerful turboprop aircraft, the Tu-114, whose decorative panels and technical equipment weighed 1,295 kg, had the same maximum noise level as the An-10 - 122 dB, but the power of its engines was more than twice as high.

The Tu-104 jet, which Antonov was “rolling the barrel” of, has been modernized. The designers increased the weight of the TZI to 1100 kg, widely using fiberglass materials, foam plastic, perforated plywood, rubber bands and pavinol. As a result, the noise level in the cabin of the 70-seat Tu-104A dropped to 105 dB, and the 100-seat Tu-104B to 110 dB. The Tu-124 with the standard version of the TZI had approximately the same noise level (105 dB), and with the lightweight version it was up to 112 dB.

On the new jet airliners Tu-134 and Il-62, the maximum sound load (in the rear cabin near the engines) was 104 and 106 dB, respectively. Moreover, this was achieved due to the layout (the power plant is in the tail), and the weight of the TZI was small - 300 and 955 kg.

The noise indicators of foreign aircraft also turned out to be better than those of the An-10. Thus, American piston airliners Conver 340 and 440, Lockheed 1649A Starliner with engines of 2400...3400 hp. had a noise level of about 90...110 dB in the cabin, in the French piston aircraft Breguet "De Pont" (4 engines of 2400 hp) - up to 104 dB. The comfort of the new jet aircraft was qualitatively higher. The noise in the cabin of the Boeing 707, whose turbojet engines had special nozzles, did not exceed 90 dB; the French Caravel had the same level of acoustic loads; the twin-engine jet Leme of the French concern SNCASO looked only slightly worse - 92 dB. All of them had special sound-absorbing structures made of new synthetic materials, for which a significant weight limit was allocated.

An important area was increasing the reliability of the power plant. Initially, the An-10 was equipped with AI-20A engines of series 01. As production progressed, in parallel with the An-12, passenger “tens” began to receive AI-20 series 02 and 03. Then AI-20A appeared on the An-10 and An-10A aircraft. 20K, products of the more advanced 05 series.

The reliability of these engines was constantly improved and their service life increased. Along with the NK-12, these were the only Soviet aircraft engines whose service life was no worse than that of similar foreign ones. However, the AI-20 had a design feature that turned into its main drawback: it did not have a free turbine and the rotor shaft was connected to the propeller shaft. Because of this, when the engine was turned off in flight when the feathering system (blades aligned with the flow) failed, the propeller rotated “tightly” from the oncoming flow, creating enormous aerodynamic drag. It was impossible in principle to eradicate this drawback on the AI-20, and in the event of an engine failure one had to rely only on feathering the propellers.

The last innovation of the first modification of the An-10 was the modification of the “crackers” on the rudder and on the elevator rocker, as well as the introduction of a limiter on the locking rocker RV. This was done due to the fact that when there was a lot of wind in the parking lot, there were cases of steering wheels being torn off their stops, in which case they hit the stops and cracked. This innovation was made on aircraft 1501, and the production of the first modification of the An-10 was completed with model 9401601.

An-10: evolution and revolution

The significant thrust-to-weight ratio of the An-10 made it possible to increase the payload, but to accommodate additional passengers and cargo it was necessary to find volumes. It was unprofitable to radically alter the fuselage, and its dimensions remained the same. At the same time, I didn’t want to reduce the comfort levels on board. In the course of comparing various solution options, it was decided to expand the habitable volume, compact the existing salons and use part of the office space to accommodate additional seats.

In the first salon, having removed the passage in front of the bow bathroom, they added one more place. The wardrobes, luggage rooms and buffet-kitchen were shrunk and two five-seater compartments were made behind them. Because of this, the number of seats in the second cabin has decreased. In the 1st class version there were 36 seats installed, and in the tourist version - 42. The front wall of this compartment was moved slightly back, and the back - forward. The rear wall of the 16-seat passenger compartment No. 3 was pressurized frame No. 56. It became leaky on the An-10A, and a tail compartment with six seats was made behind it. The passengers in the compartment sat with their backs to the sides, the windows were in the ceiling, and only the sky was visible through them. Now the pressurized compartment was closed by the 60th frame.

The capacity of the An-10A in 1st class was 94 passengers, and with the second tourist class cabin - 100. In conditions of a shortage of air tickets, the second option turned out to be preferable. By sealing the seats, the An-10A could be turned into an economy class aircraft capable of carrying 132 people. There were also intermediate loading options for 112 or 118 seats. Another toilet was added on board, but overall the plane became more cramped. This was especially evident in winter, when one of the trunks had to be given away for an additional wardrobe.

The main loading options for the An-10A aircraft are shown in the table below:

Table 2. Main loading options for the An-10A aircraft

	Number of passengers, people	Passenger weight, kg	Luggage weight, kg	Cargo weight, kg	Commercial load weight, kg	Take-off weight, kg

It was believed that the total weight of luggage could reach up to 2 tons, 20 kg per passenger, but control weighing was usually not carried out, and often its weight on board was greater. Weighty trunks were shoved onto shelves above the heads of their owners. Another cargo compartment was made under the floor of the 2nd cabin, and on the floor of the passenger cabin between frames No. 44 and 50 on all An-10A except cars from 1903 to 2001, additional mooring eyelets and sockets were installed for securing cargo in the transport version.

Having taken 100 passengers on board, the An-10A could also transport 4120 kg of cargo. The total mass of the paid load in the normal version reached 14.5 tons or 27% of the take-off weight. When using the aircraft in a transport version, the size of its payload increased by a ton. The reconfiguration narrowed the alignment spread to a range of 20.4-26.1%, without moving as far back as on the “clean” An-10.

Innovations increased the weight of the structure and reduced the range. Without navigation reserve, it amounted to 1900 km in flight at an average altitude of 10,000 m. The maximum range of 3000 km, close to the parameters of the “pure” An-10, could only be obtained with a partial load of 11.3 tons.

The power of the power plant of the An-10A aircraft remained at the same level, but the engines themselves were of a new modification - AI-20A 3rd series with AB-68I series propellers. 03.

Serial production of the An-10A began with machine 1602, it was delivered according to the 1959 plan. Already on the next aircraft, 1603, the first small change was introduced: to increase the gap between the steering cylinder fitting of the nose landing gear and the small flap, a cutout was introduced in it. Now the danger of their collision, when the plane, while taxiing at the maximum angle, hit an uneven surface and sank, was eliminated. This change affected all previously built An-10s. On the next aircraft, 1604, wear-resistant duralumin lining of the floors and walls of the lower cargo compartments was standardly introduced, replacing textolite or plywood.

On the head An-10A, the antenna of the GRP-2 glide path receiver of the SP-50 blind landing system, installed above the pilot’s cabin and protruding into the flow, was transferred to the nose glass of the navigator’s cabin and was made in the form of a metal strip glued to triplex. This improved aerodynamics, but when flying over the timing beacon, its signal was obscured by the fuselage and disappeared for some time, which caused concern to the crew. The same situation was, for example, with long-range bombers Tu-16, M-4 and others: the operation of the system was restored with distance from the timing belt, the crews gradually got used to the “new tricks” of the equipment and it was believed that there was no need to modify the system.

However, either the “short and thick” fuselage of the An-10 created more interference, or simply civilian pilots were “more prone to anxiety” than their military colleagues, but the flow of complaints did their job: the OKB did not “take a pose” and deny the obvious and issued a bulletin that provided for the installation of a backup glide path receiver and a second antenna for it in the old location.

On the 1701 machine, new safety valves for both hydraulic systems appeared, which serve to maintain a given pressure from the hydraulic accumulators and prevent complete discharge of the systems in the event of an emergency drop in pressure. The pressure drop threshold in the new valve was increased, which was supposed to improve the safety of the hydraulics and the aircraft as a whole. On the same aircraft, additional hatches were introduced in the center section for access to hydraulic units.

The improvement of hydraulics continued on the 2101: the combined hydraulic lock for opening the front landing gear flaps, designed to connect an emergency hydraulic line from a hand pump, was removed. Instead, simplified shut-off valves were installed.

Starting with car 2201, the circuit of the automatic braking of the wheels of the main struts was changed and an electromanometer was installed to control the pressure in the braking system. Starting from the same model, the An-10A was no longer equipped with side ladders for loading the lower cargo compartments. For this purpose, they began to use standard devices for all types of aircraft, which were stored at airports.

The composition of the radio equipment on the An-10A remained the same, but only the switching order was new. The first new product appeared on machine 2204 - a lightweight and compact semiconductor intercom SPU-7, replacing the bulky tube SPU-6.

Paying a lot of attention to improving the power plant and equipment, the designers almost did not touch its airframe. The only change that caught my eye was the abandonment of the keel washers. But this was done not during the production of the aircraft, but after, by modifying the aircraft in use. The "tail decoration" was removed, and the single ventral ridge was replaced with a double one. The alteration of the empennage reduced the weight and aerodynamic drag of the aircraft, and the loads on the fuselage and stabilizer were reduced while maintaining stability characteristics.

The construction of An-10A aircraft was to be completed in 1960 with the delivery of the 25th series. The technology for assembling the vehicle had already been worked out, the number of products in the series increased (for the An-10A it reached six, while for the An-10 it did not exceed four). However, as usual, the schedule remained behind schedule. A total of 104 An-10 aircraft of all variants were built, the last of which left the workshops of plant No. 64 in 1961.

For the needs of Aeroflot, the An-10AS variant with a capacity of 16.3 tons of cargo was tested and put into operation, and in contrast to the previously used removal of seats and installation of cargo flooring, it was also planned to dismantle the partitions in the cabin. The An-10AS was not widely used, although it performed well.

Designers had to “pack” the interiors more and more tightly, and the operator had to give preference to “economic” options. But it cannot be said that aircraft developers did nothing to correct the current situation; Antonov already proposed several new modifications of the “ten” in the late fifties.

Back in 1957, the Antonov Design Bureau team proposed a project for an extended An-16 for 130 passengers with luggage and cargo with a total weight of up to 14 tons. But its implementation was postponed due to workload with other work.

In 1962, the An-10B modification project was completed. With the same pressurized cabin sizes as the An-10A, the maximum number of seats was limited to 118. Radio and instrumentation equipment was replaced: it became possible to receive the latest innovations from the arsenal of the Air Force, which was experiencing the peak of Khrushchev’s “overclocking” and therefore willingly shared with Aeroflot the most secret REO systems.

On the A-10B (1963), the fuselage was completely redone. It was extended by 6 meters, which made it possible to carry up to 174 passengers. This aircraft, in its concept, was reminiscent of short-haul Airbuses, which became so widespread in the 80s, and could relieve overloaded short-haul airlines in the central regions of the USSR.

For extended-range flights, it was planned to use the An-10D, the fuel reserve of which was sufficient to cover a distance of 4000 km. The passenger cabin of this modification was designed for 124 seats.

Proposals for the development of new modifications of the An-10 aircraft were relevant, but did not find support from the Ministry of Aviation Industry and Aeroflot and were not implemented. However, we must admit that there were reasons for this. Quite an objective and, to put it mildly, “unpleasant” property for Kyiv designers. You will find out which ones in the second part of the article.

Found a typo? Select a fragment and press Ctrl+Enter.

Sp-force-hide ( display: none;).sp-form ( display: block; background: #ffffff; padding: 15px; width: 960px; max-width: 100%; border-radius: 5px; -moz-border -radius: 5px; -webkit-border-radius: 5px; border-color: #dddddd; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; font-family: Arial, "Helvetica Neue", sans-serif; background- repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center; background-size: auto;).sp-form input ( display: inline-block; opacity: 1; visibility: visible;).sp-form .sp-form-fields -wrapper ( margin: 0 auto; width: 930px;).sp-form .sp-form-control ( background: #ffffff; border-color: #cccccc; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; font- size: 15px; padding-left: 8.75px; padding-right: 8.75px; border-radius: 4px; -moz-border-radius: 4px; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; height: 35px; width: 100% ;).sp-form .sp-field label ( color: #444444; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-weight: bold;).sp-form .sp-button ( border-radius: 4px ; -moz-border-radius: 4px; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; background-color: #0089bf; color: #ffffff; width: auto; font-weight: 700; font-style: normal; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;).sp-form .sp-button-container ( text-align: left;)

In memory of the crews who died

on An-10 aircraft, dedicated to

On Aeroflot lines

In the fall of 1958, An-10 aircraft appeared in the operational divisions of Aeroflot. By order of the head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet, Air Chief Marshal P.F. Zhigarev, its operational tests were entrusted to the personnel of the Ukrainian Civil Aviation Administration (UCA).

New equipment was distributed “by rank” - first to Kyiv, and then to the periphery. In addition to the Kyiv airline, the An-10 was operated by flight squads based in Chisinau, Kuibyshev, Lvov, Minsk, Rostov, Syktyvkar, Khabarovsk, Kharkov and Irkutsk. Several machines were at the Ulyanovsk Civil Air Flight School of Higher Flight Training. In the Ukrainian Civil Aviation Administration, Kyiv pilots - M.I. - were the first to master piloting the new aircraft. Dubovik, V.V. Kiryukhin, A.N. Zakharevich, I.I. Boguslavsky, E.V. Belashev, P.G. Makarov.

Operational testing of the An-10 took 6 months, 232 paired flights were carried out and 2,170 landings were made. Planes flew to major airports in the country, transporting economic cargo. The tests established the possibility and safety of regular operation of the aircraft in various meteorological conditions, day and night, from concrete and dirt runways, and also showed the features of the machine and its maintenance.

Their completion of the program was the technical flight on May 27, 1959 Kyiv - Vnukovo - Tbilisi - Adler - Kharkov - Kyiv. On that day, the first passengers of the An-10 were employees of the design bureau, the manufacturing plant, personnel of the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate and flight attendants. The plane was piloted by Kyiv pilots E.V. Belashev and V.V. Kiryukhin, and the flight was led by M.I. Dubovik. In June 1959, the first technical conference on the operation of the new aircraft was held in Kyiv, and on July 21-22, the An-10 made the first passenger flight Kyiv - Vnukovo - Simferopol. The commander of the ship was P.G. Makarov.

As further events in the life of the An-10 will show, hasty factory, government and operational tests failed to identify serious “diseases” of the machine, for which they subsequently had to pay with human lives.

The plane flew more or less safely during the summer of 1959, although all sorts of organizational difficulties often arose. Thus, already in October, the Head of the Civil Aviation Administration of the Civil Air Fleet, in an order about the unsatisfactory use of the An-10, noted:

“With the start of regular flights on airlines, the use of An-10 aircraft is in an unsatisfactory state, both in terms of flight hours and flight performance.

The 9-month plan for this technique was completed by 60%, with productivity lower than planned by 10%. The main reason for the unsatisfactory use of An-10 aircraft is the extremely low serviceability of the aircraft, deficiencies in the organization of operation and use of An-10 aircraft.”

The very first regular flights with passengers on board revealed numerous design flaws. Despite the spaciousness of the passenger compartments, in the summer the temperature in them when boarding passengers, towing or taxiing rose above the permissible limits of +18...24 ° C, which caused a lot of complaints. The heat subsided slowly after takeoff and climb.

Over the next 12 years of operation, despite numerous comments about discomfort in passenger cabins, the question of installing the on-board turbogenerator TG-16, which was used on the An-12 to power the air conditioning system turbo-refrigerator (SCV) on the ground, on the An-10 and was not resolved.

The unification of the passenger and transport options dictated the insufficient height of the extensive luggage spaces located under the floor of the cabins: only 0.57-0.8 m. The capacity of these compartments reached 6400 kg, loading and unloading was done manually. Postal service was especially labor-intensive. With time-limited parking at Moscow airports, it often caused departure delays and complaints from passengers and postal and luggage services.

Since its introduction, the An-10 aircraft has become a regular participant in various exhibitions and other promotional events - O.K. Antonov loved them and attached great importance to this. The An-10 was first presented on the international stage in 1958 in Brussels at the Expo-58 exhibition, where it was awarded a Gold Medal and an honorary diploma. In December 1959, the An-10, under the control of P. Shulzhenko, brought a cargo of tree and shrub seedlings to Washington, and in early January of the following year, 1960, it delivered the animals to the World Agricultural Exhibition in Delhi.

In the 60s, cooperation with India developed rapidly and this country, which had previously focused on Great Britain, began to become interested in Soviet technology. Among other things, the Indian partners liked the An-10 and An-12 aircraft.

The Voronezh Aviation Plant produced two An-10A with VIP cabins for India in 1960, but the customer refused them, the planes were returned to standard form and delivered to Aeroflot. The An-10 became the only Soviet passenger airliner of the post-war period that was never operated by any foreign airline and was not even approved for passenger flights abroad. The reason for this was the unimportant situation associated with the use of the aircraft in the USSR. It was not possible to hide these facts.

As of January 1, 1960, Aeroflot operated only 26 of the 58 An-10s received; most of the rest were awaiting modifications according to the BE-G series bulletins, i.e. “operational, issued for civil aviation for a reason affecting flight safety”. But all the complaints that gave rise to them, which had already made both the Antonov Design Bureau and the serial Voronezh aircraft plant No. 64, which was now the first to be responsible for everything that happened with the An-10 aircraft, pretty nervous, turned out to be “just flowers,” and the “berries” were not for mountains.

On November 16, 1959, ship commander N.A. Spirenkov performed a landing approach on the An-10 USSR-11167 at Lviv airport in difficult weather conditions (icing, clouds). On the straight line, at the moment of entering the descent glide path, he was unable to resist the unexpectedly strong desire of the aircraft for an instantaneous deep drawdown, which led to disaster.

By that fateful day, Spirenkov, one of the pioneers in the development of the aircraft, had significant flying time, including on the An-10, and it was difficult to accuse him of unprofessionalism. The conclusions of the emergency commission were superficial and did not reflect the cause of the disaster. There were different versions of what happened, for example, about the removal of the “propellers from the stop” while still in the air, which led to them reaching a small pitch and a sharp drop in thrust. The truth was not established, but the An-10 fleet continued to be used.

Soon, on February 26, 1960, in the same Lvov, P.G. Makarov, on the An-10A plane USSR-11180, of the Kyiv aviation squadron of Aeroflot, crashed due to icing in the clouds. Its commander, highly experienced MGA pilot Pyotr Gerasimovich Makarov, was once entrusted with the first passenger flight on the An-10 on July 21, 1959 and a report to the First Secretary of the Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev about a new plane, and it was not possible to blame everything on the crew this time either.

The details of the incident were similar to the previous disaster. An-10 flights were suspended.

A repeated analysis of the reports and materials of the State tests did not produce results: the characteristics of longitudinal stability and controllability complied with current standards. Then there was an assumption about icing, and to check the behavior of the aircraft in such conditions, the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, LII MAP and GSOKB-473 were instructed to conduct special flight studies. This work was supervised by an employee of the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, Candidate of Technical Sciences O.K. Trunov.

At that time, in the “martyrology” of our civil aviation there had already been a number of accidents due to icing with the Li-2, Il-12 and Il-14 aircraft, but the laminar profiles of the wing and tail of the An-10 had worse stall properties than on these low-speed aircraft. Why didn’t Aeroflot executives, when accepting the new aircraft for operation, attach any importance to this issue? Why, having thoughtfully analyzed the results of all kinds of planned test flights, did they not demand that these not at all rare operating modes be included in the program?

I still had to carry out icing tests. Oddly enough, the responsible work of taking the characteristics of the aircraft in difficult weather conditions was entrusted to ordinary pilots of the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate - the crew headed by N.E. Karlash, and for some reason the venerable testing professionals were not involved in this work, which was precisely within their competence.

And so An-10 USSR-11133 set off to plow the Fifth Ocean in search of weather suitable for carrying out the planned research. Fortune smiled on the pilots (if bad weather can be called a smile), an area with the required atmospheric conditions was found, a complex and risky flight experiment was carried out successfully, clearly showing the physics of the phenomenon.

These flight studies were the first of their kind, they allowed not only to detect this very dangerous phenomenon, but also to establish its causes. Major shortcomings of the aerodynamic layout and the anti-icing system were revealed, which, for economic reasons, was made cyclic, operating not constantly, but from time to time. It was determined that during cyclic heating, the ice on the leading edges of the aerodynamic surfaces melted and deformed without falling off. A so-called “saddle” was formed, which sharply distorted the profile of the wing and tail.

The sudden transition of an aircraft in a landing configuration, in the presence of a layer of ice of a certain size and shape on the stabilizer, into a steep dive with a slight movement of the steering wheel “from itself” is called “peck”.

What happens to an airplane on the glide path in icing conditions? Under normal conditions, a car descending in a straight line at a constant speed is in a balanced state. The extension of the flaps leads to an increase in lift, but also an increase in the slope of the flow behind the wing. As a result, the angle of attack of the horizontal tail is approaching a critical point. The margin of this value is usually very small and amounts to only 3-5°.

And the distortion of the stabilizer profile by adhered ice leads to the fact that the critical angle of attack of the tail is reduced by 4-6°. When the angle of attack of the horizontal tail exceeds a critical value, a flow stall occurs and the aircraft vigorously tilts its nose, leaving the equilibrium state. As noted in official documents, the safety of piloting the An-10 when descending with flaps already at an angle of 35-25° in icing conditions is not ensured (and during landing at that time the flaps were extended at 45°). Behind this dry phrase lies a terrible meaning - the lives of passengers and crew are under threat.

Managers of various ranks highly appreciated the work done. The order of the head of the CAA in May 1960 noted that “the crew of the Kiev 86th flight detachment consisting of ship commander N.E. Karlash, co-pilot O.V. Dmitrenko, navigator V.S. Gulov, flight mechanic N.A. Afanasyev, flight radio operator P.P. Chernysh, despite Great organizational difficulties and unfavorable meteorological conditions, which forced most of the work to be carried out beyond the Arctic Circle, carried out high-quality tests and in a short time. For the excellent performance of flights, perseverance and courage in performing responsible work, express gratitude to the crew.". And here are the lines from another document, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 31, 1961: “ For exemplary fulfillment of the Government’s assignment for the preparation and holding of the Air Parade on July 9, 1961 at the Tushinsky airfield and for the development of new technology” I.E. Karlash. was awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor.

The laid up planes were transported to Voronezh. Under the leadership of the Design Bureau, Plant No. 64, despite the risk of failure of defense orders, carried out a large amount of work. Throughout the An-10 fleet, the wing POS was improved, a new stabilizer POS with “thermal knives” was installed, which worked constantly in the leading edge areas, eliminating the “saddle” effect. The flap span was reduced by 0.4 m, and the landing angle of their deflection was limited from 45 to 33°. The landing characteristics did not deteriorate.

Aeroflot was vitally interested in the resumption of operation of the An-10 and modifications to eliminate the “peck” were made on all aircraft very quickly: from July 1960, An-10 aircraft again entered service. But they still had one more defect, which was already reflected in numerous complaints: when the engine failed, the propeller feathering system did not work. The blades did not rotate “along the flow” to reduce aerodynamic drag, but remained in the pitch position in which the failure occurred. The oncoming flow spun them (autorotation began), but since the AI-20 engine did not have a free turbine, and the propeller was connected directly to the main rotor shaft, it did not reach the launch speed, and created a lot of resistance. As a result, instead of thrust, the plane acquired a “brake”, which also tried to turn the aircraft around. Although the AI-20 was not the most unreliable engine, it was bound to end in disaster at some point.

At one time, it was decided to stop fine-tuning the Kuznetsov NK-4 engine, which was installed on the first Il-18 aircraft and on the experimental An-10, and instead, the AI-20 designed by Ivchenko was launched into a large series at the plant in Zaporozhye. It was used for the An-10, An-12, Il-18, Il-20, Il-22, Il-38 and Be-12 aircraft (and in the future it will also be used for the An-32) and no one would even think about changing it could.

At one time, the British, faced with a similar problem on the four-engine Lincoln bomber, conducted a demonstration and test flight on one of the four engines. A film was made about this - it was transported and shown in parts armed with this aircraft, and “the issue was closed,” although the reliability of the engines did not improve.

In order to somehow reassure the combat pilots in June 1960, OKB test pilot Yu.V. Kurlin performed two similar flights using one operating engine (internal and external). The flight with an external running engine, the most difficult in terms of piloting technique, lasted 45 minutes. It seemed that he was proving that such a situation was not fatal, however, what raised doubts was whether an ordinary crew on a fully loaded plane would be able to do something similar?

Photo from the book by O.K. Antonov "Ten times first"

To raise the shaky prestige of the car and for advertising purposes, the crew on the An-10 A.F. On April 29, 1961, Mitronin set a world speed record in class C-I, covering a closed 500-km route with an average speed of 730.616 km/h. On July 9, 1961, the An-10 was shown at an air parade in Tushino. The plane was piloted by the ship's commander Nikolai Efimovich Karlash.

The service of the An-10 continued, and the pilots had to urgently master new areas of activity. In October 1961, the An-10, together with the Il-18, were included in the operational transport group formed by government decision to provide assistance to Afghanistan, which was in distress, in dire need of selling its agricultural products. The group was based at Tashkent airport, its task was to quickly transport Afghan grapes from Afghanistan to the USSR.

The group included 8 aircraft from various territorial departments of Civil Aviation. The Ukrainian department sent three aircraft: two belonged to the Boryspil aviation enterprise, one to the Kharkov airline (the leader aircraft USSR-11140) and four crew. They were led by experienced ship commanders - Vorona, Kalnysh, Bystrov, Kaluzhin. We flew along the route Tashkent - Samarkand - Termez - Puli-Khumri - Askarkhan - Kabul (750 km), or Tashkent - Kandahar (1050 km). The routes passed over the mountains, where some peaks were more than 5000 m. Despite the difficulty, the task was successfully solved, and a bountiful harvest was saved. Similar flights on the An-10 were carried out in the fall of 1962.

On November 23-24, 1961, the 2nd technical conference on the operation of the An-10 was held at the Kiev Zhulyany airport. The speakers sharply criticized the leaders of the Antonov Design Bureau, noting the inadequacy of measures to eliminate the comments made by the flight and technical staff. OKB. The manufacturing plant and repair enterprises of the Civil Air Fleet did a great job, but new troubles happened where no one expected them. Thus, on January 27, 1962, on the An-10A USSR-11148 aircraft, while taking off at the Barataevka training airfield, one of the outer engines failed. The plane was flown by the pilot-instructor of the Ulyanovsk School of Higher Flight Training, Slovokhotov. The propeller did not enter the feathering position. Autorotation. Catastrophe.

A similar incident occurred in the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate. On the An-10A, the outermost engine failed in horizontal flight, the propeller of which did not feather. Flight with an autorotating propeller turned out to be possible only with a descent. The ship's commander, Sergei Denisov, decided to make an emergency landing on a corn field. Fortunately, everyone survived.

Flight accidents associated with the failure of the propeller feathering system worried the flight crew. Some tried to give their own recommendations for the operation of complex automation. I remember a curious incident that happened to one Kharkov crew of an An-10A in Ufa on May 29, 1969.

The flight was Kharkov - Ufa - Sverdlovsk. According to the recommendations of the “traditional craftsmen”, the flight radio operator, without advertising his actions, after reaching a given flight level and the engines reaching cruising mode, turned off the gas station (network protection circuit breaker) “removing the screws from the stop.” It should be turned on constantly, but this was seen as the reason for the failure of the feathering system during an emergency engine stop. The radio operator was going to turn on the gas station while descending, but forgot to do so. After touching the ground, the ship's commander received the command - “internal from the stop, external from the stop!”, the thrust reverser did not turn on, the brakes were not enough to hold the fifty-ton aircraft on the runway, it rolled out onto the ground and was damaged.

“Experimenters and innovators” were not only among flight radio operators. One of the most experienced ship commanders, Semenov Viktor Fedorovich, who possessed a unique, simply jewelry piloting technique, and was awarded the country’s highest award for mastering the An-10 - the Order of Lenin, taking advantage of the lack of objective control means, demonstrated “his technique” of landing at the capital’s Vnukovo airport.

When approaching the end of the runway, a few seconds before the wheels touched the concrete, he gave the command to the flight mechanic - “screws from the stop!” At the moment of contact, when, after the usual slight delay, the screws were removed from the stop, and intense braking began. At the same time, the range of the An-10 aircraft, to the surprise of all dispatchers, was only 300-400 meters. Subsequently, this never made public method was used during Il-18 flights to the Antarctic Bellingshausen station, but what was it like for the passengers!

In the initial period of operation, the An-10 was intensively used for urgent transportation of national economic goods. In the summer, when cherries and cherries were ripening en masse, the perishable delicacy needed to be delivered to the consumer as quickly as possible. Especially often, the “Anas” of the Ukrainian Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet were involved in helping the collective farms of the Melitopol region, delivering fruit to Moscow and Leningrad. More than a thousand boxes of fragrant products were loaded into the salon, emptied of seats. The planes operated from field airfields near farms, takeoffs and landings were not always smooth, it was almost impossible to create a flat runway surface on such a dirt airfield, and the plane received significant excess loads on the structural elements of the structure. Unfortunately, there was no recording equipment in this period yet, and the engineering and technical staff judged the resulting overloads only by the fallen bolts securing the fairings on the fuselage, which were cut off by undesigned forces.

Of course, the ability to work from the “ground” provided enormous advantages, but at the same time, flight safety requirements were not fully observed.

The An-10 aircraft at that time did not yet have equipment for recording flight parameters; the K3-63 recorder appeared later. The accounting system delimited the landing conditions, and the logic showed that landings on the ground would need to be multiplied by the “ignorance” correction factor, since the loads on the structural elements were different in each specific case, and this problem had not been studied.

The absence of an on-board flight data recorder once almost ended tragically. When the An-10 board USSR-11172 was lowering its landing gear before landing at Mirny airport, the right main landing gear unexpectedly simply dared. The crew skillfully sat down “on one leg” on the dirt strip, and although the car skidded a little and collided with a tanker, no one was hurt. As it turned out, the day before, another crew made a mistake in calculating the moment of contact in Irkutsk so much that the power 30th frame, on which one of the landing gear linkage units was attached, was damaged. There was no recorder on the car, and no one said anything to anyone, but “you can’t hide a sewing in a bag”!

In the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate, regular An-10 flights from the ground were carried out at the airports of Vinnitsa, Poltava and Kherson. Flights from these airports were operated to Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, as a rule, the load on the aircraft was maximum. The Vinnytsia airport caused especially a lot of complaints from the flight crew; in the vocabulary of pilots it was called a “washboard”. The Kherson airport runway was of sufficient length, but with large sandy patches spaced at a considerable distance from each other. Pilots who flew in those years say:

“Hot summer day. The An-10, having taken 112 passengers into its belly, a huge amount of luggage and a countless number of watermelons and melons, lowered its tail somewhat, roaring its engines, began to take off. Hidden from the eyes of the mourners by a cloud of dust, from time to time he jumped into the sandy potholes of the airfield, as if pausing his run, then rushed again to the next pothole. Having gained sufficient speed, with one final jump, he slowly moved away from the runway. A long trail of dust trailed behind him. The crew wiped the sweat from their faces with relief and reported to the dispatcher that the takeoff had been completed.”

How did the power elements of the aircraft’s structure feel? Soon after the start of operation, they began to be “patched” - to install, according to the bulletins of the Antonov Design Bureau, all kinds of reinforcing linings on the cracks that appeared here and there.

In September 1963, on the basis of the Line Operational Workshops (LERM) of the Kharkov Aviation Enterprise, the “School of Excellence in Maintenance of the An-10 Aircraft” was held. In the report of the head of the Quality Control Department of LERM M.I. Belobrova was given a detailed list and analysis of characteristic defects on the aircraft:

“The operation of An-10 aircraft in our squadron began in April 1959. The regular operation of these aircraft was hampered big quantity production and constructive defects, which were detected during flight and during maintenance.”

• – cracks in the vertical struts of the front landing gear compartment;
• – cracks on the center section fairings;
• – violation of the tightness of the fuselage due to the edging of the passenger cabin glass being squeezed out;
• – deformation of thresholds of hatches and doors;
• – cracks in the tips of the struts of the aileron mounting brackets;
• – cracks in the skin of the tail section of the wing;
• – leakage of fuel tanks due to the formation of cracks and delamination of shells;
• – various defects in the locks of the retracted and extended position of the landing gear.

The most characteristic defect in the aircraft's equipment was the shearing of the starter-generator limit coupling roller, which occurred during the transition from the starter mode to the generator mode.

The speaker emphasized that under operating conditions, the most qualified specialists from LERM and the manufacturer were involved to eliminate serious defects.

The main reasons for the occurrence of cracks in power elements were:

• – insufficient strength of individual parts, errors made during design;
• – insufficient control of the condition of the power elements of the airframe of the leading aircraft An-10A USSR-11140 and 11172, and, as a consequence, voluntarism in decisions to extend the life of the aircraft;
• – unfavorable operating conditions, overloads higher than designed (flights in areas of increased turbulence, rough landings, operation on unsuitable unpaved runways);
• – insufficient quality of construction materials.”

At the same time, there were also cases of violation of the rules of operation of the An-10 aircraft by the flight and technical staff of Aeroflot, but nevertheless, it was the design and production deficiencies that “set the tone of the conversation.”

In the long list of problems set out in a memo to the Minister of Aviation Industry, O.K. Antonov noted shortly before his death: “...Insufficient quality of materials, especially in terms of fatigue strength, toughness and crack propagation rate, ultimately affects the entire aircraft production and has led to a decrease in the service life of the An-10, An-12, etc. aircraft, to more frequent repairs, etc. "

The start of operation of the An-10 coincided with the introduction of new methods of non-destructive testing and flaw detection of components and parts. But they were still far from perfect, and the staff had not yet gained sufficient experience.

The An-10 was one of Aeroflot's first mass-produced heavy passenger aircraft. It was preceded by piston vehicles with a maximum take-off weight of up to 17.5 tons - three times less than that of the An-10. The MGA pilots had no experience of flying such aircraft and gas turbine power plants. The quality of the aircraft's development was affected by the rush to introduce it.

The first commanders of the An-10 crews were Aeroflot pilots who passed a strict selection process and had previously flown mainly as commanders of the Il-12 and Il-14 ships. They already had experience flying airplanes with front landing gear, but when switching to new equipment, the piloting skills of the previous type of aircraft inevitably transferred to it, which especially concerned pilots with extensive flying hours. For many pilots, the flight profile when performing a landing resembled the flight path of a piston aircraft, in which there was an element of keeping the aircraft above the runway, which led to the tail landing touching the runway, or to a “plump” landing and an undesigned overload of the structure.

But the lack of training of the pilots was not always to blame - different cases, different weather and other circumstances... That is why in aviation aircraft are so valued that “forgive” the mistakes of pilots so that passengers do not even notice it. Or if they notice, they get off with a slight fright.

Plans for operating the An-10 with a reduced crew (without a flight mechanic) also left an imprint on the ship’s commander’s workplace. On landing, at the end of leveling, when the plane was approaching the beginning of the runway, having removed his left hand from the steering wheel and making sure by touch that it was on the throttle levers of the internal engines, the commander had to move them to the 0° position according to UPRT (the angle of rotation of the control lever The command-fuel unit determines the fuel supply, propeller pitch and power in this mode; a zero angle meant the inclusion of thrust reverse). Switching all four engines to reverse led to a sharp increase in drag, sagging and a rough impact of the landing gear on the runway.

There have been cases when the zero thrust mode was mistakenly set to the engines of one wing, which led to sudden overload and even destruction of the main landing gear structure. For this reason, in the early 60s, at the Kharkov airport, the Rostov crew made a rough landing on the right leg of the main landing gear. The restoration of the heavily damaged aircraft was carried out by a factory team.

Often rough landings happened at night or in SMU - during snowfall or rain. At the same time, taking advantage of the lack of objective control means (SOK), the crews did not always report rough landings and exposure to areas of increased turbulence, although they were supposed to make notes about this in the logbook. This also complicated the work of the engineering and technical staff. Managers, without having SOC data, could not promptly influence their subordinates, aiming them at improving their piloting techniques and increasing their flying skills.

A unique incident occurred in the early 60s at one of the Air Force airfields near Lvov. The crew of the Lviv airline, under the guidance of Kyiv flight chiefs, performed a training flight to develop piloting techniques when two engines on one wing failed. Lack of coordination in the actions of the crew led to a landing with the landing gear retracted. A “loud” order was issued by the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate to punish the perpetrators, but popular rumor claimed that Antonov awarded the crew with a personalized watch. This was a rare case when the designers saw in reality the consequences of such a landing. Soon the plane, obviously with the help of the Design Bureau, was restored and flew again.

This was not the only such landing. In the early 60s, the An-10A board USSR-11174 of the Syktyvkar airline made an emergency landing without landing gear on a snow-covered dirt strip due to a hydraulic system failure due to improper installation of a check valve during repairs.

Troubles with the extension of the “legs” on the An-10, as on all aircraft with retractable landing gear, have occurred. For example, on August 29, 1962, at the Kuibyshev Kurumoch airport, the commander of the ship M.I. Tsobko (86th flight detachment of the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate) on the An-10 USSR-11179, was forced to land only on the main landing gear, since the front one did not lock due to a design and manufacturing defect.

And on October 13, 1963, in Vnukovo, on a regular An-10A, which was flown by a pilot of the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate, Kharkov resident Boris Ivanovich Melnikov, the front leg did not lock. Through the efforts of the flight mechanic and flight radio operator, the pillar was “pressed” through the hatch with a pipe removed from the passenger wardrobe.

In less than five years from the start of flights of the An-10 aircraft, from April 1958 to February 1963, 23 flight accidents, accidents and catastrophes occurred with An-10 aircraft, of which 56% were associated with defects in the airframe and engines. By July 1965, 11 vehicles of this type had been lost. This number also included the brutal crash of the An-10 aircraft that occurred in 1962 at Adler airport (Sochi).

Then the crew of the Ukrainian Civil Air Fleet Directorate (ship commander Martyashev), performing a landing approach in the clouds, blindly followed the dispatcher’s command to perform the maneuver. The plane collided with a mountainside and exploded. Everyone on board died.

The fate of "Ukraine". The final

The An-10 aircraft had a very short flight life, full of dramatic collisions. Perhaps none of the Soviet “large” serial transport aircraft, with the exception of the Tu-114, was taken out of service so quickly. He worked on medium-length lines for thirteen years, but in fact he had to stand for a whole year of this short period, being finalized at the manufacturing plant.

Being a unique aircraft for its time, it soon found itself forgotten not only by its native design bureau, but also by its owner, the mighty Aeroflot. Meanwhile, by 1971, it came out on top in Aeroflot in terms of passenger turnover, carrying more than 35 million passengers and 1.2 million tons of cargo. An average of 324,000 passengers per plane!

But at what cost? At the peak of its heavenly life, measures were not taken in a timely manner to eliminate many of the shortcomings, although considerable funds were allocated for similar work on the “twin” of the An-10, the transport An-12.

What reasons, events and decisions influenced the fate of the An-10 aircraft? Of course, two Lvov disasters that occurred at the very beginning of operation, which were associated with the aerodynamic and structural imperfections of the car, had an extremely negative impact on his future career.

In the unofficial rivalry with the Il-18, which did not stop even after both vehicles were put into mass production, the An-10 gradually lost ground. Its main advantage - the ability to operate from unpaved airfields - gradually lost importance. There were fewer and fewer such runways; new airfields were being built and old airfields were being reconstructed. Landings on poorly prepared runways without a hard surface increasingly affected the power components of the aircraft - cracks progressed everywhere, especially in the wing power panels and in the joint assemblies.

The insufficient fuel supply made itself felt. The aircraft was operated mainly in the European part of the Union, where there were many spare “points,” while the Il-18 mastered more and more new routes in Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East and the Far North.

In 1968, the aircraft's service life was extended to 15,000 flight hours and 10,000 landings, and the center section panels were ordered to be strengthened to increase fatigue strength. But this was not done on all aircraft. Thus, on the lost An-10A USSR-11215 of the Kharkov aviation enterprise, during the last repair at the Rostov Civil Aviation Plant No. 412 in February 1971, reinforced panels were not installed.

In June 1969, test flights under the GosNII GA program on the leading aircraft An-10A SSSR-11140 were stopped. The plane was transported to ARZ-412, where it “subjected to a detailed inspection.” It was based on the results of this inspection and in agreement with GSOKB-473 O.K. Antonov, by order of the MGA in 1971, the An-10 and An-10A aircraft again extended the total service life to 20,000 hours and 12,000 landings.

The fact that during the investigation of the crash of USSR-11215, the center section of the leader aircraft No. 11140 was found at the Antonov Design Bureau base in Gostomel without traces of defects speaks volumes about how “carefully they examined” the leader aircraft. The layer of sealant on the structural structural elements was never washed off - because of this, the inspection simply could not reveal those cracks that subsequently led to the death of the An-10A aircraft No. 11215. This is how the service life of the leading aircraft was extended unreasonably and without a proper analysis of the condition "An - tenth." Meanwhile, on March 31, 1971, due to the destruction of a wing during descent on the approach to Voroshilovgrad, all 45 people on board the An-10 USSR-11145 were killed.

At a conference on the quality of An-10 repairs at the Rostov aircraft repair plant ARZ-412 in the spring of 1972, the representative of the Design Bureau, Deputy Antonov Ya.B. Goloborodko spoke about plans to refine the design and further modernize the aircraft. In particular, it was planned to replace the wing and improve the ventilation and heating systems for passenger compartments. But nothing was done.

On May 18, 1972, a tragedy occurred that put an end to the An-10’s career as a passenger aircraft. 25 km from the Kharkov airport, the An-10A USSR-11215 aircraft, commanded by Kharkov resident V.A., crashed to the ground, burying everyone on board in the rubble. Vasiltsov.

One of the points of the government decree was to conduct research into the operating conditions and operational loading of the wing of the An-10 and An-10A aircraft. The question inevitably arises: why, knowing these weak points, did they not conduct timely research on the leading aircraft? There is no one to answer these questions.

During the work of the Government Commission at the Kharkov airport to investigate the causes of the disaster on May 18, 1972, it was determined that the destruction of the wing was to blame, and it was decided to suspend the operation of the An-10 and An-10A. Soon, an order was issued for Aeroflot, which provided for the write-off of the main fleet of An-10 and An-10A, with the exception of a small number of aircraft of the latest series, which by that time had little flight time. After appropriate inspection, they were transferred to the transport units of the Ministry of Aviation Industry to carry out the transportation of urgent cargo. One of these machines was operated for a short time at the Kharkov Aviation Plant, the commander of the ship was B. Minaev.

It is interesting that only after decommissioning, some An-10s still appeared abroad, but as ground equipment. Thus, at the Wittstock training ground, belonging to the 16th Air Army of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, an An-10 aircraft depicted an “AWACS aircraft” type target on a field simulating an enemy airfield.

One could put an end to this when talking about the An-10 aircraft, but, unfortunately, today there are still too many “blank spots” in its history. They are guarded by vigilant zealots of “uniform honor,” waiting for the hour when all these documents can be written off, burned and forgotten.

Returning to the tragedy of USSR-11215, you can’t help but think – but it was preceded by a number of disasters and incidents. Cases of destruction of individual parts, components and even assemblies of An-10 aircraft were observed with depressing regularity. Here’s an even comical example - at Kurumoch airport, while being towed on the ground, the An-10’s wing broke off! The very last “bell” - in the summer of 1971, the An-10A USSR-11146 of the Kuibyshev Air Enterprise crashed while approaching Lugansk airport. The reason is the same - the destruction of the wing.

N.G. Kovtyukh, at that time the First Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation, at special debriefings explained to the flight crew the cause of the disaster - the crew exceeded the maximum permissible speed when descending, i.e. the crash was blamed on the pilots.

All these events alarmed the crews. Thus, an instructor pilot of the Kuibyshev airline Makagon on An-10A board 11147 performed a flight on the route Kurumoch - Leningrad - Kurumoch. On the way to Leningrad, the flight attendants heard a characteristic crash in the cabin in the center section area. Having arrived in Leningrad, Makagon refused to fly back on the same plane. He was criticized for this for a long time, but he turned out to be right: fatigue cracks were discovered in the center section and the car was written off.

This incident gave Antonov’s biographer V.D. Zakharchenko is a reason to indiscriminately accuse the deceased Kharkov crew of the USSR-11215 aircraft of “he didn’t listen to the creaks, flew and died”. Truly, childish reasoning. I would like to recall Antonov’s statements in the article “The Responsibility of the Creator” (newspaper “Izvestia” dated March 15, 1961), where he wrote self-critically about the main role of the designer - the fine-tuning of already made machines. However, in practice this task was not always fulfilled.

Why didn’t all these incidents and disasters that preceded the Kharkov tragedy serve as a signal for making a decision to stop operating the aircraft? Or, by analogy with the Lviv disasters of 1959-1960, was it necessary to smash the forehead several times and only after that decide the fate of the car? It is difficult to answer all these questions today. Obviously, Antonov did not have the courage and determination to loudly declare the need to stop the operation of the An-10 fleet, or was his voice not heard?

And where were all the various senior officials of the former Ministry of Civil Aviation of the USSR responsible for flight safety? Why did they silently look at the plane, which began to “crumble”? Did they really think that this was all a chain of coincidences?

The Kharkov disaster, in which 122 people died, put a bloody end to the history of the An-10. But this tragedy, like many others that claimed many human lives, could have been avoided if the “responsible comrades” had made reasonable decisions in a timely manner. None of them received the deserved punishment for what happened. The aircraft crews paid for their inaction with their lives, and the chief strength engineer of the Antonov Design Bureau, E.A. Shakhatuni subsequently became a Lenin Prize laureate.

Let's try to reconstruct what happened on that fateful day.

May 18, 1972, early morning, Kharkov Osnova airport. The basic An-10A USSR-11215 aircraft is being prepared for departure to Moscow on a controlled flight. The ship has been thoroughly inspected and prepared for departure. The first secretary of the Kharkov regional committee of the CPSU G.I. flies to Moscow on it. Vashchenko. The flight will be operated by the crew of 1st class pilot V.A. Vasiltsov, the crew included an inspector - the commander of the Kharkov United Aviation Squad, Honored Pilot of the USSR A.P. Ovechkin. But an unexpected call from Leningrad required Ovechkin’s urgent arrival there for a meeting. Having met Vashchenko and reported to him that the plane was ready to fly to Moscow, with his permission, Ovechkin flies to Leningrad.

The USSR-11215 plane lands safely at Vnukovo, Vashchenko, thanking the crew, leaves the airport. Preparations are underway for the return flight to Kharkov on flight 1491. Having replenished the fuel supply to 9500 kg, taking 106 adult passengers and 8 children, loading 780 kg of luggage and 2354 kg of cargo, Vasiltsov took off at 10.39 and headed for Kharkov. The take-off weight of the aircraft was 54.5 tons. The flight took place at an altitude of 7200 meters, above cloud cover. The weather conditions were favorable. After passing the Gotnya radio station, the crew received permission to descend to an altitude of 1500 m in the area of ​​the 3rd turn, landing course 263 0.

Having confirmed the received instructions at 11.44, the crew did not make contact again and did not respond to the dispatcher’s repeated requests. The plane's marker disappeared from the locator screen at 11:53. At 11.50 in Kharkov there was cloudiness of 5 points, cumulus, the lower boundary of the clouds was 1500-2000 m, the upper limit was 2000-2500 m, visibility was 10 km, air temperature +27 ° C, quiet, weak thermal bumpiness.

While descending from an altitude of 4500 to 1500 m, at an altitude of 1700 m the destruction of the aircraft began. Its wreckage was found at a distance of 20 km from the airfield.

According to the conclusion of the Government Commission, events developed as follows. An emergency situation on board arose one minute before the destruction began. In this last flight, the crack, starting from the fatigue zone between the 6th and 7th stringers of the lower center section panel, moved in both directions and began to move to the side members. At this moment, the zero rib connecting the stringers riveted to the panel collapsed. The plane's wings folded upward. Here is how the chronicle of events was recorded in the documents:

“ – Engine No. 1 was the first to separate from the left plane.

– After about two seconds, engine No. 4 separated from the right plane.

– Approximately three seconds after the engine separates. No. 1, the left plane separated from the fuselage.

– The right plane was the last to separate from the fuselage, approximately four seconds after the start of visible destruction (engine compartment No. 1).

The total duration of visible destruction was 4 seconds. The distance from the beginning of the fall to the point of impact is 3400 meters. The An-10A aircraft, tail number USSR-11215, serial number 0402502, was produced by the Voronezh Aviation Plant on February 3. 1961. By the time of the incident, he had flown 15,435 hours, made 11,106 landings, and had undergone three factory repairs - the last one on February 2. 1971 at civil aviation plant No. 412. After repairs, it flew 2291 hours and made 1516 landings. The aircraft had a general technical service life of 20,000 hours. flight time and 12,000 landings."

The forty-two-year-old commander of the ship, first class pilot Vladimir Afanasyevich Vasiltsov, had a total flight time of 11,239 hours, of which flight time as the commander of the An-10 ship was 4,157 hours.

In Kharkov, where the work of the Government Commission to investigate the causes of the crash of aircraft 11215 was underway, the future fate of the entire An-tenth fleet was being decided. The convenient version of an explosion in the air, which representatives of the MGA, Antonov Design Bureau and TsAGI tried to defend, was rejected by the report of a forensic medical examination of the remains of passengers and crew. At the direction of the Commission, the center wings of the An-10 were opened and inspected in Kuibyshev, Taganrog, Voronezh, Lvov, and Kharkov. It’s the same thing everywhere – the more plaque, the more fatigue cracks. The cause of the disaster was clear - the destruction of the wing center section in the air due to a rupture of the lower center section panel caused by fatigue cracks in the stringers and skin.

The general conclusion is accepted: An-10 passenger aircraft, which consists of several dozen aircraft, will no longer be used.

According to the memoirs of a member of the Government Commission, Academician Joseph Fridlyander, who headed the laboratory of the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials, Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation Razumovsky said during the investigation of the crash of aircraft 11215:

“VIAM helped us a lot, I really regret that he was not in Voroshilovgrad. I told Antonov that he should thank VIAM for finding the cracks and warning new disasters».

So, the story of the investigation into the tragedy of the An-10 USSR-11215 aircraft, which began with the conclusion about a complex of random factors, later came to a single cause: fatigue cracks in the stringers, which affected all aircraft of this type and the decommissioning of the entire fleet of these machines.

Monuments on the graves of the deceased crew members of the An-10 USSR-11215 aircraft, installed in the Kiev Baikov and Kharkov Gagarin cemeteries, appeal to descendants, remind us of the tragic past, once again speak of the need to remember what happened and prevent this from happening in the future.

Table 1. An-10 flight accidents

Conclusion

The creation of the An-10 aircraft occurred during the “change of eras”, when traditional piston airliners everywhere gave way to new aircraft with gas turbine engines. This process not only in the USSR, but also in Western countries, which paid much more attention to the development of civil (commercial) aviation, took more than fifteen years. It was a difficult time.

Both in the conditions of a planned Soviet economy and in the conditions of free enterprise in a market economy, the time factor had the most important influence on the conditions for the introduction of new technology - a new aircraft was needed, as they say, “here and now.” Nobody wanted to wait for the machine to complete the required cycle of development and refinement. And no one then knew what this very cycle should look like and how long it should take.

In the late forties and early fifties, the entire cycle of creating a new airliner with a take-off weight of 30-50 tons (that is, a quite serious, complex and expensive machine) from concept development to the construction of a prototype took a year and a half. About six months were spent on flight and operational testing. But the technological preparation for the production of such a machine instead of an aircraft of an older model had to be spent two or three years, and there was no way to shorten this period. This pushed the developer, manufacturer and customer of the new aircraft to a kind of “agreement”. It consisted in the fact that the developer accelerated the creation and testing of the machine, the manufacturer began preparations for its production, most often even before the first flight of the prototype, investing money in the “pie in the sky.” Moreover, there might not be enough own money, and the customer was forced to pay in advance. This form of “money in the morning, chairs in the evening” was universal and worked in both planned and market economies. Having allocated money and made financial plans for a new aircraft that did not yet exist, the customer found himself in a position where it was very difficult for him to force the developer and manufacturer to redo anything if a defect was revealed during testing.

The inevitable increase in the price of a commercial aircraft, fuel, maintenance, airports, and so on forced the owner of the aircraft to “squeeze all the juice” out of this property in order to recoup it. The plane had to fly all year round, and in some periods regular aircraft made two paired flights a day! The loads on the hardware in such conditions were enormous, but it had to work for many years. Modern experience shows that aviation technology can do this. But in order to ensure the safety of passengers and crew in such conditions, it was necessary to invest considerable funds in improving the design, improving materials, operating systems and much more.

Airliners inhabited the skies of the Planet and were forced to fly not only on traditional routes, but also to pave air routes where no civilized person had ever gone before. This means that it was necessary to develop the transport infrastructure there - to build airports, air traffic control centers and weather stations.

These circumstances played a fatal role in the fate of a number of outstanding passenger aircraft, such as the De Havilland Comet, Lockheed Electra and Antonov An-10. Their sad experience led all three interested parties to radically change their attitude towards the process of creating and operating aircraft. It became clear to all of them that the increase in cost and time spent on creating each new aircraft is an objective process that cannot be circumvented “legally.” It’s just a pity that such a high price was paid for understanding this.

Table 2. Comparison of passenger aircraft with theater

What about the An-10? “You can’t erase words from a song,” and it wasn’t possible to forget him completely right away. One such plane stood for a long time (or maybe it still stands, we don’t know) at the aviation pavilion of the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy of Ukraine in Kyiv. Another plane is still an exhibit at the Russian Aviation Museum in Monino. The An-10 units were stored in Ulyanovsk for a long time, maybe this machine will be restored for the civil aviation museum located in this city...

The wide fuselage gave rise to the idea of ​​setting up cinemas in the decommissioned An-10, and in the 70s such cultural objects appeared, but none survived the “dashing nineties”. There are none, so what of it, out of sight, out of mind! And now, at the official level, the approach to the history of the An-10 is like a dead man: either good or nothing. And since nothing good can be said, you understand...

Background information on An-10 aircraft

first flight 03/07/1957

project and prototype aircraft

Mainline passenger aircraft, technical specifications. The creation of a new generation of passenger aircraft with gas turbine engines was started with the goal of increasing the volume of air transportation, their range and comfort as part of the restoration of the national economy of the USSR after the war and improving the standard of living of the people of the USSR.

For GSKB-473, it was initially planned to create a four-engine aircraft based on the twin-engine An-8. However, later the project underwent significant changes and became a completely new type, see below.

An-10 4NK-4 (4IA-20), aircraft “U” project, long-haul passenger aircraft. Design started by GSOKB-473 according to PSM dated November 30, 1955.

N.S. was appointed lead designer for the An-10. Trunchenkov.

The project included a high level of unification of large units and systems with the military transport aircraft “T” (An-12). It was also possible to convert a passenger aircraft into a military transport aircraft both at the production stage (irreversibly into the “T” option) and in operation (without a ramp and defensive weapons, but reversibly).

In fact, there was a competition with OKB-240, which was tasked by the same PSM to develop a modification of the Il-18 for theater operations, and OKB-156 A.N. Tupolev began developing the Tu-110 jet aircraft with four turbojet engines, which was also unified with the transport aircraft (including military ones) being created in parallel.

An-10 4NK-4 (aircraft “U”, “Ukraine” USSR-U1957), 1st experimental, long-haul passenger aircraft. Built at plant No. 473 in Kyiv.

The first flight took place on 03/07/1957 (it was performed by test pilots Ya.I. Vernikov from LII MAP and I.E. Davydov from GSKB-473). The bulk of the factory tests of the An-10 aircraft were carried out by GSOKB-473 pilots I.E. Davydov and V.A. Kalinin. During the inspection, modifications were made to the aircraft:

• - to improve the stability and dynamic characteristics of the aircraft when performing turns, the angle of the transverse V wing was changed (it was made variable, as on the “T” aircraft);
• - to improve directional stability, additional keel washers were installed on the stabilizer;
• - to improve directional stability, the fork area was increased.

The aircraft's survey was completed in June 1958.

Since the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation did not yet have sufficient material resources and personnel to conduct State tests of heavy aircraft, the GI of the An-10 aircraft was given to the State Red Banner Research Institute of the Air Force.

Test pilots Kuznetsov and Fedorov, test navigators Zhitnik, Zatsepa and Vasiliev were appointed to lead the An-10. The lead testing engineer was Sorokin. In addition, test pilots from the Air Force Research Institute Golenkin, Azbievich, Yakovlev, and Dedukh flew the aircraft.

The aircraft's technical inspection, in parallel with the testing of the 1st production aircraft, took place from January to June 1959 at a very fast pace, which did not allow us to identify a number of dangerous defects that appeared during operation and led to disasters of combat aircraft.

An-10 manager No. 7400101 (01-01) 2nd experimental one, also the first production one, long-haul passenger aircraft. The aircraft was built by plant No. 64, the first flight took place on November 5, 1957 (crew commander I.E. Davydov).

The aircraft was used for factory and State tests (in parallel with the 1st prototype).

In addition to the test crews, flight crews of the MGA also flew the aircraft (including the crew of A.N. Zakharevich, who later became the commander of the An-10 squadron in the Kiev squadron of Aeroflot).

An-10 aircraft in the basic version, serial production and changes by series

An-10 4AI-20, serial from mid. 01 (No. 7400101, USSR-L2573) to ser. 16 (machine No. 9401601), a long-haul passenger aircraft with a capacity of 85 passengers. The 1st cabin accommodates 25 passengers, the 2nd - 46 and the 3rd 14. The An-10 passenger aircraft can be rearranged into an economy class aircraft with accommodation for 100 passengers by reducing the seat pitch.

Compared to the experimental one, quick-release hatches were introduced in the floor of the cockpit for access to electronic equipment units (for aircraft No. 0402006).

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 7400101 to 9401101 (except for machines No. 8400402 and 8400503), long-haul passenger aircraft. They differ from the prototype in the reinforced bolts securing the glazing of the navigator's cabin. No. 1. Revision was carried out based on the results of repeated load tests.

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 7400101 to 9401503, long-haul passenger aircraft. They differ from the prototype by drainage valves of an improved design.

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 7400101 to 9401603, long-haul passenger aircraft. Difference: the frame of the front cargo compartment is covered with panels made of fiberglass KASTV L1.2.

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 8400801, long-haul passenger aircraft. Difference: the design of the hydraulic system has been changed, some of its units have been replaced with new ones.

An-10 4AI-20, mid. 10 from No. 9401001 to 9401003, long-haul passenger aircraft. Only 3 cars were built in this series with no differences in relation to the series. 08 and 09.

An-10 4AI-20, from mid. No. 9401101, long-haul passenger aircraft. Difference: in the landing gear retraction system, ringing of the GA-159/3 gearbox has been introduced, with the help of which pressure is removed from the landing gear retraction hydraulic system (right main and left emergency) to the brake drive. For this purpose, a check valve 674600/A was introduced. This eliminated cases of fluid clogging in the line from the gearbox to the brake cylinders.

An-10 4AI-20, from mid. No. 9401102, long-haul passenger aircraft. Difference: reinforcement of the F-2 compartment was introduced (8 half-frames were added, from No. 15a to 22a) to reduce vibration and noise in the passenger compartment.

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 9401201, long-haul passenger aircraft. Difference: during construction, thermal insulation was introduced on the previously unprotected surface of the skin at the top emergency hatch in the cockpit (condensation settled there). On earlier machines this modification was made during operation (see above).

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 9401401,mainline passenger aircraft. Difference: the hermetic bottom of frames No. 33 and 41 (front and rear partitions of the rear cargo compartment) is protected from damage by loads by a wall made of BS-1L5 plywood, which is stronger than the previously used KASTVl1 panel. On previously produced aircraft from ser. No. 7400101 to 9401303 (i.e. there were 3 cars in the 13th series) such modification was carried out during operation.

An-10 4AI-20, serial from mid. No. 9401501, long-haul passenger aircraft. Differences:

• - to eliminate cases of failure of the launch vehicle and the launcher from the parking stop at high wind forces, the design of the crackers on the launcher and on the locking rocker of the launcher on the shp has been changed. No. 63;
• - the LV deflection limiter was changed, which eliminated the possibility of a hard impact of the steering wheel on the limiter in an unlocked position;
• - CIATIM-201 is used to lubricate the U5618-0 hydraulic drive instead of AMG-10, since cases of AMG leakage have been observed. If a leak appeared (more than 3 drops on each side of the shaft during 5 flap operation cycles) on previously produced aircraft, the operating organization had to replace the AMG with CIATIM.

An-10 4AI-20, serial from mid. No. 9401502, long-haul passenger aircraft. Difference: in the flap release system, the P5635-0 shut-off valves are replaced by GA-142/1 solenoid valves.

An-10 aircraft in the basic version - modifications during operation for individual series

An-10 4AI-20 combatant (No. 7400101 to 9401101), long-haul passenger aircraft.

During operation on aircraft from the manufacturer. No. the beams of the front landing gear niche were reinforced. The hydraulic system pipes for the emergency engine shutdown (in the cockpit) are made of 20A steel (on the experimental one they were made of AMgM alloy).

An-10 4AI-20, from mid. No. 8400401 to 9401103 and No. 9401202 drill, long-haul passenger aircraft. During their operation, thermal insulation was introduced on the previously unprotected surface of the skin at the top emergency hatch in the cockpit (condensation settled there).

An-10 4AI-20, from No. 7400101 to 9401003 drill, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision: in the landing gear retraction system, ringing of the GA-159/3 gearbox has been introduced, with the help of which pressure is removed from the landing gear retraction hydraulic system (right main and left emergency) to the brake drive. For this purpose, a check valve 674600/A was introduced. This eliminated cases of fluid clogging in the line from the gearbox to the brake cylinders.

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. No. 7400101 to 9401303 (i.e. in the 13th series there were 3 vehicles) combat,long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the modification: the hermetic bottom of frames No. 33 and 41 (front and rear partitions of the rear cargo compartment) is protected from damage by loads by a wall made of BS-1L5 plywood, which is stronger than the previously used KASTVl1 panel.

An-10, improvements in operation of the entire fleet of basic version vehicles

An-10 with modified POS drill,long-haul passenger aircraft. The modification was carried out following the results of the investigation of the An-10 accidents on April 29, 1958 and November 16, 1959, when the aircraft’s tendency to “pitch” (i.e., a sharp spontaneous decrease in the angle of attack) in flight with flaps set to full landing was revealed. angle in icing conditions. The reason for the modification was the ineffectiveness of the cyclic POS and the formation of an “ice saddle” on the leading edges of the GO. The work was carried out at the LII with the participation of GSOKB-473 and the State Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation, but the bulk of the tests were carried out by the MGA combat crew under the command of N.E. Karlash on the An-10 USSR-11133 plane.

• - a new continuous-action POS GO (“with a thermal knife”) was installed;
• - the size and angle of flap deflection have been reduced;
• - the Flight Manual contains warnings about the dangers of such a regime and recommendations for its prevention are given.

The system was introduced on An-10 aircraft for the first time in the USSR, and then it appeared on other aircraft.

An-10 with modified VO

An-10, combatants,long-haul passenger aircraft. During operation, the material of the cargo door support pipe “Tr. 30x28" was replaced by "Tr. 30x26" (wall thickness increased by 1 mm), because the old pipe gradually acquired an elliptical cross-section and there was a danger of the door falling off.

An-10 combatants,long-haul passenger aircraft. During operation of machine No. 07381, drainage holes were introduced into the drum rim of the chassis wheels to prevent water and snow from entering the brakes, and a protective shield was installed to prevent dirt from entering.

An-10 combatants

An-10 combatants

An-10KP aircraft

An-10KP combatant, air command post. One An-10 aircraft was transferred from the MGA to the USSR Ministry of Defense and re-equipped in 1970 by order of the Airborne Forces, but was later transferred to the command of the Trans-Baikal Military District.

The aircraft retained its three-keel airframe until the end of its operation.

An-10A aircraft, serial production and changes by series

An-10A 4AI-20, serial from mid. No. 9401602, a long-haul passenger aircraft with a capacity of 100 passengers.

The main differences from the basic version of the aircraft “without a letter”:

• - in the 1st cabin there are 26 passengers, in 2 isolated 5-seater compartments - 10 passengers, in the middle tourist class cabin - 42 passengers, in the 3rd cabin - 16 passengers and in the rear compartment - 6 passengers;
• - due to changes in the layout of the cabins, the number of windows in the fuselage was increased from 29 to 33;
• - to increase the useful volume of the fuselage, the rear hermetic partition was moved 2 m back - from the 56th frame to the 60th;
• - the sealed units for the output of the wiring rods of the control system of the RV and LV and their trimmers were moved accordingly;
• - it became possible to reconfigure the An-10A passenger aircraft into an economy class aircraft with accommodation for 132 passengers by reducing the seat pitch;
• - on aircraft No. 9401602 to 042106 (except for aircraft No. 9401903 to 9402001) on the floor of the passenger cabin between the sp. No. 44 and 50 additional mooring earrings and sockets are installed;
• - on An-10A aircraft from mid. 16 under the floor of compartment F-3 between shp. No. 41 and 43, No. 43 and 45, No. 45 and 47 there are 3 trunk compartments, separated from each other by low areas. No. 43 and 45;
• - the F-4 compartment was shifted - it was between the sp. 59 and 65, and from mid. 16 became between sp. 60 and 65;
• - due to the increase in passenger capacity of the aircraft, another tail bathroom was added;
• - the GRP-2 antenna was moved to the front window of the navigator's cabin. Because of this, when flying with a reverse course over the timing glide path beacon, a short-term loss of the timing signal may occur, which cannot be a sign of a system malfunction; however, during operation it was necessary to introduce a second timing antenna.

An-10A 4AI-20 from mid. No. 9401603 In order to increase the gap between the steering cylinder fitting and the small flap of the nose landing gear, a cutout for the fitting was introduced in this flap.

An-10A 4AI-20 from mid. No. 9401604, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision:

• - the frame of the front and rear cargo compartments is covered with D16ATl1.2 sheets (including the floor);
• - on aircraft No. 9401604 (only on it?) safety valve U5611-0 of the hydraulic system (right and left), which serves to maintain the required pressure from the battery at the automatic unloader when the pumps are idling, as well as to shut off the line when the pressure drops below 120 kg/sq.cm (which prevents its complete discharge if the line is damaged) has been abolished.

An-10A 4AI-20 from mid. No. 9401701, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision:

• - for access to hydraulic units located behind the rear center section spar, quick-release hatches have been introduced;
• - a safety valve for the hydraulic system (right and left) has been reintroduced, serving to maintain the required pressure from the battery at the unloading machine when the pumps are idling, as well as to shut off the line when the pressure drops below 120 kg/sq.cm;
• - instead of the U5611-0 valve, U5631-0 is installed (it has a modified design, its body is made of steel, and has a slightly increased opening pressure).

An-10A 4AI-20 ser. 20 from No. 0402001 to 0402006, long-haul passenger aircraft. There are 6 aircraft made in this series, which are no different in design from the previous series.

An-10A 4AI-20 from mid. No. 0402101, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision:

• - the design of the hydraulic system was changed, some of its units were replaced with new ones;
• - the system for retracting and releasing the landing gear and opening the flaps of their niches has been changed - the combined hydraulic lock designed to connect the emergency hydraulic line (from a hand pump) with the emergency valve in the drain lines of the cylinders for opening the flaps of the front landing gear niche has been removed; Instead, P5635-0 shut-off valves of a simplified design are installed.

An-10A 4AI-20 from mid. No. 0402201, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision:

• - the circuit of the automatic wheel brakes of the main landing gear has been changed;
• - an electromanometer is installed to monitor the pressure of the hydraulic mixture in the braking system;
• - starting from this machine, the MRP-56P marker receiver is switched on simultaneously with the GRP-2 glide path device (both are included in the blind landing system).

An-10A 4AI-20 from mid. No. 9402104, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of modification: equipped with intercom SPU-7 instead of SPU-6 (with an increased number of subscriber units).

An-10 4AI-20 from mid. 23, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision: the switching circuit for the MRP-56P receiver has been changed. Now it is turned on simultaneously with one of the automatic radio compasses ARC (and the GRP-2 device?, included in the blind landing system).

An-10A aircraft – modifications during operation for individual series

An-10A 4AI-20 mid. No. 9401602, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the modification: in order to increase the gap between the steering cylinder fitting and the small flap of the nose landing gear, a cutout for the fitting was introduced in this flap. The modification was carried out in the process of repairs and improvements by replacing the sashes with new ones.

An-10A 4AI-20 mid. No. 9401603, long-haul passenger aircraft. Contents of the revision: sewing up the frame of the front and rear cargo compartments as the fiberglass flooring wears out, it is replaced with sheets D16ATl1,2.

An-10A, improvements in operation of the entire fleet of basic version vehicles

An-10A with modified VO,long-haul passenger aircraft. The modification was carried out to improve the directional stability of the aircraft and its dynamic characteristics when performing turns.

• - the keel washers at the ends of the stabilizer have been removed;
• - fairing tips are installed in their place;
• - a single ventral fin according to the aircraft’s PSS has been removed, its installation location has been sealed with tape;
• - a double ventral A-shaped fin of increased area with stepped consoles installed at an angle of 35° to the PSS is installed;

The entire fleet of An10 and An-10A aircraft has been modified according to the developer's bulletin.

An-10A combatants,long-haul passenger aircraft. During operation, some of the vehicles received strengthening of the wing center section. The modification was carried out according to the bulletin as affecting flight safety and had to be done across the entire fleet. However, it was done only on some of the cars. As a result, due to fatigue failure of the wing, at least one An-10 and one An-10A crash occurred (the center wings on both machines were not reinforced).

An-10A combatants,long-haul passenger aircraft. During operation, some of the vehicles received K3-63 flight parameter recorders. The modification was carried out according to the bulletin as affecting flight safety and had to be done across the entire fleet. However, it was done only on some of the cars. As a result, the operator was not able to take into account the actual overloads acting on the aircraft and had no information about its condition. This led to a number of accidents and disasters.

unrealized modifications of An-10

An-10AS, a cargo version designed to transport 16,300 kg of cargo, incl. animals. Loading was done through the side doors, but the partitions in the cabin were removed. It was supposed to convert serial passenger aircraft.

An-10B, an economy class passenger aircraft with 132 seats. It had a modified tail (instead of washers, 2 ridges were installed under the fuselage with a total area of ​​9.06 m2). The project was created in 1962, but was not built.

An-16, modification of the An-10 to transport 130 passengers, cargo and baggage weighing up to 14,000 kg. An insert into the fuselage with a length of 3 m is provided. The project was completed in 1957, but was not implemented, because An-10A went instead.

List of sources used

In preparing the book, materials were used from the funds of the Central State Archive of the highest bodies of power and administration of Ukraine, Kiev, as well as the Archive of the Kharkov State Enterprise "Kharkiv International Airport", promotional materials of MGA, GSKB-473/KMZ (ANTK named after Antonov) and VO “Aviaexport” from the 50s to the 70s. as well as printed publications:

1. Arsenyev E.V., Berne L.P., Boev D.A. and others. History of aircraft designs in the USSR. 1951-1965 M., “Mechanical Engineering”, - 2000.
2. Memoirs of veterans of the Boryspil United Air Squadron. Collection. Kyiv, Publishing house of the European University of Finance, Information Systems, Management and Business. - 2000
3. Everything starts from the ground. Ed. // “Civil Aviation”, No. 6, - 1967
4. Gagin V. Aircraft of the Voronezh Aviation Plant. Voronezh, JSC "Poligraf", - 1995
5. Davydova M. On the runway. // “NG-Political Economy”, No. 20, -1998
6. Additions and changes to the instructions for the crew of the An-12 aircraft (An-12A, An-12B) developed by the Air Force (published by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in 1965) when used in civil aviation units. M., GosNIIGA, Department of Scientific and Technical and Economic Information, -1966
7. Zakharchenko V.D. Antonov. M., ZhZL, “Young Guard”, - 1996
8. Instructions for the crew of the An-12 aircraft (An-12A, An-12B). Ed. S.I. Lazarevich M., Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, -1965
9. Flight research and testing. Fragments of history and current state. K. Vasilchenko et al. (ed.) M. mechanical engineering, - 1993
10. Losinsky Yu. In the zone of oblivion. // “Civil Aviation”, No. 7,8, - 1991
11. Lyakhovetsky M.B., Puzynin R.G. Wings of the Republic. Kyiv, “Technology”, - 1973
12. Mazuruk I.P., Lebedev A.A. Aeroflot test pilots. M., Mechanical Engineering, - 1991
13. Above the Yenisei meridian. Comp. Sorokin P.P. Ed. Krasnoyarsk Civil Aviation Administration, Krasnoyarsk, - 1989
14. OK. Antonov. Gliders. Aircraft. Ed. B.E. Patona, P.V. Balabueva and Yu.A. Mitropolsky. Kyiv, “Naukova Dumka”, - 1990.
15. Basic provisions of the draft Program for the Development of Civil Aviation Equipment. // Express information, series "Aviainform", M., -1992.
16. Working in modern conditions. Aviation and Time. // No. 1, 2001
17. Radchenko I.V., Nazarenko P.V. and others. Turboprop aircraft An-10, An-10A. M., Aeroflot Editorial and Publishing Department, -1963
18. Manual for flight operation and piloting of An-10 and An-10A aircraft with four AI-20A and AI-20K engines. M., Editorial publishing house. Aeroflot department, -1965
19. Manual for flight operation and piloting of An-12, An-12A, An-12B and An-12BP aircraft with four AI-20 engines (AI-20K, AI-20M). M., Aeroflot edition, - 1972.
20. Savelyev V. Turboprop aircraft “Ukraine”. // “Wings of Ukraine”, No. 19 (2092), - 1957
21. An-10A aircraft. Technical description, book. 1 (compiled by V.G. Efremov and others) M., State Scientific and Technical Publishing House Oborongiz, -1962
22. An-12 plane. Operating experience, equipment reliability, flight safety. Issue No. 1. M., Ministry of Civil Aviation, Aviation Engineering Service, - 1971.
23. Collection of materials from the school of excellence in operating the AN-10 aircraft. Comp. and ed. Faingolts G.B., Lukomsky V.P. Technical department of LERM of Kharkov OJSC UTU GVF, Kharkov, - 1963.
24. Collection of the main governing orders of the State Civil Air Fleet, book one. M., editorial and publishing department of Aeroflot, - 1963.
25. Sovenko A.Yu., Zayarin V.M. An-12: portrait in adulthood. // “Aviation and Time”, No. 1, - 1995
26. Technological instructions for performing routine maintenance on An-10 and An-12 aircraft. Special issue ed. MGA, M., - 1969
27. Trunov O.K. "Icebreaker" by Antonov. // “Civil Aviation”, No. 4, - 1991
28. Trunov O.K. One, but fiery passion. // “Civil Aviation”, No. 5, - 1991
29. Chronicle of Aeroflot (1962 – 1963). M. Redizdat Aeroflot, - 1965
30. Shevelko P.S. Fatigue of metals in aircraft structures. Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, M., - 1967.
31. Shcherbakov A.A. Pilots. Aircraft. Tests M.: Aviko Press, -1998
32. Yakubovich N. Winged “Ukraine”. // “Wings of the Motherland”, No. 10, - 1996

1. Airbase=KroN=.ru
2. http://foxbatavia.narod.ru
3. Aviation-safety.net

Found a typo? Select a fragment and press Ctrl+Enter.

Sp-force-hide ( display: none;).sp-form ( display: block; background: #ffffff; padding: 15px; width: 960px; max-width: 100%; border-radius: 5px; -moz-border -radius: 5px; -webkit-border-radius: 5px; border-color: #dddddd; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; font-family: Arial, "Helvetica Neue", sans-serif; background- repeat: no-repeat; background-position: center; background-size: auto;).sp-form input ( display: inline-block; opacity: 1; visibility: visible;).sp-form .sp-form-fields -wrapper ( margin: 0 auto; width: 930px;).sp-form .sp-form-control ( background: #ffffff; border-color: #cccccc; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px; font- size: 15px; padding-left: 8.75px; padding-right: 8.75px; border-radius: 4px; -moz-border-radius: 4px; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; height: 35px; width: 100% ;).sp-form .sp-field label ( color: #444444; font-size: 13px; font-style: normal; font-weight: bold;).sp-form .sp-button ( border-radius: 4px ; -moz-border-radius: 4px; -webkit-border-radius: 4px; background-color: #0089bf; color: #ffffff; width: auto; font-weight: 700; font-style: normal; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;).sp-form .sp-button-container ( text-align: left;)

60 years ago (in 1957) the An-10 aircraft took off for the first time. Being the first-born among passenger cars of OKB O.K. Antonov, it became the first airliner with a theater engine in the USSR, the first among such machines to be put into mass production, the first to enter Aeroflot's lines, but also the first to be taken out of service. Among professional aviators, authors of specialized literature, and among the general public, this aircraft has a controversial reputation.

Despite the fact that the aircraft being created was a passenger aircraft, its aerodynamic design, fuselage cross-section, and main design parameters of the wing, tail and landing gear were determined primarily based on the military transport purpose of its twin, the An-12. And although such a methodology does not bode well for a passenger aircraft as such, in the case of the An-10/12 it can be considered justified. Indeed, during the then development of the airfield network in the USSR, both passenger and transport options had to be operated from equally short, relatively poorly prepared, and often completely unpaved runways. For such operating conditions, many features of the An-10 were almost ideal. First of all, this concerns the location of the wing on the top of the fuselage. “Since Professor Juncker created the F13 (in 1919 - Author’s note),” Antonov wrote in the journal “Civil Aviation,” No. 5, 1958, “the low-wing design has dominated the construction of passenger aircraft. Why did we move away from the established “tradition” and choose a different design for our aircraft?” On a low-wing aircraft, Antonov reasoned, probably meaning the Il-18, the engine nacelles have to be placed above the wing, but on a high-wing aircraft they can be placed under it. This made it possible to increase the overall aerodynamic quality of the aircraft and, with equal flight masses, reduce fuel consumption. In addition, the high location of the engines made it possible to remove the air intakes and propeller blades at a considerable distance from the ground, due to which the likelihood of damage to them by soil particles and foreign objects was sharply reduced. Accordingly, the durability and reliability of the power plant, as well as the safety of flights from poor airfields, have increased.

The poorly equipped airports of regional centers were distinguished by another feature: passengers there often walked along the apron to the plane, forming a poorly controlled group. But even the most undisciplined of them were not in danger of falling under the rotating propellers of the An-10, because... the tips of the blades were at a height of 1.9-2.1 m from the concrete. And various vehicles could freely pass under the wing, which made it possible to park the aircraft more densely.

The fuselage, which had a huge cross-section at that time, determined by the conditions for transporting military equipment, allowed Antonov to provide unprecedented comfort to An-10 passengers. In the underground space of the fuselage it was possible to organize fairly large compartments for luggage and mail with a volume of about 20 m3. The loads there were secured with belts and nets to the walls of the compartments, and the loading hatches, made on the starboard side, were located at a small height from the ground. All this made it possible to simultaneously board passengers and load luggage without the use of additional devices.

The large diameter of the fuselage made it possible to easily solve such a specific problem of a high-wing aircraft as providing the necessary track for the landing gear, the main supports of which had to be retracted into the underground space. The fuselage of the An-10 itself resolved this issue, and the relative track width (the ratio of its width to the wing span) of the aircraft turned out to be greater than that of many similar machines (for example, for the An-10 this figure is 0.142, and for the Chase C -123 - 0.106, Lockheed C-130 - 0.108). In addition, for a given volume, a short fuselage has the smallest surface area and therefore has minimal frictional resistance. At the same time, the relative length of the laminar section of the flow is greater.

Of course, a fuselage of such a large volume had its drawbacks, the main one of which was the difficulty of ensuring its tightness. Here the main problem was created by numerous cutouts for entrance doors and various hatches. And to ensure normal conditions for passengers flying at an altitude of 7-8 thousand m, the pressure drop should have been at least 0.5 kgf/cm2. The problem was aggravated by the fact that this difference had to change with high cyclicity, due to the relatively short routes for which the An-10 was intended. This created the danger of rapid fatigue of the fuselage structure and, accordingly, a decrease in its strength.

The construction of the first copies of the An-10 was carried out at its own base GSOKB-473. By that time, the pilot production (headed by M.S. Rozhkov) already had the ability to assemble two An-10 type aircraft at once. On December 4, 1956, the airframe of one aircraft was transferred for statistical testing, which ended on May 24, 1957. In February of the same year, it was commissioned first flight prototype. Thus, from the start of design to the rollout of this machine, only 1 year and 4 months passed.
On March 7, 1957, the crew consisting of commander Ya.I. Bernikov, co-pilot V.A. Shevchenko, navigator P.V. Koshkina, flight mechanic A.V. Kalinichina, flight electrician I.D. Yevtushenko and leading testing engineer A.P. Eskin was first flown into the air by an experienced An-10 (USSR-U1957 aircraft) from the airfield of the Kyiv Aviation Plant in Svyatoshino. The plane landed at a military airfield in Boryspil. The experienced An-10 received its own name “Ukraine”. Its passenger cabins were decorated with views of Ukrainian cities: Kyiv, Zaporozhye, Kharkov, Poltava, Kakhovka.

The first flights of the An-10 showed that the aircraft had insufficient directional stability. Aerodynamicists warned about this problem even at the calculation stage and proposed increasing the area of ​​the vertical tail. However, the head of the aerodynamics team, Domenikovsky, who was distinguished by his gentle character, was unable to defend these views in the face of the pressure of the strength experts, who had their own arguments. And Antonov was also influenced by their opinion: “These aerodynamicists are always playing it safe.” Now the plane had to be “treated” by significantly increasing the fork and installing vertical washers at the ends of the stabilizer. Subsequently, the area of ​​the washers was slightly reduced, and the keel itself was increased, and in this configuration the aircraft went into mass production.

The NK-4 engines caused a lot of headaches for the creators of the An-10. Despite their advanced design, they required numerous modifications, for which flights often had to be stopped. Factory tests were delayed. Against this background, Ivchenko’s engine proved to be more reliable; moreover, it was supported by the government of the Ukrainian SSR, which was interested in the development of high-tech enterprises in the republic. Antonov had to make a final choice, but he continued to hesitate. And then one day an unusual telegram came from Zaporozhye from Ivchenko, who was tired of waiting: “The docks have sunk, the dew has cleared.” This laconic message was the straw that tipped the scales in favor of AI-20.
Such engines were installed on the first production An-10 (serial No. 01-01, board USSR-L5723). On November 5, 1957, from the Pridacha airfield of the Voronezh aircraft plant, this aircraft was lifted into the air by a crew that included representatives of the Antonov Design Bureau: commander I.E. Davydov, flight engineer E.M. Dumnov and leading test engineer V.S. Popov, as well as factory specialists: co-pilot B.V. Sharlikov, navigator T.F. Bevz, flight radio operator A.M. Brazhnikov. Factory tests lasted until October 24, 1958, with the aircraft remaining on the ground for 203 calendar days during various modifications. In total, 54 flights were carried out during the year with a total duration of 83 hours 11 minutes. In addition to I.E. Davydov and B.V. Sharlikov, during these tests the plane was piloted by Ya.I. Vernikov, as well as factory pilots A.V. Larionov and A.I. Shovkunenko.

The basic version of the An-10 provided for the transportation of 85 passengers. To improve the efficiency of the airliner, its first modification, the An-10A, was developed, designed for 100 passengers. The external geometry of the aircraft remained unchanged, and the increase in the number of seats was achieved through internal rearrangement. At the same time, the rear pressurized partition was moved 2 m back, 26 seats were placed in the front cabin, on average - 42, in the rear - 16, in two compartments in the center section - 5 each and in the rear compartment - 6. The rear compartment was distinguished by the greatest comfort, where We installed 2 sofas that could be turned into sleeping places. Between the front and middle salons, just in the area of ​​the propellers, there was a luggage compartment. At the same time, a number of changes were made to the design of many units and systems of the An-10A, adopted based on the results of various tests.

Source:

On July 21, 1959, An-10 from the 86th detachment (Makarov’s crew) made the first regular flight with passengers on the Kyiv-Moscow route. The next day it took off from Moscow and landed in Simferopol 2 hours and 15 minutes later, carrying 75 passengers. Antonov airliners began to arrive at the 87th JSC (Kharkov), 88th (Lvov) and 89th (Stalino). On September 10, the An-10 began carrying passengers on the route Kharkov-Mos-Kva-Stalino-Moscow-Kharkov, and soon the plane entered other air routes served by Ukrainian aviators.
On November 16, 1959, ship commander N.A. Spirenkov performed a landing approach on the An-10 USSR-11167 at Lviv airport in difficult weather conditions (icing, clouds). On the straight line, at the moment of entering the descent glide path, he was unable to resist the unexpectedly strong desire of the aircraft for an instantaneous deep drawdown, which led to disaster.
Soon, on February 26, 1960, in the same Lvov, P.G. Makarov, on the An-10A plane USSR-11180, of the Kyiv aviation squadron of Aeroflot, crashed due to icing in the clouds. Pyotr Gerasimovich Makarov was once entrusted with the first passenger flight on the An-10 on July 21, 1959 and a report to the First Secretary of the Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev about the new plane.
The details of the incident were similar to the previous disaster. An-10 flights were suspended.

There was an assumption about icing, and to check the behavior of the aircraft in such conditions, the State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, LII MAP and GSOKB-473 were instructed to conduct special flight studies. What happens to an airplane on the glide path in icing conditions? Under normal conditions, a car descending in a straight line at a constant speed is in a balanced state. The extension of the flaps leads to an increase in lift, but also an increase in the slope of the flow behind the wing. As a result, the angle of attack of the horizontal tail is approaching a critical point. The reserve of this value is usually very small and amounts to only 3-50. And the distortion of the stabilizer profile by adhered ice leads to the fact that the value of the critical angle of attack of the tail is reduced by 4-60. When the angle of attack of the horizontal tail exceeds a critical value, stall occurs and the aircraft vigorously tilts its nose, leaving the equilibrium state. As noted in official documents, the safety of piloting the An-10 when descending with flaps already at an angle of 35-250 in icing conditions is not ensured (and during landing at that time the flaps were extended at 450). Behind this dry phrase lies a terrible meaning: the lives of passengers and crew are under threat. Managers of various ranks highly appreciated the work done. In the order of the head of the CAA in May 1960, it was noted that “the crew of the Kiev, 86th flight detachment, consisting of ship commander N. E. Karlash, co-pilot O. V. Dmitrenko, navigator V. S. Gulov, flight mechanic N. A Afanasyev ., flight radio operator P.P. Chernysh, despite great organizational difficulties and unfavorable meteorological conditions, which forced most of the work to be carried out beyond the Arctic Circle, the tests were carried out with high quality and in a short time.

Since July 1960, An-10 aircraft have returned to service. Before this, in June, in order to raise the shaky prestige of the machine, OKB test pilot Yu.V. Kurlin performed two unique flights on one running engine (internal and external). The flight with an external running engine, the most difficult in terms of piloting technique, lasted 45 minutes. No one in the world had ever done something like this on a four-engine aircraft; however, there was some doubt about this: could an ordinary crew on a fully loaded aircraft be able to do something similar?
In 1962, Aeroflot operated 75 An-10s, which were distributed among the following departments: Ukrainian - 30 copies. (Kiev - 11, Kharkov - 7, Lvov - 6, Donetsk - 6), Belorusskoe - 6 (Minsk), Moldavskoe - 5 (Chisinau), Privolzhskoe - 8 (Kuibyshev), North Caucasian -10 (Rostov-on-Don ), Komi - 5 (Syktyvkar), East Siberian - 6 (Irkutsk - 3, Khabarovsk - 3) and Ulyanovsk ShVLP - 5. The next year, the number of "dozens" in the Civil Air Fleet reached its maximum - 80 vehicles. By the beginning of 1964, they had already transported 4 million 664.8 thousand passengers and 222.2 thousand tons of cargo. An-10 began to fly on a variety of routes, for example, Irkutsk-Yakut, Khabarovsk-Magadan, Bratsk-Irkutsk-Krasnoyarsk, Kuibyshev-Moscow, Kuibyshev-Ashgabat, Rostov-on-Don-Leningrad, Krasnodar-Moscow. In general, by 1967, the An-10 received registration on almost a hundred lines, 32 of which connected 26 administrative and industrial centers of the country with Moscow. According to the MGA, the Antonov airliner was the most profitable aircraft. From the start of operation of the An-10 until the end of the 1960s. Aeroflot received over 450 million rubles. net profit.
Aeroflot employees affectionately called Antonov’s car “Big Anna.” The plane could land on a more or less suitable field and accept passengers. There were cases when tickets were sold directly in its cabin, and the An-10 took off immediately when it was filled with passengers. By the way, the price of an air ticket was equal to the price of a railway ticket in a compartment carriage. For example, to travel in a compartment of the branded Kharkov-Moscow train, you had to pay 13 rubles. 60 kopecks, and for a flight on the An-10 - 14 rubles.

By the beginning of 1972, the An-10 had already transported over 38.7 million passengers and 1.25 million tons of cargo. Most of the car’s “childhood illnesses” were left behind, and its future fate seemed cloudless. However, on May 18, 1972, an event occurred that put an end to the An-10’s career. On the morning of that day, 12 km from the Kharkov Osnova airport, already on the landing course, an An-10A (serial number 25-02, board USSR-11215), flying from Moscow, crashed in the air. The left and right wings of the aircraft suddenly rose up, closed over the fuselage, and then fell off completely. The fuselage also began to fall apart into pieces, from which the unfortunate victims of the incident fell out. Everyone on board died: both passengers and the best crew of the 87th air squadron, led by V.A. Vasiltsov, a total of 122 people. Among them are the special correspondent of Komsomolskaya Pravda N. Alexandrova, the popular parodist V. Chistyakov, foreigners, children...

In addition to An - 8, in the OKB of O.K. Antonov in 1955-195 7. two turboprop aircraft were created: the passenger An-10 and the cargo An-12 with maximum unification.

The An-10 was the first domestic wide-body passenger aircraft with turboprop engines to transport 84 passengers on medium-haul airlines, and the An-12 was the first cargo turboprop four-engine aircraft with a payload capacity of 20 tons.

Initially, the An-10 passenger aircraft was equipped with four NK-4 turboprop engines designed by N.D. Kuznetsova. The first flight of the An-10 took place on March 7, 1957, it was performed by test pilots Ya.I. Vernikov, I.E. Davydov and navigator P.V. Koshkin. The first prototype of the An-10 aircraft was called “Ukraine”, and it was built at an aircraft plant in Kyiv. The An-10 factory testing program was completed by test pilots I.E. Davydov and V.A. Kalinin.

The An-10 "Ukraine" aircraft is an all-metal monoplane with a high wing with an area of ​​121.73 m2.

The plane has 84 soft, comfortable seats with reclining backs. A light table is inserted into the arm of the chair, on which you can put a book or magazine or place a tray with food, since all passengers will receive hot meals along the way. The plane has two wardrobes, toilets, and a buffet kitchen. In the lower part of the fuselage, under the floor, there are two pressurized cargo spaces that accommodate 4,000 kg of cargo and 350 kg of passenger luggage.

Seats for passengers are located in three separate comfortable salons, illuminated by two rows of lampshades.

The fuselage of the An-10 aircraft is located very low above the ground. The wings with engines are raised very high, so that a gaping passenger can even pass under the rotating propellers without any harm to himself. Cars and fuel tankers pass freely under the propellers.

The pressurized cabin is heated and air-conditioned, with little engine noise audible, so you can talk without raising your voice. The spacious and comfortable pilot's cabin and the well-glazed navigator's workplace reduced crew fatigue and had a positive effect on flight safety.

The crew consisted of five people: two pilots, a flight mechanic, a navigator and a radio operator.

The An-10 aircraft is designed to land at small, ubiquitous airfields and does not require long concrete strips for takeoff and landing.

The second experimental and at the same time the first production An-10 with the AI-20 theater was first flown into the air by OKB test pilot I.E. Davydov November 5, 1957 in Voronezh. Factory tests took place until June 1958. The An-10 was produced serially until December 1959.

In 1958, at the World Aviation Exhibition in Brussels, the An-10 was awarded a large Gold Medal and Diploma.

Since 1959, a modified An-1 OA aircraft with a fuselage extended by 2 meters for 100 passengers with an AI-20A theater engine with a power of 4000 hp entered serial production, and then Aeroflot. and AB-68I propellers.

The An-10A aircraft made its first technical flight on April 27, 1959. On June 22, 1959, a car with passengers went on its first flight on the route Moscow - Simferopol. In December 1959, the An-10A flew to the USA.

The first to master the An-YA aircraft were pilots of the Ukrainian Civil Aviation Administration E.V. Balashov, I.I. Boguslavsky, M.I. Dubovik.

The An-YuA was equipped with radio navigation and radar equipment that was advanced at that time, and modern flight instruments. Pressurized cabins and air conditioning units made it possible to fly at high altitudes and provide convenience and comfort for the crew. The An-YuA aircraft can continue to fly if one, two or even three engines fail. The ability to take off from unpaved platforms, ease of maintenance and good efficiency helped the An-YuA to securely gain a foothold in several republican and regional Aeroflot departments at once.

In addition to the An-10, An-YuA, other modifications were developed. An-YUB, built in 1962 in a single copy, was distinguished by the latest radio equipment and a cabin layout that could accommodate 132 passengers. The An-YuV, with a fuselage extended by 6 meters and a capacity of up to 174 passengers, did not go into mass production. The remaining project on paper is the An-1 OD with a capacity of up to 124 passengers and a flight range of up to 4,400 km. Back in 1957, the An-16 was being developed - a modification of the An-10 for transporting 130 passengers with luggage, mail and cargo with a total weight of up to 14,000 kg over a distance of 2,000 km. The increase in seats was achieved through a 3 m cylindrical insert into the fuselage of the base aircraft. This project was not implemented.

During the years of serial production (1957-1960), 108 An-10 and An-YA aircraft were built at the Voronezh Aviation Plant.

Since 1958, all An-10s were equipped with AI-20 engines. In the same year, the plant produced 16, in 1959 - 39 and in 1960 - 46 aircraft. By the end of 1963, Aeroflot was operating 81 An-10s.

By 1971, the “tens” carried 35 million passengers and a million tons of cargo. The An-10 took first place in Aeroflot in terms of passenger turnover.

The “airbus plane,” or, as the An-10 was also called, the “dolphin plane,” confidently conquered the “fifth ocean” and was preparing for new achievements.

In May 1972, a plane crash occurred near Kharkov, killing 116 people. The disaster near Kharkov forever crossed out the fate of the An-10. By voluntary decision, all An-10 aircraft are removed from Aeroflot lines. Since 1973, not a single An-10 aircraft with passengers has taken to the skies.

The An-10 is the first passenger aircraft with a turboprop engine in the Soviet Union to begin flight tests. It was the first to go into production, the first to reach airlines, and the first to be withdrawn from service.

BASIC DATA AH-10A

Take-off weight, kg 54,000

Curb weight of the aircraft, kg 35,600

Commercial load weight, kg 14,500

Number of passenger seats, people. 100

Number of crew members, people. 5

Flight range, km 1800-3000

Practical ceiling, m 10 200

Cruising speed, km/h 600-650

Landing speed, km/h 190-200

Fuel capacity, kg 11,260

Required runway length, m 1800

Mileage, m 700-800

Run, m - 500-650

Aircraft length, m 34.00

Wingspan, m 38.00

Wing area, m2 121.73

Aircraft height, m ​​9.83

Fuselage diameter, m 4.1

Almost simultaneously with the An-12 cargo aircraft, the development bureau, headed by O.K. Antonov, handed over for testing a new multi-seat passenger aircraft to serve medium-haul long-haul airlines. The first copy of the aircraft was named “Ukraine”. Its salons had 84 seats for passengers. In addition, the plane could take up to 3.5 tons of cargo. At the beginning of 1957, pilots Y. Vernikov and V. Vasin made their first flight on it.

Further comprehensive tests confirmed that the new machine is reliable and very economical; its operation is possible at airfields that do not have concrete runways.

The aircraft accepted for mass production was initially called . The operation of the machine on Aeroflot lines has shown that with minor changes its efficiency can be increased without compromising flight performance.

The designers lengthened the fuselage by 1.1 m and rearranged the arrangement of passenger seats in the cabins. This variant became known as the An-10A. He has already taken 100 or more passengers. The factories built a significant number of machines of this type, which for a long time were successfully operated on many airlines in the country. At the World Exhibition in Brussels in 1958, the An-10A aircraft was awarded a diploma and a Big Gold Medal.

Monoplane of all-metal construction. Four AI-20K turboprop engines with a power of 4 thousand e. hp installed in a relatively thin high wing with an area of ​​121.78 m2.

With a load of 15 tons, the An-10A develops a cruising speed of 630-650 km/h at an altitude of 8 thousand m. The aircraft's service ceiling is 10.2 km, landing speed is 190-200 km/h. The take-off length is 700-800 m, the run length is 600-650 m. The machine is capable of continuing to take off with three engines running, and horizontal flight with two. The empty weight of the aircraft is 32.5 tons, the maximum take-off weight is 54 tons.

The first copy of the aircraft. The An-10, named "Ukraine", was built by a design team headed by O.K. Antonov in March 1957.

In 1958, at the World Exhibition in Brussels, the An-10A received a diploma and a Big Gold Medal. In 1961, the An-10A set a speed record when flying along a closed route with a total length of 500 km - 730.616 km/h. The same aircraft in a cargo version with a modified fuselage (An-12) flew from Moscow through the tropics to Antarctica, where it was used for scientific research on the icy continent. The An-10A is an all-metal high-wing aircraft with a cantilever wing, conventional tail and retractable ten-wheel landing gear. The aircraft is equipped with four AI-20 turboprop engines with a power of 4000 hp each. With. at 12,300 rpm. The propellers are metal, four-bladed, with pitch adjustable in flight. The wing has a small reverse transverse angle V at the end sections. The trailing edge of the central part of the wing up to the ailerons is occupied by double-slotted flaps. On takeoff they deviate downwards by 25°, and on landing by 33°. Each aileron is divided into two parts along its span; the inner part has a trimmer.

The fuselage is equipped with small fairings on the sides below - “gills”, where the struts of the main landing gear, consisting of four two-wheeled bogies, are hidden during flight. The carts themselves are hidden in the fuselage. A headlight is located in the toe of the left fairing to illuminate the runway. The radar fairing is located at the bottom of the forward fuselage. There are antennas on top of the fuselage. The front landing gear, like the main landing gear, is retracted into the fuselage in flight and has a two-wheeled bogie. Thanks to the large number of wheels, low tire pressure and increased engine power, the aircraft can easily take off from unpaved airfields. The fuselage diameter is 4.1 m, while the internal volume of the passenger cabin is quite large. The height of the main passenger cabin is 2.5 m; films are shown here. The cabin has air conditioning, heating and automatically controlled boost.

Crew - 5 people. The cockpit contains modern instruments and radio equipment, allowing you to fly the aircraft in any weather. In the absence of visibility, the radar signals the crew about oncoming obstacles and thunderstorm fronts along the route. There is an anti-icing system. In the rear part of the fuselage, in front of the empennage, there is a tail heel retractable in flight in the form of a crutch with a shock-absorbing strut. The tail of the aircraft has rudders equipped with axial compensation and trim tabs, adjustable by the pilot in flight. The AN-10A aircraft can continue to fly if one, two or even three engines fail. The coloring of the An-10A is as follows: the upper half of the fuselage up to the glazing of the cockpit canopy, including the vertical tail and the central part of the wing, is painted white. The rudder trim and leading edge of the fin are painted silver. Along the length of the fuselage, at the location of the passenger compartment windows, there is a red zigzag line with a white border, tapering towards the tail.

The lower part of the fuselage under the red line, engine nacelles, wings and horizontal tail surfaces are painted silver. The engine nacelles have a red double border and triple longitudinal straight lines. Above the red line in the area of ​​the first portholes is written in red handwritten font: “An-10A”. Under the orange wing, in small print, “AEROFLOT” is written in black and the emblem is drawn in red. A waving red flag is painted on the fin and rudder. On the fuselage under the last three windows there is an inscription in black: “USSR-11185”, the same inscription on the wings, top and bottom.

The aircraft data is as follows: wingspan - 38 m; length - 34 m; height - 9.8 m; wing area - 121.73 m2; maximum take-off weight - 56 g; maximum speed 777 km/h; working altitude - 8000 m; operating flight speed - 640 km/h; range at a maximum load of 14.5 tons - 2200 km, take-off length - 750 m; run length - 600 m.